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Sociology o f Environmental Change

Land Tenure and Customary Rights: Implications to Forest Conservation and to the
Indigenous Community o f San Antonio (Cayo), Belize (154 pp.)
Director: Dr. Jill Belsky
This thesis focuses on the role o f land tenure in the conflict between national forest
resource conservation and agricultural expansion near the Masewal Maya community of
San Antonio (Cayo) in Belize. The work explores the indigenous customary agrarian
system used by the Masewal and details the gradual conversion o f communal lands to
state-owned lands under British colonial rule. In San Antonio, agricultural lands have
been distributed to villagers through a set of state leasehold arrangements while forest
reserve lands have been withheld as state property, allowing only minor resource
extraction rights to local villagers. Recent attempts by villagers to develop agricultural
clearings within the state forest reserves raise the question as to whether current land
tenure relationships near San Antonio adequately encourage agricultural intensification on
cleared farmland and whether they can continue to support the cultural autonomy o f the
Masewal people.
Using personal observations, ethnographic interviews and a social survey to document
how British colonial practices mimicked traditional Mayan land customs, this study
concludes that state leasehold arrangements under Belizean law have supported the
retention o f customary Masewal cultural traditions but have hindered agricultural
intensification and encouraged continued deforestation.
Movement away from shifting cultivation towards agricultural intensification may
require irrigation and tenure changes which will weaken the cultural practices o f the
Masewal in San Antonio by emphasizing increased national government participation in
local land management and the development o f a land market. Under current practices,
prospects for forest conservation are not good. Successful forest conservation will require
greater internal governmental cohesion and expanded coordination with the village.
Co-management o f natural resources and agroforestry are discussed as alternatives to
expensive irrigation systems as a potential means o f agricultural intensification.
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Preface
I first heard o f the conflict between property rights and environmental protection in
buffer zones near protected areas one evening in 1991 in Libby, Montana. I was arguing
before a hostile crowd o f 500 loggers and their families for support of an agreement that
had been reached between millworker representatives and environmentalists over
wilderness area protection in northwestern Montana. A logger rose following one of my
comments and told the crowd that wilderness protection was just the first step in a
preservation program. What the embattled community should expect next was "buffer
zone management" which would impose stringent environmental restrictions on adjacent
lands, undermining private property rights and local rights to access federal forested lands.
In the spring of 1993 I visited an old friend, Paula Palmer, a sociologist, author and
conservation activist in Costa Rica. She suggested I look into a course offered by the
United Nations University for Peace, located at Colon, Costa Rica, in Buffer Zone
Management. In June o f 1994, prior to making the study in Belize on which this thesis is
based, I enrolled in the course as the first non-aligned student (neither tied to a
government nor to an NGO) in the course's five year history. The course began with a
frank admission that forest degradation was an on-going historical fact in Central America
and then suggested that, by designating buffer zone areas o f varying intensities of human
)

activity around core habitat areas o f protected forests, policies for community

development programs could be designed that combine planned restoration activity with
community-driven and environmentally sensitive economic development. We visited sites
in Costa Rica where farmers and local groups had accepted the responsibility for
environmental protection through small business development using agroforestry,
intercropping, ecotourism, and forestry cooperatives.
From Costa Rica, I traveled overland to Guatemala where I observed several
examples o f agroforestry programs that had been initiated in the Peten region adjacent to
Belize in recent years. I then moved on to the Masewal Mayan village of San Antonio in
the Cayo District o f Belize to work with the Ministry of Economic Development in
researching and writing a community needs assessment for the village (Clark 1994). I
found the work through the efforts of two of my advisors who were working in the
University of Montana-University College o f Belize forestry and ecotourism exchange and
I worked in Belize under the able guidance of Dr. Marion Glaser.
My research was requested by the Social Planning Component o f the Forest Planning
and Management Project (FPMP) because satellite images and aerial photographs showed
agricultural incursions into the hardwood forests o f the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest
Reserve (MPRFR).1 In spite o f previous evictions by the Forest Department in 1984,
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1 This study resulted when modem satellite photography indicated the possible need to limit expansion by
the local indigenous population into a state forest reserve. An interesting contrary use of modem
satellite technology is presented by Fox (1994) who used a Ground Positioning System to map
customary lands of indigenous groups in Kalimantan, Indonesia, to protect customary lands from
incursions from timber companies with forest concession contracts.

1987, and 19912 (FPMP 1993), San Antonio residents were continuing to try to colonize
new land for agriculture within the forest reserve. This was the fifth such community
study by the Ministry o f Economic Development under the FPMP3 and, like the others, it
was aimed at seeking means to resolve local-state boundary disputes and to incorporate
village conceptions o f the community problems in development policies and programs. In
San Antonio the Forest Department was specifically interested in identifying and diffusing
social pressures that were pushing local cultivators into state-owned forest reserve lands.
I would like to thank the many Belizeans who helped me with my two month long
project work in San Antonio. Marion Glaser provided me with timely critiques of my
fieldwork and led me to many valuable documents and key pieces o f literature. Ricardo
Thompson o f Central Farm responded promptly to all inquiries and his information was of
great help in understanding how lease arrangements work in Belize.

Manuel Balona,

Eduvijes Tzib, and Remijio Tzib o f the Peanut and Grain Cooperative took the time to
explain how the cooperative worked in detail, let me sit in on their meetings, and took me
to see their cultivated lands. I deeply appreciated the insights o f all those San Antonio
residents that shared their ideas with me. I am particularly indebted to my good friend don
Felix Tzib and his family who provided lodging and indulged my presence while in th eir.
village. Thanks also to Abraham Balona whose assistance in my village survey was
v

2 See Appendix 2, Map 1.
3 Other communities include San Antonio (Toledo), St. Margarets, San Vincente, and communities in
the Columbia Forest Management Area.

instrumental in its success.
I would also like to thank my thesis committee for their assistance, guidance, and
perseverance in this project as well. Dr. Paul Miller showed me that humility and concern
for the impoverished need not be eliminated in the search for scientific truth. I thank Dr.
Steve Siebert for making the connections in Belize that led to my study there. His work in
non-timber forest products showed me that solutions to development problems may lie in
unchartered paths if we are only willing to look beyond current practices for those
solutions. Particularly, I wish to thank Dr. Jill Belsky for her inspiration and assistance in
pursuing a career in international development. She has opened my mind to a world of
current literature both domestically and internationally on the need to combine social
development work with environmental science. I could never repay her for her efforts in
helping me receive funding for my project and for my education.
I send my appreciation to the University of Montana for transportation assistance.
I extend my gratitude to Emily Parrot and Donetta Klein for their generosity and
support which made it possible for me to attend the University of Montana. Good friends,
after all, are required to make things possible. Finally, I wish to extend my heart-filled
thinks to my wife, Michele Nuss, who supported me during my months o f absence in
school and in Belize and with whom I have shared the trials and tribulations of a
"non-traditional" student trying to achieve a mid-life redirection o f his life's course. I am
grateful to you all.
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Land Tenure and Customary Rights: Implications to Forest Conservation
and the Indigenous Community of San Antonio (Cayo), Belize

by Charles Clark

Chapter 1 Introduction

The Historical Context
Deforestation and the shrinkage o f tropical forest habitat in Central America has led
to widespread fears that significant biodiversity losses may occur in coming years if the
process o f forest conversion to areas of concentrated human use is not arrested. Between
1974 and 1989, the forest cpverage per capita in Central America, including the country of
Belize, fell 48 percent (Aguirre 1993), highlighting both the area's nearly three percent per
year population growth and its increasing demand for forested land for commercial
products and for agricultural purposes. Six sources of deforestation have been identified
as contributing to the decline o f tropical forests in the region (de Camino V. 1993:8):

1) The demand for land for cattle pastures and subsistence farming and the migration of
farmers to forested areas because of loss of soil productivity;
2) The lack of sustained yield management of commercial forests;
3) The construction of logging roads into previously unroaded forest habitat;
4) Agricultural production for export markets which more than doubled the land under
cultivation between 1950 and 1970;
1

2
5) Firewood collection and loss of forested land to urbanization;
6) War, land reform, and international structural adjustment programs.

Central to the effort to conserve forested habitat are these two questions:

(1) can

deforestation be slowed by increasing the agricultural productivity o f small landholders
and (2) how can effective changes in production be encouraged by changes in social
institutions such as land tenure, community cooperatives, and joint local and national
participation in development programs?
In spite o f a growing acknowledgment on the part o f social agencies and NGOs that
local community and cultural concerns need to be integrated into development and forest
conservation programs along with national economic and environmental goals, few
examples o f successful local-national integration exist (Wells 1994). The need remains to
create social programs that incorporate the judgment of national administrators such as the
Belizean Forestry Department and the desires, both economic and cultural, of local
communities, particularly indigenous ones. The foundation for resolving natural resource
conflicts through a solid working relationship between a professional forestry staff and an
generally undereducated but self-reliant indigenous agricultural community lies in
understanding the roots o f the indigenous culture itself and the historical development of
its relationship to state authority. Land tenure provides an excellent means forjudging the
historical development o f a conflict because its modem form often represents a series of
compromises between indigenous customs and national authority and its current
functioning is deeply tied to other social institutions which reflect the diversity of national

3

socio-economic goals.

Land tenure institutions often provide a basis for community

bonds, establish lines o f interaction between small farmers and their government, and hold
material significance both to small farm and national productivity.
Lack o f long-term security o f land tenure is widely believed to be at the heart of the
forest conversion process.

This axiom applies to state forest managers investing in

inventories and planning mechanisms for sustainable harvest from state forest reserves, for
timber concessionaires required to reforest harvested land, for agricultural workers
investing in intensification technology, and for communities seeking ways to include
firewood supplies and open-space in future plans. Without an enforceable and stable land
ownership system, landowners and producers lack the security needed to undertake
investment in conservation measures when costs can be recouped only slowly through
time. Knowledge of, access to, and respect for the particular land tenure system in effect
is essential if the various parties seeking to use land are to concur on appropriate
conservation measures to protect forest habitat while increasing farmer productivity.
This thesis examines how the land tenure system and associated property rights
assignments in Belize affect land use conflicts and decisions in the Masewal Mayan village
o f San Antonio (Cayo) in Belize. Land ownership patterns around this agricultural village
are dominated by national lands which were appropriated as "Crown land" in 1872 by
British colonial administrators (Moberg 1992). The diverse state landholdings near San
Antonio include a sustained yield forest reserve, national lands o f unprotected status still
open for colonization, and state leasehold lands leased to village members for agricultural

purposes. Intermixed among the state leasehold lands are private holdings that have been
converted by lessees from leasehold to privately-owned parcels.
9
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It is my contention that British colonial land policies and the post-colonial transitional
government lease arrangements implemented in the 1960s upheld traditional Mayan
cultivation rights and protected the village from outside land speculation. This permitted
villagers to retain their traditional cultural patterns in spite o f the gradual development of
industrialized agriculture, the penetration o f a cash economy and national social
integration. However, acceptance by the village o f the principles of privatization o f land
which underlies the national leasing policy contradicts customary Masewal practices o f
periodic village land redistributions. This has created the seeds o f village differentiation
which along with population growth lie at the root o f the desire by some villagers to
expand agricultural holdings into the nearby forest reserve. Past policies that promoted
village unity now threaten it by introducing artificial land scarcities and community
conflicts over differential access to increasingly scarce non-timber forest products such as
firewood and posts. Village attempts to organize a modem farm cooperative as a means
to acquire additional lands within the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve above San
Antonio are not likely to provide solutions to land scarcity or distributional problems.

The Relevancy of San Antonio as a Case History
San Antonio is a relevant case study regarding of the role o f land tenure in
agricultural intensification and forest conservation for the following reasons. First, the
village land holdings are predominantly leasehold arrangements of state-owned "Crown ,

6

lands" with virtually no penetration o f a land market. Lease arrangements have not been
widely discussed in the literature.1 How the leasehold tenure institution affects land use
decisions and investment in intensification technology is important for policy makers.
Second, San Antonio is an indigenous community with a history of shifting cultivation and
low-level animal husbandry.

However, some small farmers use mechanical cultivation,

chemical inputs, and sell peanuts on the global market (Tzul 1993). As such, it provides
an excellent place to study the evolution and co-existence of different agrarian systems and
to analyze the agricultural intensification process as it relates to customary cultivation
rights, indigenous agrarian systems, and induced potential social stratification. Third,
because the village o f San Antonio borders the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve
established in 1944 for commercial timber management, an analysis of the consequence of
the limiting access to forest resources on an indigenous community facing land scarcity
and a growing population has particular relevance to other areas o f Central America.
Fourth, the level o f non-agricultural employment, cash economy penetration, and
stratification within the peasant2 economy of San Antonio have particular importance to
both the degree and forms o f agricultural intensification existing today and those which

1 Steven Cheung (1969) discusses share tenancy on privately-owned lands in Taiwan. Comista and
Escueta (1990) present an evaluation of communal forest leases in the Phillipines. King et al. (1993)
discuss figures on Belizean leaseholdings but do not discuss their implications. Bolland's (1986)
account of Belizean land tenure does not even mention state leasehold arrangements.
2 The word peasant is used in the literature to refer to small landowning fanners and landless members
of the rural proletariat who spring from fanning and indigenous cultures (Blaikie 1985; Chambers
1988). In many Latin American countries the work campesino refers to the same class of rural workers.
The use of a small rural community in Belize as the case study for this paper complicates the
terminology as the English wordfarmer is commonly used to describe rural workers and small farm
owners in Belize. The three terms, peasant, campesino, and small farmer are used interchangeably in
this paper with a distinction being made between propertied and landless farmers where necessary.
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will be adopted in the future. Fifth, by studying the historical context of property rights,
market penetration, and the relationships between the community and wider institutions,
specific policy objectives and problems can be identified as they relate to agricultural
intensification, customary rights, and access to and conservation of forest products and
habitat.
From this study o f conditions in San Antonio (Cayo), Belize, I conclude that the state
leasehold tenurial system has provided the security needed for agricultural intensification
investment and has served to protect the cultural integrity o f San Antonio Masewal Maya
community.

The leasehold arrangement suffers from the contradictory nature of

supporting integrative customary cultivation rights while promoting the privatization o f
natural resources which creates internal differentiation and increasing land scarcity. The
leasehold security has not been sufficient to promote public investments needed to expand
the profitability o f agricultural production but has tended to encourage forest conversion
to pasture land. Community acceptance o f the privatization o f land (including the de facto
recognition o f private property rights within leasehold arrangements) and the structure Of
usufruct rights in Belize promotes a situation where farmland is left idle even in the face o f
agricultural land scarcity, encouraging individuals and the San Antonio farm cooperative
to seek new farmland within the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve.

Prospects for

protecting the hardwood forests in the MPRFR from colonization by the villagers are slim
unless a means is found to either develop irrigation in support of dry season intensification
projects or to introduce agroforestry and dryland intercropping.

Thesis Organization
This thesis concentrates on the ties between land tenure and agricultural
intensification, the process o f agricultural development whereby changes in the relations of
cultivation (either in productive or social relations) or the adoption of new knowledge or
methods of technology serve to increase product output per hectare per period of time. I
have restricted the discussion o f land tenure to agricultural intensification because both
villagers and the Ministries o f the Belizean national government see agricultural
intensification as a means for local community development in San Antonio. In that spirit,
after a discussion o f methodology in Chapter 2, I introduce the case history through a
review the evolution o f land tenure near San Antonio in Chapter 3. Following that, I
present the literature review o f land tenure in Chapter 4, drawing analogies to the case
history and my study when appropriate.

Chapter 5 concentrates on agricultural

intensification and the household, public, and governmental decisions that go into
agricultural investments and risk-taking, also with analogies to San Antonio.

I devote

Chapter 6 to the specific tenure-related problems related to irrigation which would be
needed for most o f the proposals for agricultural intensification I heard discussed while in
the village.
Finally, I conclude with an assessment o f the potential for using agricultural
intensification as a tool for forest conservation on lands near San Antonio. Here I raise
the use o f alternate forms o f agricultural intensification such as agroforestry,
intercropping, and cover crops. My musings end on the separation between the Ministry
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o f Agriculture and the Forest Department in the Ministry of Natural Resources and their
historical inability to develop an integrated program for agricultural communities such as
San Antonio. Perhaps this is the biggest obstacle facing development in the area. The
responsibilities for deforestation pressure on the forests near San Antonio go well beyond
the village itself. People on many levels will have to consult their mirrors when assessing
blame for current problems in the village. What is so encouraging about Belize and San
Antonio, however, is the spirit o f national pride that ties the people together. This sense
o f common identity may serve as a basis for community and national government
comanagement o f natural resources in a way that can both enhance local economic
conditions and preserve the valued forest resources in the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest
Reserve.

Chapter 2 Study Methodology Used in San Antonio

The study3 for this thesis was accomplished by means of a multiplicity of methods to
develop a description o f the social processes in San Antonio. Methods employed included
a review o f the literature, interviews with government personnel, ethnographic interviews
with village residents, a census and survey of village households, two months o f direct
personal observation, a review of governmental documents pertaining to the Forest
Planning and Management Project, and the development of computerized maps o f the area
near San Antonio (see Appendix 2).

This attempt to establish a broad view o f social

processes in San Antonio by synthesizing the divergent perspectives of the various parties
involved in village life proved necessary because of the high degree of conflict and low
level o f communication over the issues involved.

These conflicts divided the village

residents themselves, divided government ministries, and divided the national government
from the Village Council. Because this thesis has been restricted to the role that land
tenure plays in village issues, I do not discuss in great detail the conflicts that embroil the
village and national government in political turmoil.

Rest assured, my methodology is

very much a product of those divisions.

The Literature Review
The review o f the literature required extensive readings not only in land tenure and
10
3 My study lasted from July 3 - August 15, 1994. The survey portion of the study was conducted August
10-14, 1994.
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property rights, but in associated fields of agricultural intensification, agroforestry,
Belizean forest management and conservation, sustainable development, extractive
reserves, Mayan cultivation practices and history, and the colonization and agricultural
activities in the nearby Latin American countries of Mexico and Central America.
Because o f the extensive nature of the background literature used in this study, I have
chosen to weave the literature and the story of San Antonio together through the chapters
rather than separate the literature review into a chapter of its own. This should enable the
reader to grasp the relevancy o f various points to the situation o f San Antonio without the
need to reiterate the cited literature.

The Ethnographic Interviews and Observation
While in Belize, I met with the acting Forest Supervisor o f the Mountain Pine Ridge
Forest Reserve and with the members o f the Forest Planning and Management Project
representing both the Forestry Department in the Ministry of Natural Resources and the
Social Planning Component o f the Ministry of Economic Development.

From these

discussions and the wealth o f forestry and community documents that had been developed
for the FPMP, I developed a perspective on forest management practices within the
MPRFR, particularly concerning plans for hardwood forest management in the area within
the MPRFR under dispute with San Antonio residents.4 I discovered a lack o f official
communication between the Forest Department and the village itself.

The Forest

4 I met with Ian Gray, acting Forest Officer of the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve, on three
occassions to discuss Forest Department perspectives on topics ranging from hardwood forest
management, refugee pressures on the MPRFR, fire history, hunting regulations, and agricultural
incursions into the reserve which he had mapped using a Ground Positioning System.
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Department had never held any public meetings within the village to discuss either their
management plans for the MPRFR or the agricultural incursions by San Antonio farmers
into the MPRFR.
With Dr. Marion Glaser, I visited with the Minister o f Agriculture who set up a field
trip with the Chief Extension Officer o f the Central Farm, Belize's central agricultural
research institute. We met the local agricultural extension agent in charge of the San
Antonio area and joined members of the San Antonio Peanut and Grain Cooperative and
the Village Chairman in a field trip to examine two potential water sources for a village
water supply. We discussed the farmers' desires for irrigation and the potential of the two
sources for irrigation using ram pumps. We also toured one o f the PGC's clearings within
the MPRFR that had been planted to peanuts and discussed soil erosion and Belizean soil
conservation regulations that prohibit both mechanical agriculture on slopes greater than
12.5% and forest clearing within sixty-six feet of open water (Dickson 1983; Thompson
1994, personal communication).
I spent two months living in the village with the family of the Village Chairman, now
retired from a career o f service as a Forest Officer at the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest
Reserve and at the Forestry Office in Mango Creek in southern Belize. On the one hand,
the close relationship I developed with the Village Chairman was extremely beneficial to
me as he spoke English and had an extensive forestry history that included years as a
chicle tapper, a mahogany hunter, and as a crew boss and Forest Officer managing
firefighting and work crews.

His stories about past activities were invaluable in

developing an historical perspective of the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve and its
management and relationship with the village. Following his retirement, he had begun
working his farm in earnest once again and cattle ranching, and by working with him
planting com and repairing fences I developed a practical sense o f customary agricultural
practices o f the Masewal Mayan villagers.
Living with the Village Chairman, however, had a mixed if not negative side.
Religion, party politics, attitudes towards the Forest Department, extended family
relationships, and non-farm employment were all factors that created distrust in the village
and which hampered village participation in local socio-political issues.

The Chairman

was distinguished from the general population in that he was a Roman Catholic in a village
in which some 80% o f the population had converted to the Pentecostal religion, was a
relatively large landowner, had an historical association with the Forest Department, and
was allegedly connected to the People's Unity Party (which he denied).

His own

Vice-Chairman warned me about living with the Chairman for fear o f affecting my survey.
I must conclude that my closeness to the Chairman (and my willingness to drink an
occasional beer at the local tavern in this largely non-drinking village) may have prevented
some people from opening up to me on certain issues, particularly political and religious
ones. I doubt if it seriously biased my work in the village.
In fact a sign that I developed trust through my work in the village came when the
leader o f the San Antonio Peanut and Grain Cooperative told government officials at a
meeting that the PGC considered me a friend. I attended regular meetings of this local
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agricultural cooperative during which the group would discuss matters in Spanish rather
than Yucatec Mayan so that I could understand. At the end of each meeting they allowed
time for me to ask questions and present ideas. I helped plant peanuts with one of the
member's families, observed herbicide applications and plowing procedures, and toured
the roads and fields that the Cooperative was making within the boundaries of the
Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve with one of the members. During the meetings I
heard discussions concerning bookkeeping and internal organizational issues, credit
options and loan strategies, and agricultural education on fertilizer and herbicide
applications, intercropping and soil conservation.

I also discussed the history of the

agricultural openings within the MPRFR with several o f the farmers in the Cooperative.
During the afternoons, when the heat of the day slowed the pace o f life in the village,
I would walk around the village and hold spontaneous interviews with individuals and then
record the heart o f the discussion later. In all, I collected 36 ethnographic surveys from
28 people. Information from some o f these surveys is included in the thesis but for the
most part, the information has served as background material which helped me establish a
better comprehension o f current farming practices and general village attitudes.
When water scarcity proved to be a central village issue, I met with the district's
Water and Sewer Authority supervisor and he asked me to make a map of village lots to
assist in planning a potential water system for the town (see Appendix 2, Map 3). I also
developed maps on agricultural landholdings, MPRFR openings, and potential water
sources.

These maps are derived from various sources and were digitized later using

AtlasGIS software at the University o f Montana.

The Social Planning Component

furnished me with a general map of western Belize on which I overlaid boundaries of the
MPRFR from the Forest Department's maps. The Ministry o f Natural Resources Lands
and Survey Department provided maps of the village and o f agricultural holdings near the
village which I adapted to accommodate local knowledge of landowners and boundaries.
The openings from the agricultural incursions was digitized from an aerial photograph
from NARMAP (and thus are somewhat distorted) while the Peanut and Grain
Cooperative proposed boundaries inside of the MPRFR come from Forest Department
documents (FPMP 1994).
Besides biking the loop from the village to the PGC openings in the MPRFR, I also
hiked the area extensively, walking the San Antonio and Cristo Rey roads to the village
rural land boundaries, hiking the trail to the Macal River, and walking the agricultural
feeder roads.

I visited many o f the ecotourist facilities that employed local workers,

including the Maya Lodge, Bull Run, the Blancaneau Lodge, Caracol, Mountain
Equestrian Trails, and the Garcia sisters' museum o f Mayan artifacts and stone carvings.
I also held interviews with people outside of the area about San Antonio. I discussed
San Antonio with two Forest Conservation Officers, learning first hand about wildlife
issues, conservation education, and refugee and development pressures on the area's
wildlife habitat. This was particularly useful in assessing the social processes near San
Antonio that reflected interactions between villagers and nearby Seven Miles, a rapidly
growing refugee settlement.

The Village Sample Survey
I conducted a census/survey of the village and surrounding rural households. The
results from that survey are summarized in Table 1 and detailed in Appendices 3-5.
Because o f unfortunate complications and particular village data needs, what was planned
i

to be a random survey became a house to house sampling as 201 of 207 households were
contacted during the survey.

Many difficulties and irregularities (as described below)

occurred during the survey which cast doubt on the validity of the data to be generalized
to the whole population using statistics. Results are, therefore, at best descriptive and
they are shown with valid N given for each question and percentages being the # of
responses received divided by the valid N for that question.
Timing was the greatest problem with the survey. When I arrived in Belize, I agreed
\

to wait to put together the survey until Dr. Glaser returned from Europe.

However,

personal reasons delayed her return until the my last ten days in the village. There was no
time to pre-test the survey and I settled on adjusting it following each of the first two days
t
o f interviews. Because I delayed so late in writing the survey, I was unable to do the
survey myself and had to hire three villagers to help with the interviews at the last
moment. They were not properly trained and only one of them met regularly with me over
the four days it took to complete the survey and tried consciously to adopt scientific
procedures. Between he and I, we surveyed about 70% o f the village households. The
Village Chairman insisted on surveying a portion of the village, but he consistently failed
to ask the open ended questions on village problems and fallow cycles, though he asked
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most agricultural questions on landholdings and cultivation. The final person, who had
done the village census for the government just four years before, failed to ask any
agricultural questions and often skipped questions. His. section o f the village, about 15%
(
o f the village, has irregular and suspect results.
The house by house census, rather than the planned random survey, was conducted
for two important reasons that arose during my research. First, the Water and Sewage
Authority (WASA) had plans for a water system for the village based upon a population
figure o f 1000 people - well below the 1164 village residents of the 1990 Census figures
(Belizean National Census 1991). WASA estimated the need for a holding capacity of
twenty gallons per person per day (Andrews 1994).

It seemed quite likely that the

population was increasing and that the WASA estimate was too low for an adequate
design o f a village water system.

Secondly, a major conflict within the village was

occurring over the fact that village did not have adequate house lots for younger village
members needing them. When the Village Chairman mentioned that nearly one hundred
new house lots were needed, I was skeptical as only 207 households exist in the whole
San Antonio area, including village-born residents living along the San Antonio and Cristo
Rey Roads.

My survey found a slowly declining population (down to 1126 by 1994) that

was blamed by residents on out-migration due to the hardship from the lack o f water,
because educated younger people were leaving to seek better paying employment, on the
lure o f drugs and rock and roll, and on "too much religion" in the village itself. From the
survey, we found the village might need as many as 209 house lots in the next ten years to
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accommodate household growth and younger families, though this figure that would
double the size o f San Antonio seemed to be based on village desires that out-migration
stop, an improbable factor.

Some obvious over-reporting o f lot needs was identified as

some households apparently hoped that by reporting greater need they might access a
greater number of lots in the future.
Figures from my study are interspersed in the following chapters to make certain
points in the literature review clearer to the case history of San Antonio (Cayo). It is my
honest belief that, in spite o f study irregularities and lack o f statistical correlation, the
study results indicate clear trends concerning property relationships and agricultural
practices in the area. These trends are the subject o f this thesis.

Chapter 3 Land Tenure and Property Rights Development in San Antonio:

The Case for Customary Cultivation Rights

Masewal Settlement in San Antonio Village
The Masewal residents o f San Antonio are descendants from a portion of some 5000
immigrants who moved south from the Yucatan in the latter half of the 1800s.

They

moved to escape the Caste Wars of Yucatan and its aftermath which reduced the
indigenous population in the Yucatan by 75% due to war, sickness and impoverishment
(Reed 1964). The San Antonio ancestors came by foot and established settlements along
the creeks in the pine and hardwood forests above the what is now the village of San
Antonio village in the western uplands of Belize in the late 1860s or early 1870s, about the
time that British colonial administrators declared non-registered private lands in Belize as
Crown lands.5 The Masewal farmed and pastured their cattle until the turn of the century
when a strange disease forced the abandonment o f the villages. The families moved to the
current site o f San Antonio located on the rolling flatlands below what is now the
Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve, Belize's oldest sustained yield forest timber reserve
(Tzul 1993).
19

5_An 1861 Census of Belize estimated that 38% of the Belizean population was Mayan Indians from
Mexico, primarily the Yucatan. The British declared Belize a British colony in 1862 (Bolland 1986).
In 1872 the colonial administration passed the Crown Lands Ordinance which declared forested land to
be the property of the government (Moberg 1992) and which may have established the first Mayan
reserves (Bolland 1986). This is contradicted by Glaser and Marcus (1994) who state that the
Indigenous Reservation system began in the 1930s.
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I purposefully use the term Masewal6 for the people o f San Antonio for several
reasons.

First and foremost is the fact that the people of the village call themselves

Masewal (M asehual or M asahual in Spanish) and not Maya, though they are not adverse
to the term Maya as a generic term for indigenous people in the wider international region.
According to Masewal verbal tradition, the Masewal words "ma yan" which signify
"There is none," was the response that Masewal chieftains gave to the first Spanish
colonialists when they entered villages and demanded gold and silver (Tzul 1993).
Through the process o f social construction, the honest response to European greed was
turned into the name now characteristically used to include native peoples between
Honduras and Chiapas, Mexico.

Today, San Antonio residents remain one o f just two

Belizean villages to retain Masewal (Yucatec Maya) as the common village language (F.
Tzib, personal communication), though church services and meetings are often held in
Spanish and the public schools are taught only in the national language of English. By
emphasizing the self-identity o f the Masewal in San Antonio, I am emphasizing the ties the
community maintains to traditional customs and customary property rights relationships
that existed until very recently among the villagers.

The Evolution o f Customary Cultivation Rights in San Antonio
Land tenure and property rights in Belize may be understood in terms of the steadily
evolving conception o f tenure through years of modern international development
programs. Early post-World War II Central American development projects defined land

6 There are 49 different indigenous groups of Mexico, the Masahuals being just one (Rodriguez 1994).
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tenure along straightforward ownership terms as "the legal or customary system under
which land is owned" (United Nations 1951:4). This simplistic definition o f land tenure
proved unworkable because land tenure is inextricably linked to other institutions
(Plumwood and Routley 1982).

The land ownership expectations of impoverished

peasants facing inequitable systems of land ownership

distribution encouraged

confrontations between small farmers and state authorities throughout this century. This
struggle has complicated land reform efforts and led to the notion that land ownership
involves social relationships well beyond the simple titling of land (Barraclough 1973; de
Janvry et al. 1989). The existence of customary rights among indigenous groups who
viewed land as common property also led to conflicts between the colonial and
developmental goal o f improving small farmer household security through land titling and
indigenous desires for the preservation of cultural traditions.

In the poor agricultural

indigenous community of San Antonio, an evolution of land tenure has occurred along
with the gradual expansion o f agricultural landholdings resulting in the slow growth of
I

national government presence in property rights management.
Many Mayan groups retain ancient cultural traditions o f collectively farming
community-held village lands or they farm nearby lands using variations of
village-regulated shifting or swidden cultivation.7 In the pre-Colonial absence of a money

7 Shifting cultivation or swidden cultivation is the rotation of area plots from a base of a stable
community, a base that moved from time to time as land productivity and forest products declined. This
form of agriculture, common to tropical climates world-wide, is in contrast to permanent or fixed-fteld
cultivation' For a description of shifting cultivation, see H.C. Conklin's 1957 "Hanunoo Agriculture,"
FAO. Conklin divided shifting cultivation into periods involving removal of old vegetation and control
of new vegetation through the five.general processes of site selection, cutting, burning, cropping and
fallowing (from Carter 1969).
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economy, neither practice recognized privatized ownership over cultivated lands. Instead,
cultivation rights were obtained through birth and marriage into tribal membership and
through usufruct rights, rights established through continued use of the land held by the
village as common property.

Among the Masewal Maya o f the Yucatan Peninsula in

Mexico, village elders redistributed land in and near the village periodically among village
households while more distant lands were free to the open access o f anyone willing to
make a go o f it in the wilds (Redfield 1941; Reed 1964; Culbert 1973).

Village

membership remained central in cultivation rights, for even if a family chose to leave the
village for a period o f time, they could be assured o f obtaining land and a place to farm
and settle upon their return. Young families were also guaranteed agricultural land to
farm. As long as land was plentiful and indigenous populations low, conflicts over land
and forest resources could be settled by the local administration o f councils of elders. This
indigenous agrarian system o f cultivating commonly-held land in combination with and
derived from cultural social traditions, I call customary cultivation rights which have
appeared in aboriginal groups throughout the world and throughout Central America (cf.
Reed 1964; Boserup 1965; Wolf 1966; Little and Brokensha 1987; Watts 1987; Clay
1988; Feeny et al. 1990; Bromley 1991).
The colonization of Central America, primarily by the Spaniards but inclusive of
British occupation o f Belize, introduced many European feudal and early capitalist social
and productive relations into the customary farming livelihoods o f native indigenous
groups such as fa jin a (six days o f conscription each year for public works infrastructure
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development), taxation to support colonial administration, money, crop production for
export markets, and the privatization of agricultural land. These changes had the effect of
undermining village elder leadership and authority as colonial administrators dismissed
traditional indigenous agricultural systems based on shifting cultivation in favor of
plantation and annual cropping near areas of colonial population centers. Colonial
emphasis on market crops, whether agricultural or forest products, neglected
infrastructure investment for improved subsistence fanning and domestic production and
under Spanish rule concentrated the best lands in the hands o f a few colonial owners
(Baker 1984; Jones 1990; de Janvry et al. 1989). In contrast to this, the British colonial
administration in Belize concentrated land ownership in the hands o f the state through the
establishment o f "Crown" lands in 1872* as a means to monopolize rights on mahogany
exports and logwood (for dies) extraction. As long as British exclusive rights to timber
were respected, indigenous groups like the Masewal of San Antonio were permitted to
make settlements and graze cattle at will.

The San Antonio ancestors pursued an

indigenous agrarian system that combined cattle husbandry on the wildfire-generated
grasses growing beneath the pine forests of the Mayan Mountains with long-fallow

8 Under Belizean law, the Crown Land Ordinance of 1872 was amended to recognize private land claims
established prior to 1879 (Dickson 1983). While most land was reserved for the colonial administration,
private lands where heavily concentrated in the hands of a few British corporate owners (Bolland 1986).
The Masewal settled in areas very near the current sites of agricultural incurisions in the Mountain Pine
Ridge Forest Reserve in the late 1860s or early 1870s. I will leave it to ohers to judge who established
primary rights to the land above San Antonio, the Masewal whose ancestors built the extensive raised
cultivation beds in the Mayan Mountain uplands of Belize and in the Yucatan or the white British
colonialists. The Forest Department was established in 1922 (Bolland 1986), while the Mountain Pine
Ridge Forest Reserve, the first sustained-yield managed Forest Reserve in Belize, was not established
until 1944 (Revista Forestal Centroamericana 1994).
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shifting cultivation on more fertile lands cleared and burnt from hardwood forests along
the Little Vaqueros and Privassion Creeks (Tzul 1993).
This indigenous agrarian system, still used by the Masewal in San Antonio, Belize,
was a local adaptation to the system of shifting cultivation found in place in the Yucatan
by early Spanish colonialists (Reed 1964). The system involved a cycle o f clearing and
burning followed by two or three years o f cultivation o f maize, beans, coco yams and
squash and then a regenerative long-fallow period up to twenty years of length that
permitted forest regeneration. During the cultivation period, the humid climate of Belize
permitted the intensified method o f double cropping during the eight or nine month wet
season, followed by the dry months from February to May conducive to the slash and
burning o f new land.9 In addition to restoring soil fertility, long fallow periods allowed for
post and pole regeneration which were used for home construction (lumbered homes were
unknown until after hurricane Hattie destroyed San Antonio in 1961) and for fence posts.
Cohune palms, used for roof thatch, are fire resistant and were left standing in agricultural
fields.
Shifting cultivation as was practiced by early San Antonio residents was vilified as
inefficient and wasteful by colonial administrators, as well as by development program
administrators through the late 1970s. These administrators blamed the need to shift plots
on rapid losses o f soil fertility from soil erosion rather than recognizing the inherent
limitations o f tropical soils. A growing body of scientific evidence, however, indicates

9 Carter (1969) found a similar cropping pattern among Kekchi migrants near Lake Isabel in the
southern tropical lowlands of Guatemala, not far from the southern tip of Belize.
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that shifting cultivation is a rational agricultural response to tropical conditions (Kellman
and Adams 1970; Lambert and Amason 1980; Amason et. al. 1982; Clay 1988; Ong
1991). Amason's research in nearby Succotz indicates that soil fertility can be maintained
through short cultivation periods followed by fallow periods of 17 years duration, though
longer periods o f fallow are needed to restore lands that have been continuously cropped
for many years. Ong reports that erosion from shifting cultivation is of short duration and
not particularly damaging to soil nutrients on moderate slopes (Ong 1991). Permanent
field cultivation which lacks fallow restoration periods, remains a scientific concern.
In his philosophical book on environmental degradation in Latin America, El Discurso
de La Naturaleza. Fernando Mires (1990) presents the compelling argument that
traditional indigenous cultivation systems are not just subsistence farming systems but
highly evolved scientific socio-economic systems.10 He asserts that historical relationships
to the natural environment represent a form of ecological economics based on an economy
o f scarcity in contrast to modem exploitative economics o f growth based on limitless
natural resource exploitation. Mires believes that acceptance of the growth economy is
tantamount to sacrificing the livelihoods and cultural existence of those who depend on
the environment for existence.

He maintains that indigenous rationality and years of

scientific practice have led native cultures to an economic system that preserves the
environment, minimizes labor and resource use, and is carried forth from generation to

10 Carter (1969) points out that Kekchi migrants in lowland Guatemala who had inhabited the area by
Chichipate for less than twenty years had names for eight soil types, ten levels of soil texture, five soil
drainage patterns, and a root-bound element that were used as a basis for site selection. They identified
twenty stages of milpa agriculture, ten stages of vegetative growth, and recognized sixteen plants as
important in site selection, some for wet season milpa and some for dry season sites.
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generation - one which can serve a model for modem development. To Mires, the goal of
resource conservation is not biological preservation but rather the cultural preservation of
those social groups who depend on the survival o f the natural environment around them.
Mires, though, fails to address the issue that as the fallow period of shifting
cultivation is shortened with the growth of more sedentary communities, practices develop
that may not be ecologically feasible. Mires' own romanticism states that the grand Mayan
cultures o f Central America altered ecosystems and created new ones in a reciprocal
’ relationship to the environment that grew from an intensive use of resources based on
ecological knowledge, not its destmction.

Other authors take issue with this point.

Abrams and Rue (1988) report that sampling indicates that soil and nutrient loss from
deforestation during the Classic Maya Peripd in Peten, Guatemala, led to deficiencies in
potassium,

phosphorus,

and

magnesium associated

with excessive

run-off and

sedimentation, possibly contributing to the causes of the civilization's downfall. Using
. pollen samples near Copan, Honduras, they found that ovemse of hardwood firewood
supplies was the most likely cause of deforestation. Turner (1974) also documents Mayan
intensification in the Rio Bee region of the Yucatan and suggests that repeated burning
turned large areas into grasslands that the Mayans were then unable to crop given their
technological capabilities. In forming permanent settlements, the farming practices of the
ancestors of San Antonio residents may not have been as ecologically sustainable as Mires
might have us believe.
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The Introduction o f Private Property Rights through Leasehold Arrangements
When the Masewal Maya living in the hardwood forest areas o f what is now the
/

Mountain Pine Ridge11 Forest Reserve moved to the flatlands below at the turn o f the 20th
Century to escape disease, they began to populate the permanent settlement of San
Antonio (Cayo).

They brought with them the traditional governing system developed

under centuries o f Spanish rule in the Yucatan where local administration and dispute
resolution was done by a single Alcalde chosen for the village by a Council of Elders
(Reed 1964; Tzul 1993). They continued the long-fallow shifting cultivation system which
mixed crops and cattle until market penetration led many to begin modernization and
annual cropping with shorter fallow periods in the mid-20th Century.

They also

maintained customary cultivation rights o f allowing all village members the right to
cultivate surrounding arable commonly-held lands.
While the British ignored agricultural investment in local infrastructure, markets and
production for small producers in favor of temporary road construction for timber
extraction in the rural areas of Belize (Moberg 1992),12 they at least took administrative
steps to secure rights and land for indigenous groups. The British colonial administration
developed Indian settlements in the 1930s that allocated annually-renewed cultivation
rights to block 'reservation' areas at the community level.

The alcalde or village head

11 "Ridge" in Creole is a term used to describe a plant/land association rather than an upland geographic
formation (Moberg 1992). The pine 'ridge' forests represent pine overstory orver an oak understory,
characterisitic of poor granitic subsoil and frequent fire history. Some researchers believe the pine forest
predominance to be a sign of past Mayan practices of over-harv esting of hardwood firewood and
intentionally set fires for grassland formation to improve deer hunting. (See Abrams and Rue 1988)
Hartshorn and Davidson (1984) define a "ridge" as a "strip of well-developed forest canopy" (p. 88).
12 Moberg states that investment in agricultural infrastructure did not begin in Belize until the 1950s.
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allocated the land and individuals paid $5/year/household to the government (Glaser and
Marcus 1994). This system was an adoption o f traditional Masewal and Mayan customary
cultivation rights with the addition of a yearly tax to support the colonial administration.
San Antonio retained the right to distribute land among its residents but lost the right to
freely colonize farm land outside of the reserve lands set aside for the village. A more
significant long range change, however, came from the fee payment to an outside authority
which established the first threads of privatization into the land tenure system used by the
Masewal of San Antonio. The customary village right to redistribute unused land to needy
individuals and young families was replaced by semi-permanent individual-state property
relationship based on an annual fee payment (a precursor to the leasehold system). For the
first time, land could be "locked up" by a non-internal community relationship. As long as
the population remained small, the reserved lands near San Antonio were adequate for the
village. In time, however, gradual population growth from births and immigration led to
increasing land scarcity (Tzul 1993) and the need to either intensify cultivation practices
on existing land or to expand to other Crown lands near San Antonio. Hurricane Hattie in
1961, which leveled the old forests of Central Belize and the town of San Antonio, along
with prospects for national independence provided the impetus for a formal land tenure
change to state leasehold lands and the extensive expansion of San Antonio landholdings.
Hurricane Hattie altered San Antonio's physical development and land settlement
patterns. Hattie leveled many o f the thatched roofed pole houses in the village and a great
portion o f the large trees in the tropical forests around the village.

In the hurricane's
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aftermath, the village rebuilt using lumber from sawmills that had been established in the
Mountain Pine Ridge area in the 1950s and began the process of the transition to the tidy
village o f houses and yards found in San Antonio today. Forest Department log salvage of
the blowdown and commercial trees in the area provided the impetus to improve the two
main roads into San Antonio in the early sixties which opened the door to community
expansion along the new roads.
The leasehold agreement that followed provided the means for this community
expansion. It was a modernization o f the reserve system o f the 1930s but with the newly
created local government Village Council left out o f land distribution issues. In 1959 the
British introduced the current Village Council system o f community-wide elected
representatives into indigenous villages replacing traditional rule by a council of elders and
their chosen alcalde (Tzul 1993).

In 1961 Belizeans elected the People's Unity Party

(PUP) as an interim transitional government in the first step towards national
independence. Shortly thereafter individual application for leasehold from the state was
introduced at the request o f young village members facing a land scarcity situation.
In [1963], a small group of young farmers began to press government to allow the
leasing of the crown land. After several representations to the Lands Department,
government decided to lease land to the young farmers under the following
understanding: Since there were no lands surveyed in the area, the Lands Department
would accept lease only on lands located on the newly opened Guacamallo Road [San
Antonio Road]. Consequently, Mr. Carlos Harrison, Lands Inspector, went to San
Antonio and demarcated several parcels of land along the Guacamallo Road. Thus, in
1964 applications were accepted by the Lands Department for the purchase of land
under the Location Ticket System.
As soon as the applications were approved, the lessees began to develop lands. Today
all those lands have been developed to pastures, fruit trees, row cropping and other
forms of cultivation.
A few years after the first group applied for the lands, many more began to purchase
their lands and finally all the lands along the Guacamallo Road and deep into the
hinterland were taken over. At present most of the lands in the vicinity of the village
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have been leased and much difficulty and quarrels have been experienced over the
distribution of land.
In the 1980's the road from San Ignacio to San Antonio via Cristo Rey was improved
to all weather road status. As a consequence of that development, all the suitable lands
on that road were also leased from government and developed. Today that is the most
developed area of San Antonio. (Tzul 1993: 78-79)13

Within the current land ownership patterns in the San Antonio area private ownership
co-exists with three state ownership forms: state leasehold, unleased national or Crown
lands, and the restricted access state-owned Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve
(MPRFR). , Common village agricultural property no longer exists.

Following the

development o f leasehold arrangements and the opening of roads, virtually all the arable
land near San Antonio was placed under local control through lease applications by what
is now the older generation o f San Antonio residents. Leasing was not divided by need
but on a first come, first serve basis of distribution. Those applying later for land found
accessible and machine cultivable land unavailable. One farmer told me that he had to go
so far to lease even rocky land that members of the nearby community o f Cristo Rey have
complained that his leases were within their jurisdiction.
The leasehold system established in Belize is a flexible ownership system whereby the
national government transfers virtual private property rights to the leaseholder as
usufructuary rights. Originally,
”[t]he Location Ticket System [was] a system whereby the government leases land for
five years. During the five years, the lessee must develop and pay the purchase price to
the government. After the five years, the lessee is granted title to the land." (Tzul 1993:
79)

13 In 1978 the government subdivided a section of the Maya Ranch obtained by the government for lease
to village members. Five members of the San Antonio Peanut and Grain Cooperative were among those
families leasing land from the Maya Ranch ("Report of a Meeting to Discuss Land Availability for the
San Antonio Peanut and Small Grain Cooperative, FPMP, 4/8/94).
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Under the current system, leases run for seven years. Following a review during which
proof o f development must be shown, leases are renewable at the request of lessee and
transferable to offspring. Longer leases can be obtained in special cases when collateral is
needed. A $10 fee for title application is required, and land is sold at the discretion of and
price set by the Minister o f Natural Resources (usually about $25/acre) (Thompson 1994).
The inexpensive land leases, only BZ$2 per acre per year, allowed local residents to
quickly lay claim to nearly all arable land around San Antonio.

This monopoly over

agricultural land by local residents, combined with the virtually complete harvest o f valued
timber around the village by the Forest Department, served to produce a situation where a
land market (the sale o f private land property to other private individuals) failed to
develop in San Antonio. Two key results arose from the lack o f a land market: the village
maintained ties to traditional patterns o f customary rights and agricultural intensification
on cleared land did not reach its maximum productivity.
First, the lack o f outside intrusion permitted the village to retain its isolation and
cultural integration even as it modernized, developed schools, and participated in outside
employment. This helps explain why the village maintains the Masewal language even
though it is not taught in the schools.14 In spite of electoral politics, the Village Council
functions in much the same way as the old Council o f Elders and chosen Alcalde, as
younger village members tend not to participate in village meetings and/or allow elder
14 Masewal is commonly used in personal interactions in the village, but it is greatly diluted with Spanish
which is the language of the churches and public meetings. Many newcomers and spouses are not fluent
in the Masewal dialect. The situation is complicated by the fact that the schools are taught in the
national language English which is commonly spoken among village children. A large portion of the
village is tri-lingual, though many older residents are not comfortable speaking English even though
they may understand it.
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members to dominate discussions (personal observation).

The current elected Village

Chairman is still expected to direct village life in much the same manner as the old Alcalde
(Clark, 1994).

Additionally, birth in the village and village membership is still reason

enough to return to vote and participate in community affairs (C. Mai 1994, pers. com.).
As will be illustrated in following chapters, this is a direct result of the leasehold operation.
Thus, the customary cultivation system of San Antonio's ancestors has been retained in
many dimensions with the very important distinction that the village no longer possesses
control over usufruct rights and there no longer are periodic redistributions of access to
arable land and forest resources. This is a key point that impinges directly on local desires
to maintain San Antonio's cultural identity and the problems it faces maintaining internal
cohesion in the face o f growing land scarcity13 as well as on its conflicts with national land
managers of the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve.
The second point concerning the lack of a markets is that without the potential to
recover investment costs through profitable commodity or land markets, agricultural
landowners are not apt to invest in expensive technological intensification or in public

15 The findings of Morhmann and Nelson (1993) in the village of San Antonio (Toledo) have striking
similarities to the situation in San Antonio (Cayo). They write, "The change to other Christianity [than
Catholocism] which is more based on the nuclear family rather than on the community as a whole might
have brought about the first major move towards separating the village. Land parcelling and the
dispossessing the Maya People of communally held land is a further step in breaking up a culture. Once
people live separated in that sense (loss of common religion, common land), they show litlle or no
responsibility for the environment they live in, as they are no longer in tune with nature as a whole and
the responsibility lays with the 'neighbors' or the 'village chairman' or the 'forestry department' or if even
more removed, with the 'government.'" An estimated 80% of the residents of San Antonio (Cayo) have
converted to the Pentecostal religion in the last 15 years, stressing relations with other community
members. This has created significant internal difficulties in dealing with political issues which are
avoided by Pentecostal followers (F. Tzib, per. com.) but the significance of this change seems to be in
an increased respect for private property rights which often work against the poorer families, not on
increased degradation of the environment.
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works (Russell and Nicholson 1981; Pearce and Warford 1990).

Moberg (1991) has

documented how vacillating national policies between food price supports which raised
the national debt and cheap food imports for urban areas has placed small Belizean
producers at a disadvantage and encouraged them to shift away from subsistence
production towards non-farm income.
"From this it is apparent that government policies have favored town residents at the
expense of rural producers, despite the Marketing Board's stated goal of promoting
staple crop production. This point is not lost upon rural staple crop producers, many of
whom 'justifiably feel that they subsidize urban non-producers, while they are
themselves forced to live at subsistence level with insufficient returns to encourage
increased production' (Machines 1983:106).
"The Belizean government's attempt to deliver low-cost food to non-farming
populations via price controls creates major disincentives for staple crop production in
rural communities."
"Both neoclassical and populist analyses concur that agricultural self-sufficiency
requires a rise in producer prices to competitive levels. Only then will farmers deliver
crops to urban markets and invest in technological change." (Moberg 1991: 19,21)

A weak commodity market with low prices for locally produced food and cheap imported
food has prevented capital accumulation in San Antonio as well as in other parts of the
country. Moberg found evidence that rural farmers in Stann Creek were shifting to citrus
in favor o f staple crop production but 1 found little evidence of similar desires on the part
o f San Antonio farmers.
Because o f the low-cost land lease system in Belize, San Antonio villagers have been
able to retain possession o f large tracts of land without fear of losing them or needing to
sell them to outsiders.

Even workers employed outside San Antonio have not been

disposed to purchase and sell land near San Antonio because retention of these lands
guarantees continued participation in community affairs (a form of customary cultivation
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rights). Lack o f profitable commodity markets, customary unwillingness to sell land to
outsiders, and the state operated leasehold arrangements increase village reluctance to
invest in agriculture and encourage under-utilization o f arable land. Few village members
other than the San Antonio Peanut and Grain Cooperative (PGC) have invested heavily in
agricultural intensification and even the PGC work has been financed largely by outside
t

NGOs from Canada and the Netherlands (Carroo 1987). Whether the Peanut and Grain
Cooperative, which is responsible for the agricultural incursions into the Mountain Pine
Ridge Forest Reserve, should be considered a form o f public or private investment is a
critical issue in determining strategies for those wishing to improve the profitability o f San
Antonio agriculture through intensification and for those wanting to protect forest
resources from continued colonization and its conversion to permanent agriculture.

Chapter 4 Land Tenure and Property Rights Conceptions:
How They Relate to San Antonio

The Evolving Social Context of Land Tenure and Property Rights
Forty years o f international development experience14 has shown that land ownership
as a social institution carries with it a series of implications concerning its extensions into
political and economic arenas. Land tenure, in a post-modernization sense, is defined as

"the legal and traditional relations between persons, groups, and classes that regulate
the rights to the use of land, transfer thereof, and enjoyment of its products, and the
duties that go with those rights. In brief, land tenure can be considered as a reflection of
the power relations between persons and groups in the use of land" (Barraclough 1973:
xvii).

Land ownership, the right to use and dispose of land, which appeared as a title-possessing
component o f early development models, evolved into a relative concept in the neo-liberal
programs o f the 1970s, with land tenure systems being defined in terms o f local social
systems interrelated with particular patterns of land tenure relationships.

These land

tenure systems were tied to "the legal forms of tenancy, the type o f agriculture, and the
degree o f security and bargaining power o f landless workers and small farmers"
(Barraclough 1973: 15) and to contracted and customary rights and duties, liberties, and
exposures in land use applications (Poostchi 1986). Land tenure systems recognized the
fact that tenure relationships seem to influence (and sometimes follow) changes in
36
14 For a thorough review of early development theory see Eicher and Staatz (1984). Moberg (1992)
presents an adequate discussion of later developments and relates them directly to development issues in
Belize.
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agricultural patterns, labor availability, investment potential, and markets within the
context o f historical agricultural and cultural development.

Conceptualization of land

tenure systems built upon earlier attempts to construct theoretical models o f agrarian
systems (see Figure 2) for the purpose o f devising land reform programs in Latin America.

T U M A •s AGRARIAN STRUCTURE

Figure 3
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Tenure, defined as "the act, right, manner or term of holding something" (Webster's
1977), has been applied to social and ownership relationships to land, water, minerals,
trees, animals, plants and air, (and in slavery systems to people), as well as products of
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human labor in different social contexts. Tenure implies both the authority relations that
permit and control the holding and disposition (sale, giving, or inheritance) and the rights
of and abilities to use the property in question. Some authors such as Daniel Bromley
choose to avoid the use o f the word "tenure", preferring to discuss land ownership
systems as property rights regimes with accompanying social authority systems. Others,
such as John Bruce and Louise Fortmann (1992) who work with and write about tree
tenure prefer "tenure and associated rights of use."
For the purpose o f this paper, I recognize two levels of social institutions as they
relate to landed property relationships. Tenure represents the holding of property within
an associated social historical context, inclusive of cultural perspectives, market and labor
availability, and political relationship.

In this thesis property rights mean enforceable

ownership and are therefore tied to authority-based institutional arrangements, ownership
being the "right to possess, to use, to manage, to benefit, to be secure, and to alienate"
property (Bromley 1991: 159). This implies a more immediate right to use than tenure.
Authority related to property is situational and may be legally-based or result from any
number o f socially derived differentials between owners and non-owners such as
experience, education, knowledge of political processes, and wealth.

Property rights

analysis serves for understanding the privatization of land and natural resources because it
emphasizes the changes in authority restrictions as property undergoes a transition from
one form of property to another.

Tenure analysis, on the other hand, speaks more to

!

cultural expectations and non-property relationships that affect decisions on how and for
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what purposes one uses one's property, be it private or public property. The two are
certainly inseparable on some level and my separation o f land tenure from property rights
may be more an effort to analyze different social constructions o f property relationships
than a real difference.
Bromley's (1991: 2) theoretical work on property rights has given us the following
definitions o f property and property rights:

property - "is a right to a benefit stream that is only as secure as the duty of all others to
respect the conditions that protect that stream."

property right - is a claim to a benefit stream that the state will agree to protect
through the assignment of duty to others who may covet, or somehow interfere with, the
benefit stream. Rights have no meaning without correlated duties and the management
problem with open access regimes is that there are no duties on aspiring users to refrain
from use. Property is not an object but rather something of value (the benefit stream)
against all others. Property is a triadic social relation involving benefit streams, rights
holders, and duty bearers (Hallowell 1943 in Bromley)

The Belizean leasehold arrangement that dominates agricultural landholdings around
San Antonio illustrates the difference between tenure and property rights and
demonstrates that mixed systems may have contradictory results. As a tenure system, the
i

leasehold arrangement gives the individual household long-term property security due to
its low rent and, as demonstrated earlier, it also provides an institutional structure that
protects the Masewal culture from outside influences.

This represents an integrating

function for the community. On the other hand, leasing has given individuals sole rights to
posts, poles and firewood which for a majority o f households are becoming increasingly
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scarce commodities (Clark 1994).15 Many respondents without land or who possess land
without access easements complained that the right to exclude others from private and
leased lands had exacerbated resource scarcity because they were no longer permitted to
collect forest products from leased lands that had been considered customary common
property resources.

In spite o f the fact that leasing granted effective private property

rights to leaseholders as early as the mid-1960s, it was only in recent years as resources
became scarcer near the village that individuals have chosen to break with traditional
common property customs and to enforce their individual property rights under
British/Belizean law, supported by the growth of Pentecostal respect for private property.

Property Rights Regimes
Bromley's work on property rights has greatly clarified the nature, if not the role, of
property rights relationships in the market economy.

Particularly, he has clarified the

difference between open access and common property land and as such has opened the
ground for a deeper understanding o f customary rights and traditional indigenous land
tenure systems.

Bromley introduces four forms o f natural resource ownership: open

access regimes, common property regimes, state property regimes, and private property
regimes (see Figure 3). Property regimes are systems of property rights which "acquire
their special character by virtue o f collective perceptions regarding what is scarce (and
15 The most commonly used forest product from the MPRFR is bay leaf, the preferred palm for thatched
roofs (about 15% of the houses in San Antonio still have thatched roofs). Fence poles and firewood are
generally collected closer to San Antonio or from wamil (short bush fallow) portions of farms. 38% of
respondents to my survey felt that firewood was currently scarce near San Antonio and another 21%
reported that all non-timber products were scarce, indicating that nearly two-thirds of the village
recognized a problem with growing scarcity of non-timber forest products (Clark 1994).
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hence possibly worth protecting with rights), and what is valuable (and hence certainly
worth protecting with rights)." (Bromley 1991: 3)

Figure 4

BROMLEY'S PROPERTY RIGHTS CLASSIFICATIONS

Table 10-2. Definition of Property Regimes
Type o f
p roperty

D efinition

State

Individuals have a duty to observe the rules o f use determ ined by the
controlling agency. T h e agency has the right to determ ine those
ruies.

Private

Individuals have the right to u n d e rta k e socially acceptable uses and a
duty to refrain from unaccep tab le uses. O thers have a d uty to respect
individual rights.

C om m on

A m anagem ent group h a s the right to exclude nonm em bers.
N onm em bers have a d uty to ab id e by th a t exclusion. C o-ow ners
com prise the m anagem ent g ro u p a n d have rights a n d duties related
to the use o f resources.

O pen access
N o users o r ow ners are defined. Individuals have the privilege but not
_____________ the right to use resources.
_____
Source: A dapted from Bromiey (1 989), p. 872.

Source: Pearce and Warford (1 9 9 3 )

Open access, unlike the other three forms o f property rights regimes, does not have
an associated authority system to define limits of use and extent o f rights and has been the
subject o f a never-ending debate over Hardin’s Tragedy o f the Commons’ assertion that,
due to free unregulated access to the resource, commonly-held land inevitably will face
degradation or extinction, depending upon the type o f resource.

Rational choice

advocates have used the Prisoners' Dilemma16 to illustrate that not only will open access
land be over-used, but that public investment in infrastructure and methodology that might
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protect the resource will not be implemented because each individual can be assured of
greater return by using the resource to his/her own advantage without contributing to the
public investment (Russell and Nicholson 1981). When the San Antonio ancestors settled
originally in what is now the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve, the surrounding forest
operated as an open access grazing area incapable o f being overused because of the small
population and light grazing demands. When the village settled more permanently in San
Antonio and began to grow, the land tenure regime made the transition to common
property under the control o f an alcalde in line with the customary rights of the Masewal.
The error made by Hardin and many early works on the overuse of open access
resources was that agricultural property, as represented by the Mayan cultivation rights
systems employed in the Yucatan and Belize prior to leasehold implementation in the
mid-1960s, did not operate as open access regimes but as common property regulated by
oversight from village elders or other traditional land controlling organizations. Rights
were established by village membership and by use, and redistributed periodically to
account for village needs, growing populations, and immigration and intermarriage from
other indigenous groups.

Far from lacking authority, customary and traditional land

tenure systems characteristic o f common property relationships maintained stable (if not
always equitable) social/land relationships that protected natural resources (Reed 1964;
Watts 1987; Bromley 1991).

As European markets and export crop production

penetrated into traditional Central American indigenous systems, mixed systems that
16 "The 'prisoner's dilemma' is a situation in which it is optimal for any prospective participant in a
collective enterprise to opt out (to 'defect') regardless of the strategy followed by other would-be
participants. If all cooperate, all, in the aggregate, will be better off than if all defect; but every
individual is better off defecting." (Russell and Nicholson 1981: 9-10)
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retained communal forests and pastures but accepted the privatization of cultivated land
became common.

In the Yucatan, these common indigenous property regimes were

incorporated into collective peasant landholdings known as ejidos as early as 1573
(Herzog 1959), which permitted Spanish control over but not the elimination of, village
common land (Tuma 1965; Tello 1968). In Belize, local indigenous systems were first
restricted to indigenous reserves and then incorporated into the state-controlled leasehold
system.
Under a state property regime, "rights to the resource are vested exclusively in
government which in turn makes decisions concerning access to the resource and the level
and nature o f exploitation" (Feeny et al. 1990: 5), State property regimes characterized by
state ownership were less common under Spanish rule which tended to designate vast land
tracts to large landed estates while interest in dye wood and mahogany led Belizean British
administrators to take steps for state domination of a particular resource, particularly
timber.

The British established exclusive rights to timber through both tenure and

property rights regulations. They declared all forested land as state land reserved for state
exploitation ("Crown land"); and then they reserved the property right for the state to all
standing timber, even on private property. When the government decided to encourage
infrastructure development and colonization of Crown land with a potential for
agricultural development in the interior o f the country in the 1940s and 1950s, the need
arose to delineate forest lands that could be cleared for agriculture from those reserved for
sustainable forestry production (Moberg 1992). In 1944, Belize established the Mountain
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Pine Ridge as the first official forest reserve in the mountains above the village of San
Antonio. The Belize Forestry Department planned to harvest primarily pine trees (Pirns
caribaea and Pinus patula) (Revista Forestal Centroamericana 1994). The reserve also
k
included 25% hardwoods located in the zone where San Antonio's ancestors originally
settled in the late 1800s. Today, Belizean forest reserves cover one-quarter of Belize,
established either for timber extraction or for soil and watershed protection (King et al.
1993).
Throughout the 20th Century, all Central American governments have established
forested timber reserves, and more recently, parks and wildlife reserves, often excluding
use by local citizens and disregarding traditional customs (Thrupp 1988; Gomez-Pompa
and Kaus 1992).

The creation o f forest reserves highlights two features about tenure

systems and property rights:

(1) they are effective relative to the enforcement o f the

associated rights and duties, particularly on state property at the margins of agricultural
expansion, and (2) they are ever changing, based on positions of those in power and on
public values.
Another look at the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve illustrates both o f the above
enforcement and evolution issues. The Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve reserved all
rights for the state, but selective enforcement has allowed villagers to hunt and to collect
medicinal herbs, firewood, and bay leaf palms for roof thatch while prohibiting timber
harvest and agricultural expansion. When San Antonio Peanut and Grain Cooperative
members began clearing land in the MPRFR in 1984 , the Forest Department sent mixed
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signals by evicting farmers whose plots were deep within the reserve while allowing those
near the edge o f the MPRFR to maintain their land without an official lease arrangement
(Garcia 1994, pers. com.). These mixed signals continued during the ensuing years, with
the Lands and Survey Department agreeing to dereserve 600-1000 acres of MPRFR lands
and to grant a lease for those hardwood lands to the Cooperative in 1987, 1989, and 1994
(FPMP 1994) while the Forest Department has refused to concede title and has continued
eviction for forest incursions by the PGC members (Carroo 1987; Harpold et. al. 1990;
Tzul 1990). In 1994, under verbal agreements between the Peanut and Grain Cooperative
and high ranking Ministry officials, the PGC cleared about 100 acres of rolling ground
near Privassion Creek and planted commercial peanuts, still -without Forest Department
approval or a written lease agreement.

The Forest Planning and Management Project

commissioned my study, "Social Needs Assessment, San Antonio (Cayo),'August 1994"
(Clark 1994) to examine social pressures behind the persistent efforts by the Peanut and
Grain Cooperative to colonize MPRFR land.

Review of recent incursions into the

MPRFR is on-going (see maps in Appendix 2 for locations of historical agricultural
incursions into the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve).
The evolution o f tenure in the MPRFR is instructive. First an open access forest, the
British colonial administration declared the area to be state land, though it did nothing to
evict Masewal settlers in the area.

Later, as concern over protecting areas for forest

production combined with the need for developing agricultural land, the forests of the
MPRFR were protected as a state forest reserve. Recently, potential land scarcity near
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San Antonio has been used as a reason to consider dereservation of 600-1000 acres of
MPRFR hardwood forest land to enable villagers to farm irrigable land there. But even
this dereservation proposal is currently being debated along two quite different lines of
public opinion pressure. One is the conservation imperative (Brechin and West 1990) to
protect forest cover and habitat by maximizing forest use efficiency, an imperative evident
in most international development programs as a result of the overwhelming evidence of
rapid tropical forest deforestation and habitat loss (see Collins 1986; Van Orsdol 1987;
Hedstrom 1990; Wood 1990; Singh 1993; Diagnostico Participativo Communitario
1993). The recognition o f conservation imperatives to slow deforestation and its resulting
ecological degradation pressured NGOs working in San Antonio to add conservation
measures (no riparian harvest, no clearings on slopes, and no hunting) as conditions to
their support for the PGC.

The Agricultural Department has enforced Belizean law

against agricultural clearings by the PGC on land greater than 12.5% by requiring
pineapple intercropping across slopes in the middle o f peanut fields to prevent erosion on
MPRFR lands. A second perspective comes from the local Masewals themselves. Some
local indigenous community members discussed relocating San Antonio to the MPRFR
lands (a site with running water) and converting a larger forested area into an Masewal
Indigenous Reserve for cultural preservation (personal communication17) as has been done
in Talamanca, Costa Rica, with the Bribri and Cabecar Indians (Palmer 1992, personal

17 Due to the sensitive nature of this topic, I choose not to list my sources. Both members of the PGC and
non-members discussed this option. Settlement within the the MPRFR has been granted previously to
private tourist concessions. MPRFR settlement (but not an Indigenous Reserve) have been discussed in
NGO reports (Harpold et al. 1990) and in government surveys (Tzul 1990).

47

communication18). The dereservation of MPRFR lands to either the PGC or an a Masewal
Indigenous Reserve would necessitate a tenurial change from state to common property
under the authority o f a specific local group. Even before obtaining an official lease, the
(

v

PGC has further subdivided its holdings among the members, giving ten acres to those
lacking land near San Antonio for subsistence farming and subdividing the rest for peanut
production among members. Whether this is a step towards privatization o f landholdings
as seen in Guatemalan cooperatives (Barraclough 1973) or in Mexican ejidos (Tello 1968)
is not yet clear.

Characteristics o f Property Rights
As Bromley points out, a right "denotes a set o f actions and behaviors that the
possessor may not be prevented from undertaking [and] a right - by definition - implies a
duty on the part o f all others to refrain from preventing those actions and behaviors."
(1991: 3-4). In locations where the state is strong enough and has the will-power to stop
colonial expansion into forest reserves, growing rural populations will be forced (i.e., have
the duty) to live within the confines of previously allocated lands, and subdivision into
smaller and smaller farms (such as minifundios) and agricultural intensification can be
expected to occur (Prostermann and Reidinger 1987).

In areas where state tenure is

weak, confused, and unstable, colonization of state land may occur that carries its own
18 Paula Palmer, twenty year resident of the Talamanca Coast in Costa Rica, has documented her
ethnographic collection of stories of the history of Black coastal residents of Talamanca in "What
Happen": A Folk-Historv of Costa Rica's Talamanca Coast. 1977, Ecodesarrollos, San Jose, Costa Rica
and joined with Juanita Sanchez and Gloria Mayorga to record the oral traditions of the Bribri and
Cabecar indigenous people of Talamanca in Taking Care of Sibo's Gifts. 1991, Editorama, San Jose,
Costa Rica.
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particular tenure problems and associated rights.

In Belize which recognizes usufruct

rights as a basis for tenure establishment,19 immigration by possibly as many as 40,000
refugees, 75% who live in the Cayo District (King et. al 1993), from politically unstable
countries in the region has been met by national government acceptance o f residency and
usufructuary (and technically illegal) leasehold rights for the immigrants. This accession
to the needs o f refugees has created ambivalent attitudes among the Masewal o f San
Antonio who, while professing concern o f the refugees' plight, harbor resentment against
the refugees and national government for the colonization o f new land when locals are
prevented from colonizing areas within the MPRFR currently not being actively managed
for timber harvest.20 On the other hand, the PGC has allowed one refugee from a
neighboring refugee settlement to become a member and to participate in its 'holdings'
within the MPRFR, a considerate measure but one which complicates the PGC's
relationship to the national government as it raises issues about just who the PGC
represents and to whom and for whose benefit the state is considering dereserving
MPRFR land.21
19 See Jeffrey R. Jones Colonization and Environment: Land Settlement Projects in Central America for
a full analysis of colonization history and prospects in Latin America.
20 The hardwood forests of the MPRFR are just now being mapped by the Forest Department into
management compartments (Gray 1994, pers. com.). The current operating guideline for the MPRFR,
the Management Plan for Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve. 1st April 1992 to 31st March 1997.
Draft fails to consider hardwood management in the next several years.
21 Refugees in Belize must live in the country for ten years prior to applying for lease land but they can
join local cooperatives to get land and credit (Nelson 1992). King et. al. (1993) estimates that 75% of
the country's refugees live in the Cayo District whose 5300 registered refugees is estimated to be but
one-fifth of the total in Cayo. Lack of land rights has created a quandry for the government as large
settlements like Siete Millas (Seven Miles) near San Antonio have sprung up without any official
recognition or rights. Efforts to deal with problems in refugee areas has opened the government to
criticism from impoverished Belizean indigenous groups for unfair treatment of Belizean citizens.

49

Private property regimes represent the most alienated forms o f property where use
and disposition o f the resource lies in the hands of individuals in the possession of legal
title. Private property cannot exist without political institutions willing to enforce the
individuals exclusive rights and the duties of others to respect those rights. However,
under private property, the state cedes ownership rights to titled individuals or
corporations recognized as legal entities under the laws o f the state. The Belizean state
grants de facto private property rights (usufruct rights) to those showing active
improvements while colonizing land under the leasehold arrangement. The state retains no
or only limited rights o f regulation over the use and disposition o f private property or
leasehold lands. The state-controlled leasehold o f Belize, therefore, operates in contrast
to other forms o f leasing and tenancy involving tenants and private landlords in that full
property rights are granted to the tenant following the clearing of the land, even the right
not to use the land. Most tenancy leasing from private owners represents a transfer of
limited property rights through a contract to "use another person's agricultural land for the
purpose o f cultivation by oneself by paying a rent therefore" (Cheung 1969: 12) and
requires payment o f a fixed rent or share o f the crop produced.
The low lease rent o f BZ$2 per acre per year,22 equivalent to a single ride in the back
‘ o f a pick-up to the nearby urban hub of San Ignacio, provides little incentive to convert
leaseholdings to private property. Lacking a land market to encourage land sales, leasing
in San Antonio amounts to a perpetual leasehold arrangement, a specialized form of
transferring private property rights to individuals without endangering the cultural
22 BZ$2 = US$1
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solidarity o f the village. San Antonio conversion rates from leasehold to private property
lie are low. Belizean landholdings are divided into 37% private land and 10.6% leased
land.

San Antonio villagers reported that only 25.7% of agricultural holdings were

privately owned and while fully three-quarters remain leased, with only a fourth o f the
households reporting any private land ownership (Clark 1994). This ratio is typical for
areas o f Belize characterized by lease arrangements averaging under 50 acres (King et al.
1993).

Conversion o f land to private property, accomplished through the Lands and

Survey Department at a price set by the Minister o f Natural Resources, usually at BZ$25
per acre (Thompson 1994), is not being pursued in San Antonio.

Traditional Mayan

tenure relationships tied to customary rights and common property in San Antonio and
poverty which is endemic with small farmers throughout the country are tied to
inexpensive leasing to explain the slow conversion rate.
Private property rights are not irrevocable in all cases. The right of repossession of
private land for public infrastructure development (such as market road development),
known as eminent domain in the United States, is retained by most national states. Recent
environmental cases involving pollution control, habitat protection, and reserve set-asides
have shown that property rights can be terminated or limited by a recognized authority
regime at considerable cost to the private owner.

Belizean law which recognizes

assartment claims, defined by Bruce and Fortmann (1992) as the establishment of
ownership through the clearing o f land, also reserves the right to repossess titled land if
improvements are left unattended for three years running at any time in the future at the
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original purchase price o f the land regardless whether the land is subsequently sold to
another owner (Dickson 1983).23
Limitations on land and natural resource use rights vary by systems. Easements are
prior limitations incorporated into the title that reserve use o f property to others or limit
the use o f the resource by the owner himself/herself, as in right of way and conservation
easements. During official land surveys, the Belizean government surveys access right of
ways to all lots and agricultural plots24. An implicit right of transfer is a process that
enables an authority institution to modify the degree o f control exercised by the owners of
record over the land (Bromley 1991). Proprietary rights are conditional rights of use over
a natural resource given by the state to particular user groups such as timber concessions,
extractive reserves, or preserved areas.25 Usufruct rights are the right to use but not own
land. Usufruct rights are commonly employed to encourage the colonization of new areas
and/or are used as a transitional step in the formal titling process of colonized land.
In the case o f Belize, usufruct rights are applied to state/cultivator relationships in
lease arrangements for Crown land where lessees are required to prove continuing use of
lease land. Failure to maintain improvements or the sub-leasing of Crown lands to others
without Ministerial permission are grounds for revoking the lease permit. The restriction
23 According to King et. al. (1993) the Land Use Authority is currently reviewing legal requirements for
improvements in an effort to reconsider areas of the law that tend to encourage poor conservation and
overdevelopment of plots.
24 See Land and Survey Department Plan No. 1937 for surveyed village lots and easements and Plan No.
1704 for surveyed agricultural plots and easements near San Antonio (Appendix 2 of this paper).
25 Belize has given mangement authority over seven of its national parks to the Belize Audobon Society
and offers long-term timber concessions to various large mills. The government has experimented with
extractive rights near the Cockscomb Jaguar Preserve for the displaced Mopan Maya of the area.
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against sub-leasing without prior official approval and the fact that the Belizean
government will entertain transferring leases to sub-lessors making improvements on a
given piece o f land leads San Antonio residents to be leery about leasing arable land to
others.

The result is that arable land is left idle rather than to be rented to landless

community members, as indicated by the fact that only 27.3% of the land in San Antonio
is being farmed in spite o f trends towards using multi-cropping, machine cultivation, and
agrochemical inputs (Clark 1994).26
Environmental property rights are another rights category that govern the use of
resources, including waste assimilation into the environment and which bestow rights to
conserve, consume, sell, lease, bequeath, and exclude others as related to the natural
resource (Pearce and Warford 1993). A group o f San Antonio residents are currently
appealing to the government in a case over environmental rights. Methane gas from an
improperly operated gas generator from pig manure has been seeping downhill and making
neighboring residents ill.

The case has been slow in developing because many of the

victims are relatives of the generator's owners and have been unwilling to press the
government for relief. Usufruct, proprietary, and environmental rights often vary by the
status o f the users, and will be modified based on whether the use is for subsistence or
commercial uses, how scarce the resource is, whether the area has ulterior social meanings
such as in sacred set-asides or even by the level of public environmental concern by those

26 The weakness of my study in failing to do a random sampling that allows statistical correlations to be
drawn between factors is here apparent. It would be useful to draw correlations between cultivation
practices (mechanical, shifting, fallowing) and land tenure (leasehold and private).
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who lack formally recognized rights such as NGOs, local and indigenous groups
(Fortmann 1985).
Property rights, then, manifest themselves as tenurial relationships in social situations
and include rights o f access to resources; rights to ownership, disposition, and inheritance;
rights to lend, lease, or permit others access and use; rights to exclude others from use;
rights o f traditional and customary use; and rights to buy, sell, and profit, from the
marketing o f the resource.
When various rights become codified through law and custom, they come to be taken
for granted in the public mind and then present constraints on the decisions and
possibilities within those systems. Other options o f choice, perhaps equally valid, are not
as readily evident. Various customary tenure systems may protect the rights of certain
individuals and groups more than those of others. Ranchers, mine, and timber companies
have long enjoyed privileged profiteering on public lands in Belize (Bolland 1986), as have
latifundistas in Mexico whose prime fertile bottom-lands have escaped land redistribution
since the ejido law Article 27 went into effect (Tello 1968).

Communal property and

customary indigenous lands have suffered losses with increased land privatization, often
against peasant wishes and legal constraints (Reed 1964; Tello 1968) and sometimes, as in
the case b f San Antonio, with their support (Tuma 1965; Tzul 1993).
Modem land leasing near San Antonio has not guaranteed fair or equal land
distribution in the community. The loss of community redistribution practices maintained
under ancient customary Mayan practices under the current lease system eliminated a local
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means to guarantee maximum utilization of agricultural land around the village and
produced a situation o f local lane/ scarcity for some in San Antonio. Within my study,
37% o f responding San Antonio households reported neither owning nor leasing land
while 16.5% o f those with land own or lease ten acres (4 hectares) or less. The majority
o f non-landowners were young people with small families usually living with their parents.
The Peanut and Grain Cooperative, representing about 11% of village households, is
seeking expansion land in the MPRFR not so much for redistributional purposes as for
access to irrigation and year-round farming. Many PGC members already have adequate
acreage o f land near San Antonio, though they, too, maintain the need for land to divide
among their children.
Perhaps Daniel Bromley puts the relationship of property rights and distributive
)

justice the best when he says that land reform should deal with four aspects: "(a) who
controls land, (A) who may use land, (c) who reaps the benefit o f land use, and (d) who
bears the costs o f land use" (Bromley in Eicher and Staatz 1984: 276). There is little to
indicate that PGC incursions into the MPRFR should be considered a community-based
land reform practice aimed at colonizing land for the benefit o f the village's landless
population.

Chapter 5 How Tenure Security and Household Differentiation Affect Decisions to

Invest in Agricultural Intensification
Leasehold and Under-Utilization
The preceding chapters established that the Masewal have a tradition of customary
cultivation rights that integrates community membership and community regulation with a
system o f shifting cultivation. Under British colonial rule, these customary practices were
tolerated while the government first limited the area available for cultivation and then
established a fixed rent leasehold that replaced local control over land distribution within
the village.

The low fixed rent leasehold tenure system had the curious effect of

permitting the village to monopolize agricultural land around San Antonio and thus
prevent the development o f a land market. This process ensured San Antonio's isolation,
giving it a rare opportunity to maintain Masewal cultural heritage while the village
gradually modernized. This heritage is seen today in the use of the Masewal language
within the village and in the village's adaptation o f leasehold and village council
arrangements to maintain elements of customary cultivation rights, including rule by an
alcalde selected by elders, voting rights established by birth and maintained through land
relationships, and responsibility o f a council of elders for the distribution o f land to
younger families.27
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27 While land distribution rights have been taken over by the national government, the right to distribute
surveyed town lots is still practiced by the Village Councils. Belizean law requires that town lots be
auctioned (Dickson 1983). However, the custom is to grant distribution rights to indigenous
communities (F. Tzib, R. Thompson 1994, pers. com.).
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The acceptance o f the privatization o f property rights embodied in leasehold
arrangements, however, limits land redistribution to hereditary division and, because
all arable land near the village is currently leased, San Antonio newcomers lack the
means to obtain land. Consequently, large families are forced to subdivide parcels to heirs
into units too small to be profitable under current farming techniques. Many follow the
option to seek land and employment outside o f the village. The San Antonio Peanut and
Grain Cooperative has actively been pursuing land acquisition within the Mountain Pine
Ridge Forest Reserve for a variety of reasons, additional land for younger family members
and the landless being one.28
While leasehold serves to provide adequate land tenure security for community
members to encourage investment, lease laws and the recognition of usufruct rights serve
to discourage maximum land utilization while encouraging continued deforestation and
conversion to pasture land and idle farmland. Under-utilization of land occurs because
individuals refuse to lease idle land to others due to fears o f losing the lease to the tenants.
It is cheaper to pay the small yearly rent and keep the land. I was told of nearly 200 acres
being held idle for this reason. Only a quarter of the land near San Antonio was reported
to be cropped, partially indicative of degraded soils, rocky soils, and the village practice of
wamil (a form o f shortened bush fallow) and partially due to idle land and low productivity
pasture. Other than rocky forested hills, the land near the village was generally treeless
while more distant land was actively undergoing forest to pasture conversion. Belizean

28 The search for water for year-round irrigation as a means to eliminate the dry season unemployment
that forces most San Antonio residents into debt is the main reason. Seeking a new village site with
water to lessen the daily burden on families was another. (PGC, pers. com ).
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law recognizes the clearing o f land as "improvement" and therefore clearcutting is the
basis o f usufruct rights used to establish leasehold land.29 With 50% clearing, the land
becomes available for purchase as private property (Moberg 1992)30 though few San
Antonio residents feel the need to convert land as seen by the low percentage of private to
lease land in the area. Poor farmers find the clearing of new land to be a less expensive
way to show continued use for lease requirements than investing in agricultural
intensification o f land already cleared.
Finding ways to encourage better utilization o f cleared land through increased
productivity will ostensibly reduce pressures for forest conversion to permanent
agriculture land. Agricultural intensification near San Antonio will need to deal with the
issue o f under-utilization if it is to be used as a means to stem forest conversion pressure.

Peasant Household Differentiation and Wider Security Issues
A digression from the issue o f land tenure systems into the issue o f household
differentiation and risk strategies is useful to explore the root issues behind investment
practices in agricultural intensification.

For sure, secure land tenure, usually obtained

29 Glaser and Marcus (1994) report that 38% of the residents in the Columbia Forest Management Area in
Southern Belize believe that the "forest belongs to those who cut it" - another example of the
continuation of Mayan customary cultivation rights but now the village lacks the local authority to
control land use.
30 "Under the country's tenure laws, applications for land title are denied unless at least half the land
applied for is 'developed' (i.e., cleared or under permanent cultivation). The planting of tree crops, such
as citrus or coconuts, thus provides a means for small-scale farmers to formalize their claim to land.
Citrus is also attractive to farmers as a source of old-age income because once established it requires
much less strenuous labor than milpa farming." (Moberg 1992: 85) At this point, there is no evidence
that San Antonio farmers see the planting of trees as a necessary means to achieve title, nor is investing
in trees and agroforestry seen as a viable form of farm investment or retirement income.

through either a formal land title or a long-term fixed lease, lies at the heart o f patterns of
peasant investment in agricultural intensification.

Without the assurance that they will

possess the land in the future, few peasant households will make investments in the land
beyond those needed to guarantee family subsistence. But given the penetration of the
money economy to virtually all comers under global capitalism, peasants with the means
will invest in capital improvement and public works as a capitalist unit as long as
household subsistence is not threatened (Popkin 1979) and domestic and food import
competition is not too strong (Moberg 1991).

Thus, living a functionally dualistic role,

peasants develop adaptive strategies to minimize risk and maximize profit. In a rational.
but non-capitalist manner, small farm households at times forego income generating work
and allocate household labor instead to subsistence crop production (increase production),
shift between market crops and subsistence crops, and work at unprofitable wages to
preserve household subsistence (Moberg 1992).

The curtailment of household

consumption through reduced caloric intake, the reduction of outside purchases and
agrochemical inputs accompanied by increased reliance on household food production,
and the rejection o f innovation for fear of upsetting the balance between the peasant
household and outside markets are all conservative survival strategies aimed at reducing
family subsistence risk (Wolf 1966). "Local people tend to be reluctant to enter into any
situation which they perceive as exposing themselves to significant risks, and avoiding risk
rather than maximizing yield is the basis for much subsistence agriculture" (Hough 1988:

On the other hand, peasants live with climatic risk as a major determinant in their
livelihood security31 and seek investment risk as an element of household survival
strategies when there is an availability of agricultural surpluses (Russell and Nicholson
1981).

Numerous elements play into a peasant's willingness to accept the risk of

investment in agricultural intensification techniques:

family food security, secure

long-term land tenure relationships, population pressures and land scarcity, variations in
asymmetrical market relationships, climatic patterns, credit and non-farm employment
opportunities, and peasant/government relations.

Customary practices of group public

investment known as fa jin a are practiced in San Antonio - formerly six days of voluntary
work each year required o f all able bodied men of the village for community infrastructure
maintenance that now designates collective work days called by the Village Chairman to
accomplish specific community projects. The Peanut ,and Grain Cooperative with about
25 members is another form o f collective investment using funds received from
non-Belizean NGOs and from the Belizean Federation o f Associated Cooperatives to
purchase machinery and to provide loan capital for members (Carroo 1987; Harpold et. al.
1990; Re. Tzib 1994, pers. com.).

Most agricultural investment, however, is left to

individual households to make on their own leased land or to the national government for
public works when funding and political will is available.32
31 "Livelihood is defined as adequate stocks and flows of food and cash to meet basic needs. Security
refers to secure ownership of, or access to, resources and income-earning activities, including reserves
and assets to offset risk, ease shocks and meet contigencies. Sustainable refers to the maintenance of
enhancement of resource productivity on a long-term basis. A household may be enabled to gain
sustainable livelihood security in many ways - through ownership of land, livestock or trees, rights to
grazing, fishing, hunting or gathering; through stable employment with adequate remuneration; or
through varied repertoires of activities (Food 2000. 1987:3)." (from Chambers 1988: 9-10, emphasis
added)
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Peasants are generally risk-aversive in their investment patterns, tending to adopt new
technology and methods o f agricultural intensification only after community leaders have
adopted them or by piecemeal adaptation o f traditional practices to more modem ones.
According to Village Chairman don Felix Tzib (personal communication), Mayan villagers
o f San Antonio (Cayo) have crossed imported short-season sweet com with local
indigenous varieties. Imported sweet com, whose sweetness may sell for extremely high
prices if sold in a timely manner, suffers the disadvantage o f storing poorly in the Belizean
heat if not sold as "green" (fresh) com, a source o f risk and loss in glut years for local
farmers.

The local indigenous variety is larger, slower growing, and susceptible to

windthrow but stores without a fungus problem. Thus local farmers are improvising a
new variety in an attempt to reduce risk yet take advantage the strengths and markets of
each species.

The introduction o f agro-chemical inputs and of new African star grass

varieties for cattle pastures have been pioneered by the area's largest landowners and the
PGC are slowly being adopted by area farmers in San Antonio. The capital accumulation
that accompanies successful risk gambles is found commonly as a goal o f small peasant
farmers.
The degree of acceptance o f risk among peasant households is not the same for all
households. Ample research o f patterns o f income distribution and land tenure has shown
32 San Antonio residents tell the following story about public investment in the electrical system in the
village. Twice in the years preceding the coming of electricity to town in 1992, the people of San
Antonio went to the mountains, cut electrical poles, and erected them along the streets in anticipation of
government fullfilling political promises to bring electricity to the village. Twice they were cut down
for firewood when those promises proved to be hollow. One pole remains standing by the Catholic
Church in symbolic memory to the collective investment on the part of residents. Residents who live
along the San Antonio Road still await electricity with poles erected. Skepticism of government
promises and politics runs deep in San Antonio for good reason.
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that peasant communities are highly differentiated social structures (Chambers 1988;
Belsky 1993). This differentiation is based on amount and quality of land farmed, the level
o f diversification o f production (and hence market flexibility), the scale or production and
use o f technological inputs, availability of risk capital, the age and characterization o f a
household in terms o f lifecycle, unequal food security, mobility and access to
transportation, and household credit opportunities.

Differentiation in San Antonio Landholdings
My study suggests a differentiated land ownership pattern in San Antonio.

The

average reported ownership holding was above 48 acres while the average lease holding
was around 35 acres.

(Belize uses the acre rather than the hectare measure).

Just four

land owners held 55% of the reported private land holdings. If they are removed from the
survey the average size o f the private ownership holding falls to 27 acres.

This is just

below the 30 acre level that Belize has set as a goal for small farms (Hartshorn et. al.
1984) - a goal in accordance with local perceptions o f a necessary farm size (R. Tzib,
personal communication).33 Nearly 44% of those holding lease land rented more than 35
acres o f land with an average o f 52 acres per leasehold while the remaining 56% averaged
leasehold sizes o f 22 acres, suggesting that more than half o f the leasehold farms may be
below the size needed for farm self-sufficiency. About 54% o f reporting households had

33 Glaser (1992) reccomends a minimum of 20 acres per family but suggests that where land scarcity or
the need to protect forest habitat is especially acute, ten acres and supplemental non-farm income might
be a better social goal. The idea of supplemental income is especially important for forest conservation
interests as supplemental income activities such as nontimber forest product collection can serve both for
household income and as a forest conservation practice (Belsky 1993).
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less than ten acres o f farmland or no land at all, certainly indicating the need for non-farm
employment in the support o f household sustainability. The overall average size o f the
103 households reporting land ownership or leasing was 38 acres.
These figures, which illustrate San Antonio's farming dependency and relative farm
size differential, clearly do not tell the whole tenure story. San Antonio's second largest
landowning and cattle ranching family, with 500 acres, is not included in the statistics due
to sampling problems.

Including them here, only five families report controlling more

than one hundred acres o f land - two control 500 acres and 600 acres respectively, one
181 acres, and the other two just over one hundred.

These large ranch/farms tend to be

shared with extended families and may include joint control by several closely related
families.
Intermittent heavy rains in July and throughout the fall and winter and the hard work
o f local farmers has made San Antonio well-known for its productivity (Thompson 1994,
pers. com ). Peanuts are marketed both in Belize's largest cities by village merchants and
through the Peanut and Grain Cooperative and its association with the Belizean Federation
of Associated Cooperatives (BFAC) to Barbados and other Caribbean markets. Moberg
(1992) states that peanuts are the one crop that has rivaled citrus in Belize for profitability
per acre, but national peanut production has been inconsistent and affected by climatic
conditions and his claim may be somewhat overstated. Farmers in San Antonio have not
profited enough to own pick-up trucks and it is the merchants who seem to have reaped
the benefits o f the peanut's success. Low gross profit margins for peanuts (King et al.
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1993) might be improved by recent plantings of larger Virginia peanuts imported from the
states and planted in the area in May of 1994. Watermelon is a consistent producer in San
/

Antonio (if cattle, horses, and tapir are successfully kept out) and brings consistent prices
except during glut years. Com is only rarely used domestically as a food source, though it
is retained as subsistence security and as poultry feed. Most is sold locally to one of four
pig farms or on the feed market in San Ignacio. For the most part, small farmers seem to
)

believe that agriculture is still a healthy and profitable business, but blame the dry season
and financial debts, accruing to the penetration of the money economy as the reason for not
advancing economically.
An interesting point can be made between the relationship of tenure and land
productivity in San Antonio.34 Like most of Central America, cattle are perceived as an
agricultural goal due the possibility of rapid conversion to large capital sums when mature
(valued at almost BZSIOOO per animal). The disadvantages of high cattle production costs
from herd purchase, veterinarian bills, fence construction and repair, water development,
compensation payments to neighbors whose subsistence and commercial crops may be
damaged by marauding cattle, and gradual range degradation common to the tropics (de
Janvry et al. 1989) are often overlooked by eager local farmers.

Success, however,

appears to have a direct relationship to land ownership. The direct relationship between
farm size and successful cattle ranching is readily evident in San Antonio.

34 See Barraclough 1973, de Janvry et. al. 1989. and Prostermann andReidinger 1990 for discussions on
farm size and productivity. Essentially they concur that small, even marginal farms in Central America
have outproduced large farms due to high labor investment and low input investment per acre and
because of increased yields through intercropping.
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Only nine households reported owning commercial animals in the San Antonio survey
out o f 65 reporting (13.8%) and two o f these were commercial pig farms that bought
rather than grew feed for their animals. O f the nine, five were associated with holdings of
over 100 acres, one o f 75 acres and one o f 60 acres. Thus only two farms reported cattle
on acreage o f 30 acres or less, with one possessing only 4 head. Cattle provide a source
o f cash security for peasant farmers and represent a high level of capital accumulation.
Local farmers told me that a herd of only 12-15 animals was barely self-sustaining and that
a herd o f nearly 30 animals was needed to make consistent money selling cattle (F. Tzib,
personal communication). Using a figure taken from Costa Rica, 3 acres of fresh pasture
land or 7 acres o f old deteriorated pasture land is needed per head of cattle in the tropics
(Forest Historical Society 1992). Local farmers reported the need to rotate cattle from
area to area estimating the need from between two and five acres per head o f cattle (F.
Tzib, A. Tzul; E. Tzib, pers. com.) Since most pasture land in the San Antonio area is
old, it can be assumed that it takes 60-85 acres to maintain a self-sustaining herd and
around 150-200 acres for profitable cattle ranching. Only two farms fit this size in the
area.
Based on land tenure relations, profitable cattle raising35 does not seem to be a
sustainable or equitable method of agricultural intensification in the San Antonio area,
though pasture improvement might increase herd size per area and permit smaller sized
profitable ranches (at 3 acres/head, 70 acres might suffice for a sustainable and profitable

35 In his 1987 report to HTVOS (the Humanistic Insititute for Cooperation with DevelopingcCountries) on
the progress of the San Antonio Peanut and Grain Cooperative, Winston Carroo suggests for
intensification possiblities for the cooperative: cattle, citrus, coffee, and cacao.
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herd - eleven reporting farms meet that limitation). Many years ago the USAID and the
government o f Belize developed a pasture demonstration project to the northeast o f San
Antonio using five types o f zacate grasses in efforts to encourage methods of enriching
pasture land for cattle.

"The Mayans don't like zacate," a local pig farmer told me,

"because cattle and pigs won't eat it much. They prefer to use Guinea grass or faragua."
Guinea grass is a two foot tall wetter site grass used to fatten cattle but not common in
local pastures. A second type o f grass introduction, this one being currently supported by
a few local cattle ranchers and the cattle association, is a form o f African star grass that
can be transplanted by simply pulling up roots and shoving them underground in new
locations. The largest cattle rancher in the area swears by the African star grass which is
practically indestructible and soon dominates the vegetative landscape, providing even dry
season forage.36 However, I witnessed African grass that had been planted on a hill above
productive bottomland which had spread rapidly into the crop soil.

The farmer

complained that even following mechanical plowing, nothing would germinate or grow on
the ground because o f the grass.

There should be a cautionary note added to its

introduction not to plant African grass near cultivable areas.
A second restriction on the expansion of cattle ranching is the availability of water.
Until 1968, San Antonio only had five cattle operations, all with less than 15 head o f
cattle. The establishment o f artificial ponds (rainwater catchments) and the development
o f a few springs allowed the expansion of cattle to 22 ranchers and 350 total head by 1992

36 This grass is being used only by a few area ranchers. Whether it will maintain its productivity with
time has not been demonstrated.

66

(Tzul 1993) although my study indicates that these numbers have dwindled in the
intervening years. The question o f water availability returns time and time again as one of
the major restrictions on agricultural expansion and intensification. Possibly the drilling of
wells and the installation o f gas pumps might permit greater land area to be converted to
pasture.
If a small farm family has members capable of supporting intensification investment
through outside income, a family may be encouraged to take intensification risks.
Landless and tenant households often lack access to credit and therefore lack risk
opportunity even if they would pursue investment. Low wages and real wage declines in
the 1980s due to the international recession, estimated at 6%, and persistent rural poverty
(62%) in rural Latin America (de Janvry et al. 1989) severely limits peasant household
investment patterns (Moberg 1991). San Antonio residents have participated extensively
in outside income generating activities, beginning with work in the woods and in the
sawmills in the Mountain Pine Ridge area in the 1950s. Today, 92 households or 45% of
all village households report having outside employment income, the majority being
employment in marketing, with the Forest Department or with tourist resorts near the
MPRFR. O f these, just under half report owning or leasing land in the surrounding area
with an average holding o f 41 acres, fairly close to the San Antonio average. Households
with out-of-household income cultivate 29% of their land with annual crops as compared
to a village average o f 27.3% (Clark 1994). This would seem to indicate that outside
employment is not a factor in land use productivity, although in many cases
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out-of-household income permits investment in the hiring of seasonal agricultural laborers
for clearing, planting, and harvesting.

Risk and National Government Policies
A peasant's relationship to the government agencies which control titling practices
and entitlement policies is fundamental to security issues. The peasant J s, at a decided
disadvantage in titling procedures. National governments, as in Belize, are responsible for
granting formal fee-simple ownership titles to peasants who have demonstrated
usufructuary rights through land clearing, fence and building construction, annual cropping
or the planting o f perennial crops. The centralized political authority in charge o f granting
and adjudicating titles (the Lands and Survey Department in Belize), is usually distant
from rural crop lands, maintaining surveying and titling procedures that take years to
negotiate. Often states grant titles or expedite land surveys as a means to support national
economic development priorities rather than to assist the security and agricultural
investments o f small farmers. Faced with burdensome international debts and the need for
export earnings, Third World governments commonly illustrate more sympathy to settling
large corporate farms or to forest conversion to pasture than attending the rather
expensive surveying and titling procedures for small household farmers (Bolland 1986;
Moberg 1992). The possibility o f political corruption in the granting of formal titles, or if
not corruption then at least abrupt changes in national development policies during
governmental party transitions, is a source o f insecurity of real importance to peasants in
remote areas o f little political influence (Chambers 1988; Pearce and Warford 1993).
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The granting o f private title and ownership, however, is not always the same as
•

gaining control o f the land. Many resources, such as trees of commercial timber size,
minerals, and precious metals Belize, are reserved by the state even during titling.
Continual improvement maintenance is a prerequisite for holding land in Belize, even after
purchase, and sixty-six foot wide riparian strips are expressly protected from
development.37 On the other hand, without formal titles and the credit worthiness it
bestows on a peasant, peasants needing to intensify agriculture to remain competitive may
be forced to borrow heavily on extremely costly informal credit markets and thereby
worsen their competitive position (Pearce and Warford 1993).

In Belize, surveyed

leasehold land (see map in Appendix 2) is available for use as collateral (FPMP 1993).
Informal credit markets persist in San Antonio where farmers agree to exclusively sell.
peanuts to individuals granting loans to area farmers, often at a price actually higher than
that offered by the Belize Federation of Associated Cooperatives and the PGC. The PGC
maintains credit with the BFAC and offers loans for seed, fertilizer and tractor services to
its own member's and to the community at large. The last Belizean government under the
People's Unity Party opened a series of Small Business and Farmers Banks capitalized by a
combination o f government funds and small farmer stock purchases which operated for a
year and a half to the benefit of local San Antonio farmers.

However, structural

adjustment policies shut the bank down in 1992 in the middle o f the growing season,
catching local farmers with outstanding loans from greatly expanded purchases o f seeds

37 Easements to permit development within the 66 foot riparian zone have been given to ecotourism
developments in the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve (personal observation) and in other areas of
Belize such as the coastal village of Hopkins (Palacio 1995, pers. com.).
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and tractor services but in need o f additional funds for fertilizer, harvest and marketing.
Many farmers lost a bundle and are now risk shy given the past uneven levels of
government support:

Furthermore, local investors in the bank have been unable to

determine the location o f their investment capital in the bank and may have lost that as
well (A. Mai, pers. com ).
For tenants lacking secure formal titles or tenure security, investment that cannot be
recouped within one year or sometimes even one growing season often is not pursued
except under conditions o f land pressure (Boserup 1965). Many agroforestry perennial
crops and reforestation efforts are virtually impossible under systems of insecure land
tenure (Bruce and Fortmann 1992) due to long rotation periods (15-50 years). However,
short term leases do not necessarily discourage agricultural investment. Cheung (1969)
believes that "insecurity, although undesirable for the tenant, may provide a stimulus to
farming activity" (p. 80). He states that research in Asia indicates that production per
hectare is nearly equal on lands with long or short term leases,, with long term leases
reducing the transaction costs involved in leasing while short term leases permit lower
enforcement costs and renegotiation allows tenants with insufficient experience or
knowledge to improve their position in later negotiations.

Colonization of Forest Land and the San Antonio Peanut and Grain Cooperative
Colonization o f forested land presents a host or risks to peasants, government, and
the environment due to the low level of existing governmental authority and services in
remote settlement areas. Operation under usufruct tenure title security drives peasants to
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give priority to activities (i.e., deforestation) that clearly increase one's usufruct claims to
the land regardless o f landform, soil type, or political policy governing forested lands. The
possibility o f public sector expropriation, particularly for forest reserves, parks, and
biodiversity protection, combines with the remoteness of government institutions and
general marginal soil fertility to produce extensive title conflicts and environmental
degradation in areas o f on-going forest conversion and colonization. Colonization is often
driven by population growth, impoverishment, scarcity of land, fluctuating non-farm
employment opportunities and the creation o f national reserves.
"In such areas, as populations grow and common property resources are appropriated,
agriculture becomes more intensive, and for time at least, less sustainable as fallows
shorten and/or livestock become more numerous. Core invasions and pressures,
appropriations and exclusions by government and by the urban and rural rich, declining
biological productivity, and rising human populations drive many of the poorer people
to migrate. This they do either seasonally or permanently, some to cities and towns,
some to areas of green revolution agriculture, and some to forests, savannas, steepslopes, flood-prone flatlands and other vulnerable or marginal areas. In these areas they
may adopt sustainable forms of cultivation and pastoralism, but more often cannot,
hindered and discouraged as they are by insecure tenure, lack of appropriate technology,
and poverty." (Chambers 1988: 4)

Land titling in colonization areas usually follows the stages of the exploration and
filing o f initial claims, farm consolidation and the establishment of usufruct rights, the
intensification and development o f agriculture, and formal land titling (Jones 1990). Due
to the lack o f the presence o f governmental authority in areas of colonization, titling
presents specific problems in such areas. Many titles are never formalized due to costs
and difficulties in reaching distant titling offices and titles are passed on through informal
written titles that establish usufruct lineage. These informal transfer titles often lead to

competing claims that are difficult to resolve.

In efforts to limit environmental

degradation and to encourage equitable land distribution, many settlement schemes are
designed with acreage limits to limit ownership and consolidation. The proposed PGC
leasehold in the MPRFR is 1000 acres with the provision that only 400 acres of flat land
can be farmed but lacks an impaired right provision against land consolidation.
Maintaining limitations on title rights is difficult due to the passage of many informal titles
to single persons and the lack o f impaired right easements that limit the sale o f property to
others.

Even where regulations exist, wealthy owners are able to gain control o f

additional land by titling it in the names o f children and relatives, and cases of hiring
farmers to colonize land to be sold to a prospective rancher and o f 'predatory' burning
have been documented in Central America (Collins 1986; Schwartzman 1987; Jones
1990). I did not document such cases in San Antonio.
Poor peasant management by non-native migrants has been a serious problem in areas
undergoing deforestation and conversion to agricultural land or pastures:

"Intensification of shifting cultivation, a frontier attitude toward new lands that leads to
an ongoing pattern of exploitation and abandonment of fields, and failure to consider the
long-term effects of cultivation practises are all problems that have been attributed to
small farm colonists in new settlement areas.... Moran found that most of the problems
that colonists encountered were related not to their own poor resources or inability to
sustain yields, but to their own poor management practices and an inattentiveness on the
part of government agencies and other institutions to the local realities of the
colonization context." (Collins 1986: 2)

Collins found significant patterns o f interaction between the social context of colonization
activity, small producer decisions, and environmental degradation. Tax incentives and
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subsidies often support forest conversion to pasture which remains the greatest serious
threat to forest habitat in the neotropics.38 Business-based development such as road
construction for commercial timber extraction and mining is a major watershed and
deforestation problem, and infrastructure road construction for business purposes opens
areas to the advancing colonization frontier, threatening biodiversity that relies on secure
forest habitat (Plumwood and Routley 1982, Noss 1987, 1989, and 1990). In some cases,
the weakening o f indigenous institutions at the edge of the agricultural/forest interface has
resulted in power being handed to corrupt politicians and special interest minded forest
officials and contractors who have protected the forests less than most indigenous
communities might have (Chambers 1988; Pearce and Warford 1993).

This has not been

the case o f the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve which has a reputation for being one
o f Central America's better managed reserves. Blame for the degradation o f forests and
the conversion o f forest to cleared agricultural land, then, is highly site specific; most
documented cases o f rapid forest conversion in Belize and the rest o f Central America
have resulted from outside speculation (timber concessions, ranchers and tourism), from
agribusiness plantation expansion, and from immigration o f non-native colonos or refugees
rather than from the practices o f sedentary indigenous or peasant populations. Sedentary

38 "Inadequate forest policy and management are often abetted by misguided agricultural policy. Many
countries actively encourage the conversion of tropical forests to other uses. Rules of land tenure in
many states, such as Sabah, allow private parties to obtain title to forested land by showing evidence of
'improving' it - by clearing away the trees, for example. In the Philippines, Brazil and elsewhere,
recognized rights of occupancy or possession are awarded on the basis of the area of land cleared. Such
provisions often become a mechanism for privatizing land from the public forest estate. Those who
obtain ownership soon sell out to larger capitalists, who consolidate the land to establish private ranches
and accumulate speculative holdings.” (Reppeto 1990: 41) See also K.D. Singh's (1993) comparative
analysis of ten-year FAO data for more information entitled "The 1990 tropical forest resources
assessment," Unasvlva. Vol.44, No. 174, pp. 10-19.
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peasant cultures commonly respond to population pressures and land scarcity primarily
through the intensification o f agriculture (Boserup 1965; Comista and Escueta 1990), but
not always with the conservation o f forest and forest resources.
In the case o f San Antonio, continued land colonization since 1964 has not left
government analysts confident that forest resources and agricultural land are being
adequately protected. An early USAID document on deforestation in Belize reported that
"[e]xtensively deforested areas are few in Belize: Mennonite farming communities in the
northwest; sugar cane lands in the north; and traditional Indian areas o f milpa farming in
the west [near San AntOiiio and Succotz] and the south." (Hartshorn et. al., 1984:98)
Preliminary investigation o f land use intensification in the San Antonio area, performed by
the NARMAP for the Forest Planning and Management Project, characterized the area
like this:

Observations [of NARMAP reconnaissance flight]: Area north of San Antonio is being
extensively fanned. Most of the lands are on hilly or rolling topography. Land pressure
is relatively intense. Topography and land use dictate a need to introduce and promote
conservation practices that will encourage sustainable framing of these lands. If action
is not taken these lands will be degraded by intense cropping to the point that they will
be abandoned. As a result more lands will be needed to support the farming community.
This process has al reach' been initiated as the San Antonio Small Grains and Peanut
Cooperative has requested and received lands in the Pine Ridge Forest Reserve.
Farming activity has been initiated by the cooperative. Lands have been cleared in the
lower regions. The amount of land cleared is in excess of 100 A The total area leased
to the cooperative is 1000 A and approximately 400A is valley bottom lands. Very little
clearing can be observed on the hillsides. (Nolan, NARMAP, December 20, 1993)

For those concerned with forest protection, the colonization efforts by the San
Antonio Peanut and Grain Cooperative of land within the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest
Reserve (see map in Appendix 2) present two distributional issues related to land tenure.
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The first is whether title transfer to the PGC will benefit land needs o f the community,
particularly those o f landless young families needing leasehold land for their own, and
thereby reduce local forest conversion pressures.

The second concerns future tenure

expectations for land in question and whether privatization and the loss o f government
control over development processes is probable.

The Intensification o f Agriculture - Household Investment and Appropriate Technology
The modeling o f agricultural development and the reasoning behind peasant adoption
o f increasingly intensified cultivation techniques has been pursued along a variety of paths.
Conklin (1957), Boserup (1965), W olf (1966) and other cultural analysts have taken an
historical approach o f attempting to follow cultivation patterns from extensive shifting
cultivation with long fallow periods to highly intensified multi-cropping with little or no
fallow. Economic theorists have preferred to view intensification as the inevitable product
of linear technical advancement and of market driven adaptation to meet the needs of
colonial, domestic, or international demand (see Eicher and Staatz 1984 for a summary of
the ideas o f Prebish, Singer, Johnston, Hirschman, and Schultz). Modernization theorists
stressed modernity as the root to technological development - the change o f attitude
toward modem values o f hard work, efficiency, individualism, and entrepreneurship.39 On
the other hand, other analysts chose to study the history and livelihoods of peasants
themselves and to base models on peasant practices.

Popkin (1979) saw peasants

39 "With ... an understanding of traditional social structure, economy, and culture, one could anticipate the
changes needed to bring about a shift to modem forms and chart a course." (Russell and Nicholson
1981: 17 on modernization) For more reading on modernization see the works of Henri Aujac, Alex
Inkeles, and neo-liberal works by Milton Friedman.
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adopting new technology as a rational household peasant survival strategy, while Boserup
believed that intensification is rare without the prerequisite of population growth to supply
additional labor for intensification.
The various models, while providing useful frameworks for analysis, break down on
micro-inspection o f conditions near San Antonio where the coexistence o f agricultural
systems represents a common modeling dilemma. Near the agricultural/forest interface, a
differentiated peasantry farms with a variety o f techniques under the constraints of mixed
and sometimes unclear tenurial relations. Larger land owners and flat-land cultivators use
machinery and agrochemical inputs on securely titled or leased land.

More marginal

farmers still practice shifting cultivation on hillsides and poor ground to the west and north
o f the village.

Distant commercial farms and orchards hire local labor to irrigate and

harvest plantations. Migrants and refugees may be found squatting on private and state
land in large numbers not far from the village. The lack of consistent ownership patterns
provide a cautionary note to the use o f agricultural development models as descriptions of
conditions near San Antonio without rejecting their conclusions outright.
Boserup (1965) describes intensification in terms of the five staged process of
continual reduction of fallow periods - forest fallow, bush fallow, short fallow, annual
cropping and multicropping. Both of the long fallow systems, forest and bush fallow, are
forms o f shifting cultivation which use slash and bum clearing techniques, one or two year
cropping use, and then extended rotation back to natural vegetation. Gradual conversion
to fire resistant grasses occurs when fallow periods decrease following increases in food

76

demand and land scarcity resulting from population growth and ecological degradation.
Peasant communities face forced abandonment o f cultivation areas for new ground or
need the invention o f cultivation tools to turn sod (the plow). Plowing in turn leads to the
need to pasture work animals or to grow fodder crops in rotation with food crops and the
eventual development o f multi-cropping within the year or to permanent crops (Boserup
1965). W olf (1966) divides the fallow cycle as a four staged process o f long fallow,
sectoral fallow, short fallow, and permanent crops, though essentially with the same
almost linear historical development pattern.
Forest fallow rotations are characteristically 20-30 years long (Boserup 1965; Clay
1988) while in bush fallow (known in Belize as wamil or guamil) rotations persist 6-15
years in duration. Scientific evidence, indicates that long fallow periods characteristic of
tropical indigenous cultivation systems are substantially long enough to maintain soil
fertility (Amason et al. 1982, Baker 1984).40 Short cultivation periods are thought to
c

result from weed invasion rather than to soil fertility losses (Kellman and Adams 1970).
As fallow periods decline in length due to population pressures, soil fertility is maintained
by the application o f manure, crop rotations, and later agrochemical inputs. Tools, too,
are associated with the various cultivation systems.

Long fallow farmers use digging

sticks and possibly hoes, the need to weed leads short fallow farmers to use hoes and

40 Amason et. al. 1982 report that on agricultural lands nearby the Masewal village of Succotz in Belize
which have been farmed for nearly 100 years, the present cultivation system of ten year fallow periods
following two years of harvest are not long enough to restore adequate soil phosphorus levels between
cropping periods. They calculate that a 17.9 year fallow would be required to maintain original fertility
but that, with current levels of soil degradation, even longer fallow periods are currently needed for
restoration of soil quality. They suggest that non-traditional intercropping with phophorus mobilizing
plants may assist a more rapid soil reconditioning.
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plows, and annual cropping is associated with mechanical fanning and irrigation. Thus
intensification implies not only the shortening of fallow times, but changes in fertilizer type
and application rates, tool use, input labor needs, and capital investment input per crop
Boserup makes the claim that intensification technology is a result o f growing
populations and that without increasing the pressure on land caused by high population
density, there is little incentive for peasants to adopt intensification techniques.

This

1

assumption arises from the finding that intensification generally raises, rather than lowers,
labor demands per hectare and only if there is sufficient labor availability will peasants
make the choice to invest in intensification (Boserup 1965; Raintree and Warner 1987).
While many cases have been studied to support Boserup's population-push theory, it has
been criticized as failing to recognize the role of ecological factors, market and price
incentives and constraints, and political factors that also encourage or discourage agrarian
investment (Padoch 1985; Collins 1986; Jones 1990).

Padoch (1985) found that

indigenous rice cultivators in Kalimantan, Indonesia, adopted irrigated rice cultivation in
spite of heavier work loads due to climatic risk of dryland rice, accepting intensified
agriculture in spite o f low population density due to rational risk-reducing calculation.
She also found that village households facing the same population pressures adopt
intensification practices at different rates implying that other social institutions may be of
more central character, especially in the short term.

Jones points out that even after

adequate knowledge is understood and available about intensification, peasants will persist
in old ways if they use cheaper input requirements.
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For W olf (1966) adoption of agricultural intensification techniques represent a
delicate balance between peasant needs to continue subsistence, replacement, and
ceremonial funds around which customary life was centered and the intrusion of rational
economic markets.

With substantial surpluses to guarantee the needs of the various

customary practices and self-sufficiency, the peasant would adapt technology to produce
specialized commodity crops for market production.
Boserup raises some rather interesting points, particularly her theory that agricultural
intensification brings a diminishing return on labor input (i.e., increases labor/hectare
needs). Intensification is associated not only with changes in fallow but with changes of
actual plant types cropped. This, in turn, changes seasonal work patterns and possibly
leads to a loss o f idle seasons, introduces weeding as a major labor requirement, and
brings a gradual lengthening o f the work day.

Irrigation brings particularly large shifts in

labor patterns with its requirements for off-season irrigation system maintenance, need for
public investment (often a non-farm wage requirement), transplanting, and weeding.
Barraclough reports that as farms increase in size, generally associated with mechanical
intensification, labor needs per hectare also increase.

Both growing complexity in the

division o f labor and increases in non-agricultural production are associated with
population density increases and lend support to Boserup's diminishing labor return theory
o f intensification.
Intensification processes can be understood by a discussion of inputs, production, and
outputs. Inputs include land, labor, finances, technology, and knowledge. Unless inputs
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are priced low enough and unless households feel secure enough in their livelihoods, the
likelihood of investing in intensification is low. Inputs can be either labor saving or land
saving. Boserup maintains that labor saving development in times of rapid population
growth and labor surpluses is inappropriate technology, a thought echoed by a host of
development experts faced with the failure o f the Green Revolution to substantially
alleviate rural poverty and unemployment in Latin America (de Janvry et al. 1989; Pearce
and Warford 1990).

The rapid adoption of mechanical cultivation and herbicide

applications in San Antonio aimed at increasing household profitability and agricultural
productivity for a modem commodity market might be seen as an inappropriate
technology that exacerbates population and land scarcity pressures and which reduces
employment opportunities. Land saving inputs increase the output/area and total output
o f a region.
The application o f appropriate production technology (based on labor availability,
levels o f financial and political support, and peasant knowledge and organizational skills,
and what seems 'appropriate' to peasant beliefs) is designed to produce differential,
advantages in the sphere o f production through diversification of production,
improvement o f the economies of scale (land consolidation, collective purchase o f inputs),
and optimum land utilization. Receptivity to appropriate technology is a function of farm
characteristics and cultural context (Raintree and Warner 1986). Variation in productive
units by size, off-farm income potential, farm earning capability, land tenure, herd size,
accumulation capacity, and level o f previous savings and investment (Watts 1987) affect

80
how individual productive units accept offered technology. Previous experience with the
type o f technology also may determine the ability to accept or speed o f acceptance of a
particular form of technology such as irrigation or leguminous intercropping.
Output intensification can be direct, such as covering market roads with all-season
surfaces, or indirect such as policies that provide incentives for private construction of
export facilities and the like. Three examples for the need of market roads were found in
San Antonio. Individuals with land-locked unsurveyed plots complained that access to
and from their lands were being limited by adjacent private owners. Leaseholders of the
subdivided Maya Ranch lands complained that fall rains made the access roads impassable
for crop removal and that this had resulted in much of last year's peanut harvest in the area
spoiling. Finally, the PGC is demanding road and access improvement into the, proposed
lease lands within the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve along the Blancaneau Road,
threatening to improve it themselves if need be.

San Antonio Farming Practices and Acceptance o f Agricultural Intensification
San Antonio farmers have used multi-cropping (more than one crop per year) for
years in the practice o f milpa shifting cultivation.

The climate is conducive to double

cropping a primary crop in June and a secondary crop (matahambre) in December that
must mature during the early stages o f dry season. The farmers traditionally intercrop
squash and yams with their com, raising beans as well during the matahambre cycle. The
villagers deforested much o f the flatter arable land around the village to create cattle
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pasture grasslands and only the introduction o f tractor plowing has made the conversion
to multi-cropping commercial production possible in recent years. The soil requires heavy
agrochemical input for fertility as the natural nutrient cycle o f leaf litter incorporation was
interrupted by thorough tree removal. No virgin forest exists in the San Antonio flatlands.
Herbicides (particularly Gramazone sold as Paraquat in the U.S.) and machetes rather than
hoes are used to clear weeds.
Only a few orchards exist in the area, one showing yellowing from chlorosis, possibly
a nitrogen deficiency caused by large quantities of natural lime in the soil. (As with other
tropical areas, many different combinations o f nutrient deficiencies have been found in
soils near San Antonio).41 Other than the planting o f fruit trees, particularly lime and
native fruits near homes (known as huertas de casa), the Masewal expressed little
experience with tree planting and tree management in San Antonio was restricted to
long-fallow for post and pole growth and the leaving of fire resistant cohune palms in
fields for thatch. Several farmers remarked that the soil was inappropriate for citrus, but
cooperative members who had experimented with orchard production since 1987
suggested that lack o f water resources and costly fertilizer inputs were negative factors
inhibiting citrus expansion. The principles behind tree crop production were not widely
known and many residents expressed a belief that forestry and agriculture were
antagonistic

pursuits.

This

belief has

been

reinforced

by

conflicting

and

non-complementary programs stemming from the Agriculture Department and the

41 King et al. (1993: 19) label San Antonio soils as AZ Hill Bank Plain soil with the characterisitic of
"Droughtiness and nutrient imbalance limitations." A thorough study of San Antonio agricultural soils
was completed in 1975 (Olson 1975).
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Forestry Department over the years
Cover crops are not grown between plantings to restore soil fertility and
intercropping legumes was introduced Agriculture Department extension officers for the
first time in the summer of 1994 (pers. obs.). Com is grown both in milpas and in a few
instances as a row crop. Crop diversity, whose associated investment risk is high due to
high seed costs, the general unavailability o f water, and the lack of access to credit, is
practiced to a small scale with yams, coco yam, squash, and jicama being planted in small
areas for supplemental income.

A few growers have experimented with diversifying

commercial crops with peppers, tomatoes, okra and bokchoi, but lack of water remains a
critical problem for consistent results and production has been unreliable.
The population o f San Antonio has more than tripled since 1960, increasing at 4.21%
per annum between 1960 and 1990 (1991 Belizean National Census; Tzul 1993).42 I
found a slight population decline between 1990 and 1994, explained locally by the
out-migration o f youths seeking employment and o f families seeking livelihoods in areas
with running water.

Some signs that San Antonio may face Boserup's population
)

pressures include this acknowledged out-migration, increasing land scarcity as seen by the
professed land needs for extended families with land rights to plots just over the
subsistence minimums, the fact that 52% o f the village households have no land or
landholdings significantly below subsistence levels, and the village estimate that 209 town
lot sites will be needed in the next ten years to accommodate young families - a projected
100% increase in house structures (Clark 1994).

Census statistics concur with

42 3261960 (1 + X)30 = 11261990; therefore, X = .0421831 or 4.21%/year
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conclusions o f increasing village land needs and possible surplus future labor as 23% of
the 1126 villagers are between 10 and 19 years of age and 37.5% below ten years of age.
The village and national government are at the junction of deciding whether this
population will be met by agricultural intensification, outside employment, job
diversification and creation, increased out-migration or forest colonization.

The Smallholder Household. Local Agency and Factors Bevond Community Control
In

peasant

communities,

agricultural

intensification is clearly linked to
i.
socio-economic institutions related to household survival strategies aimed at achieving a
sense o f security about land tenure, household food security, and community stability.
However, these institutions may or may not be directly related to cultivation systems. A
peasant's sense of security is rooted in land tenure security that determines investment risk
acceptance and serves to underwrite financial credit opportunities, level of situated income
in a differentiated community, life cycle level and livelihood survival strategies, and
cultural traditions and cultivation experience. But peasant risk decisions are also affected
by many non-household determinants.

Among the outside influences on peasant

investment are environmental and social constraints: the level of development of the farm
production sphere, non-farm employment opportunities, intersectoral competition for
finance capital, and unrecognized social costs of intensification transformation such as
cultural disintegration.

Governmental support for competing incentive structures, its

willingness to invest in public goods (infrastructure development and the development of
complementary government programs), and foreign investment patterns alter the
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effectiveness o f local agency.

As long as the peasant family makes key investment

decisions at the household level, many o f the above important factors remain outside of
the household's sphere o f influence and consideration, leaving the peasant investor
alienated from the very factors that will determine the success o f his/her investment.
Those who discuss land tenure as the basis for secure investment and those who provide
linear development models o f cultivation practices clearly miss the point made by
political-economists: successful agricultural development is a multilayered social process.
Those factors that operate beyond the household farm's level o f operation I call social
and ecological constraints.

Social constraints include the willingness o f others to

organize locally (local agency), governmental actions, and public choice and markets.
Ecological constraints include poor tropical soils, tropical storms, and rainfall patterns.
Local agency operates in the sphere of decision-making by involving customs,
actions, organizations, willful public agricultural decisions, and local participation43 in
development decisions. After all,
"[t]he final task of rural development work rests on the shoulders of millions of farmers,
rural households, rural jobless, rural poor many of whom are landless, disadvantaged,
hungry and starved, and a great number of rural artisans and rural shopkeepers, who,
with sweat and toil in the burning sun, blowing windstorms, shivering cold and
torrential tropical rain, bear the burden of the work." (Poostchi 1986: 11-12)

Local organizations such as agricultural cooperatives, conservation NGOs, village
councils, and credit unions serve to share knowledge, pool resources, distribute usufruct
rights, and petition government agencies for financial and political support to local
43 local participation - "empowering people to mobilize their own capacities, be social actors rather
than passive subjects, manage the resources, make decisions, and control the activities that
affect their lives" (Cemea 1985:10 in West 1994:11)
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intensification efforts. "There is abundant evidence, contrary to Hardin, on the ability of
social groups to design, utilize, and adapt often ingenious mechanisms to allocate use
rights among members." (Feeny et al. 1990) Residents o f San Antonio have shown the
disposition to organize themselves for community betterment (the collection and raising of
electrical poles), for religion (the construction o f seven churches and a Pentecostal
school), and for agricultural organization (the Peanut and Grain Cooperative and buyer
and seller mechanisms).
Village and local agency faces both historical and present difficulties in asserting
itself, however. Village cohesion in San Antonio has suffered from many of the difficulties
recorded in other areas: the individualization of village life, the fostering of privatization
o f common property lands, the monetization o f and growth o f consumerism in village life,
fluctuations in volatile market, dependency on outside moneylenders and political
decision-makers and internal religious and power discrepancies (Blaikie 1985, Hough
1988; Bromley 1991; Wells 1994). The patronage political system of Belize which grants
economic benefits to political supporters creates grave fluctuations o f public sector
support between changes o f party regimes. A water system for San Antonio has flown on
political winds for years with pipes appearing and disappearing with leadership changes.
Factionalism is a stumbling block that stems from political favoritism.

Villagers

complained that jobs created during the road improvement projects were given to family
members o f the village chairman at the time. Two attempts at electing a village council in
1994 failed when Pentecostal members refused to participate in 'dirty politics.'

Advantageous access to resources through cooperative membership may prevent
effective social organization from taking place on a village-wide level (Moberg 1992).
The possibility that internal community dissension will surface if the PGC obtains irrigated
land in the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve is a distinct possibility if the Forest
Department decides to draw the line and permit only PGC operations there. The four
hundred arable acres in the MPRFR under consideration for allocation can provide
minimal subsistence acreage (ignoring commercial desires for the moment) for only 40
families based on Glaser's (1992) 10 acre minimum with supplemental income, no where
near the projected household growth in the village (Clark 1994).

Open-ended survey

questions administered during my survey revealed that the Peanut and Grain Cooperative
does not speak for the entire community as many respondents clearly stated their
preference to remain independent (see Appendix 4 for summary of open-ended question
responses). At a meeting I attended between government officials from the Agricultural
and Economic Development Ministries and the PGC held at the Peanut and Grain
Cooperative warehouse to discuss water issues, cooperative members, even when pressed
about community needs, continued to push for permission to develop water on
'Cooperative' lands in the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve rather than to address
overall community needs

Only the Village Chairman spoke out for the water needs of

village residents not present. While not necessarily competing claims, limited investment
capital might lead to a choice between either providing water for the village or providing
water for the PGC land in the MPRFR.
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Because the vast proportion of agricultural development funding passes through the
hands o f the national governments (Wells 1994), national resource management programs,
production incentives, and market manipulations and regulations strongly affect the
potential for local agency and investment.

In most underdeveloped countries, public

underwriting or direct subsidies may be necessary to achieve success in programs
concerned with the provision o f public goods. Forest conservation, especially when its
achievement is tied to the need for agricultural investment in intensification techniques as
argued in this thesis, is particularly sensitive to demands on national bodies from
competing public projects.

National investment falls into three areas: projects,

complementary social programs and management.
Project support includes agricultural research and extension services, agroforestry,
completion o f baseline studies, and the encouragement of the development o f local
governmental structures such as cooperatives and irrigation boards.

On this level, the

Agricultural Department is pursuing extension services and trying to encourage village
experimentation with the legume known as jrijo l abono for organic soil fertilization and
with village gardens to lessen commodity dependence by individual households (E. Tzib,
R. Thompson, pers. com ). Friction exists between extension agents and San Antonio
farmers, however, because Agriculture Department officers have historically opposed
PGC initiatives to expand landholdings into the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve
without first initiating intensification practices in the San Antonio area. Farmers maintain
that without adequate water supplies, intensification is largely a wasted effort.
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Complementary programs such as education, health care, and the provision of
modernized social services such as electricity and water greatly affect household security
and investment practices. In the last five years, the government has provided funding for
electricity, all-weather road improvement, and drilled four hand pump wells for the
village.44 With outside NGO financing and Peace Corps volunteer services, village labor
built a community health center in the summer of 1994, attesting to growing community
security. The building o f the health center, however, also produced a crisis that threatened
to end the customary tradition o f fajina or volunteer public work.

For the first time,

several community, members paid others to represent them during fajina. This angered
others who then refused to show up for fajina when it was called by the Village Chairman.
Eventually the Chairman persevered and the residents helped pour the concrete floor for
the health clinic, though laborers had to be hired to complete the structure. The grumbling
was not resolved as the Chairman was unable to secure workers to clean the cemetery and
it was eventually trimmed when a local political candidate hired people to clean the
grounds (F. Tzib 1994, pers. com.).
Finally, national agencies can assist local agricultural investment by providing
planning assistance to make sure projects are of an appropriate scale and direct projects
with appropriate land use policies and enforcement procedures. Government can further
insure the inclusion o f diversified human and natural resources in a project, develop
appropriate pricing and incentive supports, and participate in interactive planning and

44 Drinking water in San Antonio has been tested as just barely passing tests for dangerous levels of
nitrogen (King et al. 1993) and high calcium levels are above standards limiting danger to kidney stones
(Thompson 1994, personal communication).
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management with local bodies as a means of empowering and encouraging traditi'onal
cultural methodologies (Wells 1994). Yet, water and agricultural development situations
in San Antonio have revealed that the state (particularly partisan groups) often lacks the
same motivations as local citizens and rarely disclosures all of necessary information
needed for local decision-making to the San Antonio village council (F. Tzib 1994, pers.
com.). Often national governments pursue ex-sector policies and objectives that conflict
directly with peasant investment wishes (Barraclough 1973; Blaikie 1985; Moberg 1991;
Barry 1994; E. Tzib 1994, pers. com.).
In the planning and management o f public investment projects such as large scale
agricultural development projects such as irrigation and agroforestry that require changes
in customary practices and a commitment to maintenance as well as to construction, public
choice initiatives and rural development converge.

Public decisions are collective

decisions that directly require local input and design to be successful.

Russell and

Nicholson (1981) point out that local decision-makers are rational self-interested actors
-

seeking labor efficiency and profitability in their participation in public projects. Designing
public projects to focus on local goals with immediate pay-offs, maintaining a reasonable
scope and size to the project based on local conditions, and timing local inputs to fit
seasonal ability and agricultural labor requirements are keys to success (Hough 1988). It
is essential, also, that areas o f potential pit-falls for public projects be considered by both
local and state agencies in project design:

♦ lack of savings and money;
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♦ lack of trained leadership;
♦ costly and unrealizable enforcing mechanisms;
♦ organizational leadership and insurance;
♦ whether reforms are fixed or variable;
♦

operation of market mechanisms;

♦ risk of individuals absconding with public profits;
♦

how the distribution of benefits will affect a differentiated peasant community.

The view that agricultural intensification is very much a public decision needs to be
reconciled with the functional dualism o f the peasant household as a subsistence and
privatized capitalist enterprise.

Development projects that start small and incorporate

local institutional building in long term development programs have a much better chance
o f resulting in higher productivity, better household livelihoods, and more ecologically
r

minded development. For San Antonio, caught between customary Mayan practices and
modernization and between rising individualism and the need for integrated collective
decision-making, the future path o f development is neither clear nor determined.

Chapter 6 Implications of Land Tenure on Farmers' Desires for Irrigation to
Assist Agricultural Intensification in San Antonio

A Village Without Water
In seeking solutions to the conflict between the continuing expansion o f village
agricultural lands and Forest Department desires to preserve the forests o f the Mountain
Pine Ridge Forest Reserve for sustained-yield forestry, the Ministry o f Agriculture has
devoted considerable extension efforts towards increasing productivity on lands currently
cleared near the village. Farmers in San Antonio maintain, however, that it is the lack of
dry season cropping, not low productivity,45 that drives farming household broke as they
must assume burdensome debts each spring. Many scoffed at the idea o f investing in
proposed agricultural programs because those programs, too, would need stable water
supplies to guarantee their survival Because San Antonio farmers feel so strongly that
irrigation would be by far and away the best solution to dry season indebtedness, the issue
o f irrigation and its ties to land tenure institutions are discussed in depth in this chapter.
Other agricultural options such as dryland crop rotations and drought tolerant tree crops
with seasonal intercropping, and non-farm income generating possibilities such as the
collection o f non-timber forest products are reserved for the following and final chapter.
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45 In a personal interview with Dr. Glaser and I over agricultural issues in San Antonio in August of 1994,
the Minister of Agriculture acknowledged San Antonio's reputation as a hardworking and highly
productive farming community.
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When asked during my survey, "What is the major problem facing San Antonio?"
every single respondent replied, "Water."46 San Antonio is rare in that a village o f over
1100 agriculturally-based residents has grown on a site with no adequate water supply.
When village ancestors settled in San Antonio, two small creeks ran year-round from the
dense semi-tropical forest.

However, few residents can remember the creeks and San

Antonio has survived through the years from two shallow ponds and a series of springs
and wells in the surrounding countryside.
A few years ago, upon procuring funds for a community water system from USAID,
the Water and Sewage Authority (WASA) attempted to drill a community well in the
village, resulting in the development o f four wells with handpumps. None had substantial
enough flow to support a village system (estimated to need forty gallons per minute for
the current population). From early morning until evening during the dry season, every
three days, villagers line up at the well sites with as many as thirty plastic buckets waiting
their turn to secure a few days' water supply. Households without trucks have to carry
water from the wells or pay a driver to haul the water. Some residents prefer to go to the
creeks in the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve where they can bathe, wash laundry,
and return with a truck full o f domestic water all in one trip. During the wet season life is

,46 When San Antonio residents who have relocated outside of the village to seek outside employment were
asked about problems facing San Antonio, they often responded, "Too much religion." This was in
reference to the seven Pentecostal churches in and near the village. The rift between Pentecostal and
Catholic members is deep. One Pentecostal Peanut and Grain Cooperative member told me that village
cooperation was impossible because the non-Christians (i.e. the Catholics called "mundanos" or earthly
rather than heavenly people) would not convert and see the world like most of the villagers do. Only
one of the Pentecostal churches was willing to work with the Catholic Village Chairman in
accomplishing community projects.
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easier for those with metal roofs, gutters, and holding tanks who collect and store enough
water for a couple o f weeks.
Water is the major ecological constraint on agricultural intensification in San Antonio,
followed by rocky or degraded soil. Without water, many of the possible intensification
schemes proposed to assist San Antonio farmers are unrealizable.

The high intensity

household and community gardens suggested by the Agricultural Department, aimed at
decreasing household reliance on purchased commodities and increasing the labor
contribution o f women in the farming cycle, rely on dependable water supplies. Women
are currently underemployed in the village as past employment opportunities, such as an
oriental sewing shop in San Ignacio that employed thirty local women and a women's
poultry, cooperative no longer exist. Women find wage-earning work near San Antonio
only in the seasonal 'picking' and 'cleaning' of peanuts, a job for which they now have to
compete with refugee families who will work for wages lower than those paid just a few
years ago (Clark 1994).

In some but not all families, women and children help with

planting and weeding if the land is nearby the village. Theoretically, local gardens can be
highly productive and serve as alternative sources o f supplemental household income.
However, local markets for diversified produce are small because the traditional Mayan
diet is not widely varied and competition for fresh vegetables is already stiff in the nearby
urban hub o f San Ignacio. Marketing beyond San Ignacio requires access to a truck or the
marketing through commercial sellers. It is interesting that in San Antonio almost all the
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trucks are owned by store owners and commercial sellers and not by the poor farmers
themselves.
Crop diversification is another form o f intensification being tried in San Antonio.
Tomatoes, bell peppers, okra and bokchoi need water-supported transplanting and
labor-intensive care. During years when they have produced well, farmers earned large
sums o f money from them. However, fungal wilt is a growing problem that threatens to
affect future crops (F. Tzib, pers. com.) unless wilt-resistant varieties are introduced.
Successful expansion o f nursery crops will require the input and expansion o f agricultural
extension services. Bokchoi, jicama, and exotic vegetables (to the Maya at least) such as
broccoli need distant or specialized tourist markets.47
Additionally, without water, the village farmers face a dry spell (February-May) each
year when agricultural cropping is impossible.

Tied to the money and commodity

markets, households must borrow money to cover family subsistence expenses and crop
input expenses until the summer crop matures in September and October (M. Balona
1994, pers. com ).

Loan repayment and high interest and commodity costs cut deeply

into the farmers annual income.48 The 1993 Small Business and Farmers Bank closure

47 It has been said by Rigoberta Menchu, Guatemalan refugee leader who won the Nobel Peace Prize in
recent years, that eating the same com, rice and beans day and night, year after year, is a religious
practice for the Maya. If they were to change their diet, their culture would die.
48 Per capita income in Belize is about three times that of other Central American countries. Virtually no
farmers in San Antonio could estimate their yearly wages. The PGC continues to straggle with
accounting as well. The 1987 objective to "implement bookkeeping sessions so that members can
distinguish profit and/or loss being made within the cooperative" was finally achieved in 1994 when a
member attended classes offered by the BFAC in accounting. He finished bringing the books of the
PGC into order and up to date in the fell of 1994. The slowness in developing systematic bookkeeping
in the PGC is an example of the difficulty in establishing new rural institutional frameworks for
consistent long-term organizational decision-making.

caused many farmers in San Antonio to default on loans when they were unable to borrow
funds to harvest and market expanded crops. The San Antonio farmers need to avoid the
annual debt cycle, increasing to year-round production or improving the terms o f trade
they face in the marketplace.

Aware o f the price squeeze, several farmers expressed

unwillingness to sell through the PGC because of poor prices and the inability to shop
around for better terms in markets in Belize. The fact that the PGC could not extend
enough loans to the whole community also led farmers to make informal loan
arrangements and contracts with various village peanut buyers and sellers outside o f the
Peanut and Grain Cooperative structure.
Agroforestry, be it the development o f citrus groves with intercropping, the planting
o f multi-purpose traditional use trees like ramon,49 the introduction o f leguminous
Leucaena in alley-cropping, or the planting of hardwoods and shade trees in pastures or as
live fences (cercas vivas), relies on the use of water to guarantee survival o f the trees over
the long run. Without both secure land and secure water, poor peasant farmers will not
invest in agroforestry programs (Fortmann 1985; Fortmann and Bruce 1992).

The

Belizean government sent agronomists to Costa Rica to study agroforestry but has not
initiated a national program as has neighboring Guatemala (Palma 1993).

In fact, the

Forestry Department o f Belize has no active reforestation program at this time to assist

49 In nearby Peten, Guatemala, CARE produced a valuable study on plants and trees traditionally used by
area Mayan villages in home gardens ("Diagnostico Participativo Communitario 1993")- From this the
program developed an analysis of how agroforestry could be used to increase forest productivity in the
vicinity of deforested lands and hence improve community acceptance of reforestation efforts (Palma
1993). Many of these same plants and trees (such as Ramon, Brosinum allicastrum)v/ere widely used by
the Yucatec Maya of San Antonio (F. Tzib 1994, pers. com.).
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the Agriculture Department in developing an agroforestry program (Revista Forestal
Centroamericana 1994, No. 7).
Peanut and Grain Cooperative members see the extension o f the growing season
through the dry season with irrigated crops as the way to improve the marginality of
agricultural profit.

This would entail either the intensification of the current two crop

season to a three crop or persistent annual cropping pattern on semi-tropical soils of
questionable fertility. Or they might increase the acreage under cultivation at a given time
above the 25% level now found in the area. For intensification via irrigation to occur,
water would have to be brought to the village from a dependable source or new land
would have to be found closer to year-round creeks. Because the government has not
committed funding to bring water to the village and the agricultural lands near San
Antonio, the PGC has chosen to pursue the colonization of forested lands within the
Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve near Privassion and Little Vaqueros Creeks in an
effort to obtain potentially irrigable land.
To date, the government has emphasized bringing drinking water to the village rather
than developing water for irrigation. WASA plans for a tank on the hill in the center of
San Antonio, for which funding has already been received, is based on providing water for
the needs o f 1000 people.

As I have shown, the village estimates the need for the

construction some 200 new buildings in the next ten years (probably exaggerated) while
past population growth rates would project a population by the year 2000 o f over 1700
people.

Out-migration which is currently holding the population fairly stable would
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decline if running water reduced the arduous nature of village life. It can be assumed
under current plans that village water will have priority over agricultural water. This has
significant bearing on how land tenure and agricultural expectations play into issue.

Social Institutions. Land Tenure and Irrigation
If water is developed and delivered to the village first, the first logical step in
agricultural development would be high intensity community gardens, multistoried
gardens, and nurseries located in town for transplanting crops to distant fields.

These

could be either household owned or operate under a form o f cooperative membership.
Households possessing extra plots or who own farmland very close to the village could be
expected to run water lines to their land and to reap the benefits from a village water
supply.

Women, children, and the landless might obtain economic benefits from

employment in the gardens, nurseries, and perhaps in expanding canning, drying, or
marketing operations.

Reliance on purchased food commodities might drop and

household cash surpluses might rise. Individuals with land further from the village would
not benefit directly, but might find increased profitability in the transplanting of vegetables
started in nurseries if they have a spring on their land or if the transplanting was timed to
coincide with the rainy season. Clearly, dry season benefits would accrue only to those
with land in the immediate neighborhood o f the village.

It is doubtful whether cattle

ranching would substantially change under a village water system.

<
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A village water system underscores Bromley's points that a property system is a
benefit stream and that it can operate only so long as an authority system operating along
side o f it. In the above case, the benefits flow directly to those who own land near the
village. But what happens if a farmer or groups o f farmers run water lines off the system
and begin to siphon water off for agricultural uses from limited water resources that are
needed for village use? Or what happens if there is plenty o f water for village and adjacent
)

plots for the first ten years, but village growth begins to demand water resources needed
to sustain agricultural investments made in the meantime in expectation o f non-diminishing
water supplies? From the start, bringing water into an agricultural community such as San
Antonio is to invite conflict over the distribution o f access to water supplies, over
processes for redistributional practices as other users join the system, over the
establishment o f guaranteed rights to protect long-term investments, and over future
development priorities. A water board to regulate, distribute, and enforce water rights is a
necessity even under the most limited water project aimed at supplying only the village
with water.
Russell and Nicholson (1981) suggest five considerations in the creation o f a water
regulatory body:
1) the distribution of water is manipulable and controllable by institutional means;
2) the larger social environment should be systematically connected to the local
irrigation system;
3) the role of water management should be articulated in a political system;
4) the physical environment shapes organizational forms in irrigation;
5) success hinges on local control, a reasonable degree of equity, and the ability to
exclude others.
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The emphasis that success hinges on- local control is mirrored in the works of E.
Walter Coward, Jr. (1979, 1990) who studied land tenure and customary irrigation
systems in India. According to Coward, irrigation systems are anything but static supply
systems, requiring constantly changing labor needs by the season based on crop variance,
maintenance needs, and policing necessities.

Farmers do not need water at the same

times, nor do they need constant volumes o f water every day implying that water rights
may need adjustment as crops rotate through the seasons. Despite this lack o f symmetry
in their needs, they do, however, share the need to know that a reliable source o f water
will be available at a given time.

The connection between needed water security and

village knowledge and understanding o f local labor, soil and topographic conditions "are
better understood by the relevant decision-makers" and make local control over the
irrigation system a necessity (Coward 1990:83).
The organization o f irrigation management revolves around three fundamental roles:
'

1) the organization of water allocation;
2) physical maintenance activities; and
3) conflict management (Coward 1979:29).

The form that that organization will take is derived in part, according to Coward, on the
pattern o f physical structures for conveying and distributing water which determines labor
maintenance needs and on the patterns of land holding or tenure which may determine
who will benefit most from the irrigation system.

Clearly, if irrigation organization is

introduced in a village with functioning customary social institutions such as San Antonio,
its form will need to reflect practices as conflict resolution by a Council of Elders and
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periodic redistribution o f water rights to account for the needs o f younger households.
Coward warns that the concentration of authority over the distribution o f water rights in
the hands o f national agencies may induce a system water use anarchy in indigenous
cultures (Coward 1979).

Potential Irrigation Characteristics in San Antonio
Four water sources have been examined in the search for water for San Antonio:
underground supplies with unproven volumes even for village use, the Macal River, Slate
Creek, and Privassion Creek. None o f the options are great. The latter three are state
property resources and each is located between 4 1 / 2 - 6 miles from San Antonio.50 The
Macal River was the choice o f the previous PUP government which bulldozed a road from
San Antonio to Macal River and when so far as to purchase pipe for the project. (The
apparently was used elsewhere for a competing project when the United Democratic Party
[UDP] assumed power in the last national election). This option would require electrical
pumping of water from the river over a low pass and then gradually uphill to the village.
Slate Creek is considerably smaller, but estimated to hold enough volume for village use.
A

However, it provides water for some private land below where is disappears underground,
and there may be water rights complications if large amounts are drawn off for agricultural
irrigation. Slate Creek water will need to be ram pumped out of a canyon from where it
may be able to be gravity fed to the village. It would have to be piped along the San

50 I personally visited all three sites while in the village. One field trip was made to Slate Creek and
Privassion Creek with cooperative members and representatives of the FPMP and Central Farm.
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Antonio road where many villagers live and where the bulk o f the agricultural land near
San Antonio lies. This would reduce the length of water lines needed for major field
irrigation and provide water services to a group o f residents who will not receive water
under current plans for the underground or Macal River water. No electrical lines exist
along the San Antonio road so that in the case that electrical pumping is required to
maintain water pressure for irrigation, additional costs will accrue for electrical line
placement. Privassion Creek has plenty o f water to support any agricultural opportunities
with irrigation. Depending on investment capital availability, it could be developed with
ram pumps lifting with compressed air, tunnel construction, or through an irrigation ditch.
Appendix 2, Map 4 illustrates the various routes and relative distances for each.
Tenure relations remain important if plans are made to extend the irrigation system
beyond the confines o f the village and its immediate environs.

Irrigation requires a

significant investment on the part of individuals, communities, and the state in the
application o f finances, labor and technology to the project. The technologies used to
supply, divert, and control water are different from those o f applying water to fields,
leveling, tilling, planting and harvesting (Freeman and Loudermilk 1981), and it is likely
that successful planning will require knowledge from and the education and training of
parties on all levels. Because the San Antonio irrigation project will not be one of simple
diversion from a creek by trough or pipe to a nearby field, the expense of commencing a
project may be well beyond the reach of the San Antonio community. State investment
will be necessary to initiate an irrigation project o f this size, and the national government
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of Belize will likely need to develop a mechanism to recover costs of its investment
through the imposition o f taxes or rents to the irrigation users.

Irrigation is a public

■investment, involving the creation new institutions such as an irrigation control board,
joint operational planning committee, and tax boards and collectors. It is also a private
one requiring individuals and households to assume the risk of investment in funding and
labor for many years to come.
A few examples emphasize these points. Because Belize recognizes usufruct rights,
local farmers need to know how distributional issues will be handled and if they will be
designated on a first come, first serve basis. Farms located close to town and wealthier
land owners will have a decided advantage if periodic redistribution o f water rights is not
included from the outset. Water demands and usage varies with time and investors need
to know if water redistribution may occur at a later date before making investments. They
need to know if the village or the national government will be making that decision. There
is evidence that social groups can design, utilize, and adapt ingenious mechanisms for
rights distributions (Feeny et al. 1990) and many authors (Bromley 1991) fear that
concentrating arbitrary and institutional powers in the hands o f national government may
render local government powerless to fulfill its expected functions. This clearly happened
in the case o f land tenure where young families in San Antonio still expect the elders to
provide cultivation land even though the authority to do so has passed on to the national
government. Some form o f co-management of water resources based on local preferences
might be the best formation for a water board.
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Should irrigation be extended to areas outside the immediate village, surveyed land
will become collateral to raise money to pay for irrigation equipment.

The Lands and

Survey Department should complete the survey o f agricultural lands controlled by San
Antonio residents prior to initiating an irrigation system to minimize exclusion of
particular landholders.
As pipes are laid, property values along the water system can be expected to rise
rapidly. In a poor village like San Antonio, a land market can be expected to develop
where modified customary rights now dominate. If the transition to an irrigated system is
slow, perhaps with irrigation system extensions being paid for by local private investment,
a land market might result in the consolidation o f ownership by local but wealthier
residents, piece by piece. Increasing village differentiation could be expected along with a
rise o f an extensive paid agricultural labor force. Tenant contracts between individuals
and private owners, not currently found in San Antonio, might become necessarily
common and would challenge the leasehold and usufruct system. However, if the public
investment is made by the national government and the irrigation lines laid extensively
over a relatively short period, it is doubtful that local land owners could amass the capital
to prevent outside interests from speculating and buying land. Idle leasehold land may
become too valuable to leave idle, and an innovative method for distributing this land
within the village may be needed to prevent land appropriation by non-villagers.
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Other Issues with Irrigation
The penetration o f outside interests into San Antonio is clearly o f central importance
to the maintenance o f the Masewal identity, however changed it may be in the modem
world. If a goal o f development is to solidify local welfare along with the cultural integrity
o f this Masewal village, special state and local institutions will have to be developed to
regulate the land market with the coming higher land values. Perhaps a form o f legalized
sub-leasing that does not endanger the original leaseholder rights to repossess the land
might permit better utilization o f land in the irrigated areas.
For the most part, agricultural intensification through irrigation development implies
an increase in labor per acre in the production process with the hope of expanding output
per acre to a greater degree.

Besides the direct investment in labor to construct the

irrigation system, there remains the constant need for off-season maintenance and
in-season repairs.

If pumps are needed, a certain level o f technological knowledge is

needed and a fund for repairs and back-up facilities to protect planting investment during
the dry season mechanical failures is required Who is to shoulder the labor and financial
costs o f repairs and maintenance is of concern to the both the community and state
seeking to make irrigation investments.
A community based on rainfed cultivation cannot expect to maintain its traditional
agricultural patterns under irrigation (Tuma 1965). Under irrigation systems, the patterns
o f employment and cropping systems tend to change. Foremost is the loss of idle seasons
for two reasons: major maintenance is usually done in the off-season and irrigation allows

105

cropping during periodic dry seasons when previously no work could be done.

The

question as to whether the San Antonio work force, accustomed to periods of slack time,
will step forward to perform the additional labor is of concern to irrigation planners. The
Peanut and Grain Cooperative's desire to initiate irrigation activity in the MPRFR indicates
that village leaders, at least, are willing to promote year-round agricultural employment.
Boserup (1965) maintains that irrigation brings a slowly lengthening work day as well.
Crop patterns (and hence annual investment patterns as well) change as irrigation
introduces new crops with different peak input needs. Transplanting and weeding become
standard labor practices that are ignored under shifting cultivation.

These offer the

advantage o f being seasonally and physically concentrated activities that often fall to
women and children and which can, under proper pay scales and institutional
arrangements, improve money transfers to segments of the population that are traditionally
underemployed or landless.
Boserup maintains that tool development such as hoe use (then plowing) comes with
the advent of short fallow cropping. Farmers in San Antonio seem to have skipped a step,
going from long fallow shifting cultivation to plowing and the use o f herbicides. I saw no
sign o f the use o f hoes in San Antonio as farmers continue to use machetes to cut weeds
close to the ground and chemicals to kill them.

The indiscriminate and unsafe use of

herbicides is common (Clark 1994) and in spite of extension efforts, chemical
contamination o f water supplies and human use areas remains a concern.

Hoes are

indispensable for intensive community gardens and nurseries and have been central to
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managing irrigated crops throughout the world.

Yet they would represent a return to

more labor intensive practices to a community already committed to wide-spread herbicide
applications.
Cattle ranching may become more profitable, especially if irrigation permits the
growing o f forage crops on more marginal soils now left idle. This may have negative
implications for forest conservation since rockier lands to north and west may become
improved pastures for cattle. This might allow another 20% of the local farmers to secure
at least a substantial part o f their income from the sale o f cattle. As land values improve,
leasing o f pasture may become more profitable.

Such a development might seriously

quicken the pace o f deforestation in the area and in the MPRFR and this development
might need to be accompanied by a mandatory program of agroforestry to protect habitat
and biological diversity in the area.
From these points one can draw the conclusion that agricultural intensification on the
lands near San Antonio, as suggested by the farmers and agricultural extension agents in
the area, will introduce significant change to the agricultural lives o f San Antonio
residents. The success o f irrigation will be based on the ability to forge a local-national
co-management that has willingness to tackle distributive issues.

The establishment of

water rights based on a first come, first serve basis will promote greater distributional
inequality in the village as farmers near the town and large land owners will be able to take
advantage o f the water supplies due to proximity and access to credit resources. Without
firm local control over operational decisions, internal conflicts similar to current political
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divisions caused by village dependency on national political decisions will appear.
Irrigation will likely make land too valuable to remain idle, leading to land sales and the
sub-leasing o f land to people from outside the village given the limited development
capital available in the village.
Only a staged development o f irrigated agricultural intensification under the tight
control of a unified village will be able to maintain the customary traditional Masewal
values and accomplish proposed programs of gardens, nurseries, and the increased crop
diversity for water-dependent crops.

Those customary rights and practices included

periodic redistribution o f land wealth and active voluntary participation in public works.
These principles have not been lost in San Antonio, but they are very much repressed by
the acceptance and growing strength of private property rights. Furthermore, political and
religious disharmony brought political administration of the village to a standstill in 1994,
leaving the village without representatives or a governing body with which the national
government could communicate and negotiate. The PGC, the Pentecostal churches, and
various political factions in the village participate in politics by developing self-interestbased relationships with the various Ministries in the Belizean government rather than
working through their own Village Council.

The national political parties have used

political patronage in a manner that undermines village council authority and which has
prevented the development o f village institutions capable o f resolving community
problems and issues. Ministers have made promises and deals with certain village groups
and factions without consulting other Ministers who likely might oppose the proposals.
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All o f these factors have disrupted village political life.

The construction o f a water

system in San Antonio, with its vital need for social integration for resolution o f regulation
and distribution issues, is faced with turmoil and division which clearly puts prospects for
its potential survival in doubt.

Chapter 7 Conclusion: The Prospects for Forest Protection

near San Antonio

The assessment that irrigation possibilities in San Antonio face both organizational
and financial roadblocks leads back to the question of colonization pressure on the
Mountain Pine Ridge Forest Reserve.51

At present, lack o f intensified and irrigated

agriculture, increases in farm household differentiation and population, and the
immigration o f

refugees into Belize are encouraging agricultural expansion into the

reserve. What are the likely scenarios for land tenure and land use given past practice and
desires o f the various parties involved in deciding San Antonio's future? Are there ways to
effect agricultural intensification in San Antonio that rely more on individual initiative
rather than on collective decision-making and co-management, two organizational
components needed for a large irrigation project but in short supply in San Antonio?
Would a multilevel program for developing dryland crops, intercropping, and
agroforestry52 for farmers combined with income generating businesses from ecotourism
and non-timber forest product collection be a preferred alternative to irrigation?
109
51 Refugee pressure in the area is also creating pressure on private lands near the Mountain Pine Ridge
Forest Reserve. See Bevis (1991) for a propsal on setting up a Private Slate Creek Reserve to protect
habitat in an area adjacent to San Antonio and the MPRFR.
52 While beyond the scope of the immediate paper, agroforestry is being adapted throughout Central
America as a key element of rural development processes in an effort to slow deforestation and improve
campesino respect for forest protection. This is being done through buffer zone management. For
further reading on agroforestry see Conway 1985, Raintree and Warner 1986, Van Orsdol 1987, Ong
1991, Palma 1993 and McLamey et. al. 1994. For a discussion on buffer zone management see Noss
1990, Green 1993, or Palma 1993. For an analysis of food security and agroforestry acceptance see
Belsky 1993.
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The management of land tenure and related development issues near San Antonio
involve

an

array

o f intermingled

national

authority

decision-making among the government's ministries difficult.

that

makes

coordinated

The Lands and Survey

Department controls the leasing o f national land. Recent boundary changes between the
MPRFR and the village have opened the steep and highly visible mountainside above San
Antonio to colonization and conversion from forest to pastured slopes.

Villagers are

actively pursuing leasehold contracts with the Lands and Survey Department over land in
this area. The dramatic effect o f the first large-scale clearcutting of this area in the last
couple o f years (cut and burned in the last three years by a farmer lacking a formal land
lease) indicates that Lands and Survey Department practices may have a large effect on
vistas needed to promote ecotourism and may be encouraging losses in soil fertility and
erosion on steep slopes. The Lands and Survey Department has been encouraging Peanut
and Grain Cooperative initiatives within the MPRFR (Carroo 1987; Harpold et. al. 1990).
The Forest Department continues to oppose the colonization of land within the
reserve, preferring its maintenance as as a productive sustained-yield forest to its
conversion to agricultural land.

On the other hand the Forest Department approved

various lease and land use permits to foreign-owned ecotourist facilities.

The Forest

Department has not participated in discussions with the Agricultural Department on how it
can help establish an agroforestry53 program near San Antonio nor has it developed a
53 agroforestry - "refers to the techniques of either growing trees as a crop or of growing trees and
agricultural crops together" (Hyde 1992: 433 )
agroforestry - "the planting of useful tree species in conjunction with ground crops or livestock"
(Browder 1992: 180)
agroforestry - "a complex system involving numerous interactions among species in relation to physical
resources, pest levels and environmental modifications (Baker 1974)" (in Ong 1991: 107)

Ill

management program for the hardwood forests of the MPRFR which might include
9

significant economic values for the community in terms of a harvest o f non-timber forest
products. Prior to my study under the FPMP, the Forest Department had never held any
public meetings with the nearby San Antonio community to consider local needs.
The Agriculture Department, whose extension officers have opposed PGC
colonization o f MPRFR lands and therefore raised the ire o f local farmers (E Tzib 1994,
pers. com ), has been slow to introduce non-irrigated forms o f agricultural intensification
such as dryland crops, cover crops, intercropping, and agroforestry. They confused their
role even more in the summer o f 1994 when the local extension officer appeared before a
village meeting with a political officer who promised the people to bring water to the
village and to secure even larger tracts o f land within the MPRFR for the PGC and local
farmers (E. Tzib, F. Tzib 1994, pers. com.).
Even the Ministry o f Economic Development has been caught between political party
changes and restructuring programs imposed by international banking institutions,
allowing the Small Business and Farmers Bank to flounder in mid-course without
protecting the investments o f small farmers which were based on loan expectations from
the bank.

This breakdown o f national governmental communication among its own

ministries, communication necessary for the formation of broad developmental strategy,
and the government's lack o f interest in encouraging direct participation o f villagers in
policy decisions produce a top-down imposed stagnation on the development of San
Antonio.
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Before discussing alternatives other than irrigation for reducing colonization pressure
on the MPRFR, it is useful to analyze some of the potential scenarios for conservation of
the MPRFR hardwood forests given current trends, ideas, and the tenure relationships
operating in San Antonio. First, should the Ministries of the national government continue
their muddled management o f state property in the area, the PGC and other San Antonio
residents who no doubt will follow will continue the assumption o f MPRFR land under an
unclear property rights regime.

This will result in inter-ministerial conflict and

national-village conflict. Second, the Ministries Agriculture and Natural Resources can
draw together and define and enforce the limits of the Mountain Pine Ridge Forest
Reserve, either rejecting PGC expansion into the reserve outright or by limiting expansion
to the proposed PGC leasehold boundaries, effectively excluding others in the village who
are not PGC members but setting established enforceable limits to state land. Third, the
government can accept village desires to establish a settlement within the reserve by
withdrawing the MPRFR boundary line to a point between the PGC proposed leasehold
lands and the pine forest core in the Maya Mountains, thus permitting the colonization of
intervening national lands under current lease arrangements.

Fourth, the national

government can withdraw from the area by establishing a Masewal Indigenous Reserve
and leave management o f the area as common property under specified group
management rights.

Or fifth, both the national government and Masewal people could

accept the need for forest protection in the MPRFR and the work together to develop a
multi-faceted development program that would include accession to agroforestry
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management by farmers on lands near San Antonio and the institution o f hardwood
management within the MPRFR to include economic benefits from forest products for the
villagers.
The easiest program for the government is to continue muddling along. Even though
the failure to resolve property disputes causes persistent headaches and inter-ministerial
problems, it requires little cost and few governmental changes other than acceptance of
the gradual loss o f the buffer zone54 of hardwood forest between San Antonio and the pine
forest core o f the MPRFR.

Ample biological investigation throughout world would

indicate that this area o f hardwood forests is the most biologically diverse habitat in the
area and the best source o f economically valuable non-timber forest products. Habitat
losses would ensue from forest fragmentation and increased biological edge effects from
pushing the forest/farm frontier to the edge o f the pine forests and much deeper up the
Macal River.

According to the Cayo Conservation Officer, fragmentation has already

escalated under government programs to build forest roads through the area and by the
government's on-going construction of a dam upriver on the Macal River, (Chen 1994,
pers. com.).55 Habitat loss has been exacerbated by extensive hunting o f wildlife by San

54 Gina C. Green, in her presenation workshop on "Working with Communities in Protected Areas" given
April 27, 1993, in Belize defined a buffer zone as an "area which is managed in such a way that
negative influences to the integrity of the conservation area from the boundary inward is reduced to
zero." (Green 1993: 4) Buffer zone management is further based on restoration needs from antecedant
human-cause degradation from overharvest and the need to restore private as well as reserve lands
(Budowski 1994).
55 Chen explained that when blasting for the Macal River Dam Project began, rural farmers around distant
Succotz began seeing tapirs and rare tropical birds that had disappeared from the area from hunting
pressure. He reported than local citizens killed them for food. By the summer of 1994, the project area
had been made off-limits to outsiders, even residents of San Antonio, for fear of problems with
environmentalists opposed to the project (F. Tzib, pers. com.).
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Antonio residents and occasional attempts at shifting cultivation in the MPRFR. Gradual
loss o f state control to colonization would lead to the loss o f the nearly mature hardwood
forests o f the area to shifting cultivation and probable forest-to-pasture conversion.
Unclear property rights would leave the area as an open-access area where forest
resources would be under-valued and wasted.
Rejecting PGC claims to reserve land outright seems to be either unenforceable or
politically uninviting to the Belizean government. Three previous rejections have been
reversed on later review by government Ministers.56

Limiting access to the MPRFR

under secure leasehold rights given to Peanut and Grain Cooperative members only is a
holding strategy, one not likely to prevent incursions from non-members in the long-run.
The PGC does not represent the entire community (not even the entire farming
community) and its twenty-five members are pushing the limits of consensus
decision-making (M. Baloria and Re. Tzib 1994, pers. com.).

The PGC has already

subdivided the land it is seeking to gain leasehold rights to in the MPRFR, giving some to
subsistence farmers and one plot to a hardworking refugee from Siete Millas.

Once

successful irrigation is developed in the MPRFR by the cooperative, other farmers can be
expected to want to join the effort. However, the cooperative will need to draw a line
limiting membership for three reasons. First,, the benefits from the opening of reserved
land have been achieved through long years of personal work by PGC members. Whether
they will

extend those benefits to others by limiting their own benefits is doubtful.

56 In the winter of 1995, the current Belizean government once again reversed policies and evicted the
PGC from MPRFR lands for the fourth time in eleven years, citing PGC clearings being made outside of
the agreed upon boundaries and failure to adopt NARMAP conservation techniques as the reason behind
the decision (Glaser 1995, pers. com.).
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Second, the move into the reserve is intended to raise member's household profitability
from the marginal subsistence levels achieved on land near San Antonio. This will mean
excluding benefits to others simply because o f the limited land resources (about 400 arable
acres in the MPRFR).

Third, organizational demands will limit the size that the

cooperative structure can handle. Those excluded from the benefit stream derived from
the irrigated PGC lands can be expected to attempt to legally and illegally to try to follow
suit on other MPRFR lands.
The third option is to withdraw the MPRFR boundary back to a line close to the pine
forest boundary and allow both a permanent settlement in the area and the active
colonization o f national land under typical lease arrangements. As seen with the land to
the east o f San Antonio along the San Antonio Road, this will produce relatively rapid
leasing and clearing o f arable land but will not ensure the efficient utilization of land nor
the use o f agricultural intensification of arable land. This option would provide secure
tenure through leasehold but be tantamount to accepting forest conversion to pasture land.
The geography o f the MPRFR hardwood forest o f gentle slopes and watered valleys is
conducive to cattle ranching and might be combined with investment in African grass or
faragua to improve pasture quality for increases in herd size.
Two

types

of

semi-regulated

development

would

probably

occur

under

self-regulation and leasehold: large pastures for absentee land holders who live in San
Ignacio or San Antonio where livelihood amenities already exist, and subsistence farms of
San Antonio residents and foreign refugees, many of whom are approaching the ten year

.
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residency requirement to lease public lands. The development o f settlement lands in the
reserve would introduce population and growth pressures on the environment, reduce
habitat security to a minimum and push the agricultural frontier even deeper into the
MPRFR. Leasehold land currently has the highest rate o f deforestation in Belize (King et.
al. 1993),57 while farmers with leasehold parcels o f less than 50 acres usually practice low
levels o f agricultural intensification. This option provides the least forest protection but
deals more effectively with existing San Antonio land distribution problems than the
proposal to limit access to MPRFR land to PGC holdings. With this option will come an
influx o f non-Masewal colonos who may disrupt traditional cultural patterns.
The establishment o f Masewal Indigenous Reserve would give control over the
hardwood zone between San Antonio and the MPRFR pine forest zone (under national
environmental regulations, o f course) to a specific interest group. This process would
create common property in that it would exclude colonization by refugees and other
Belizean citizens and give local control to the "Masewal people." If it could be enforced,
this would surely produce a colonization rate much slower than that produced by a state
leasehold regime open to everyone.
To work, however, common property regimes must be based on historical traditions
and have a definite group o f rights holders. They also must have national government
support so as to be able to enforce those property rights and to exclude others. As a
culture, the Masewal are not just located in San Antonio but throughout northern and

57 Leased land is being cleared at a rate of 5.9% per year, private lands 3.8% per year, and national land
at 0.5% per year, and forest reserves at 0.2% per year.
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western Belize. San Antonio is unique in that the native language has not been lost in the
village. But clearly, San Antonio residents intermarry with Masewal from other villages
and promote cultural events in town and in San Ignacio that bring Masewal and other
Maya from many areas. While not impossible, the development of a body to represent and
act upon the authority o f the Masewal people would require tenacious and sensitive
negotiations on the part o f the various groups of Masewal. The potential to obtain land
potential in the area will likely draw the colonization interests o f not only San Antonio
citizens but those from out o f the area itself.

A proposal for a Masewal Indigenous

Reserve might also raise vehement opposition voices among other Belizean sectors.
Even with the establishment o f a body to regulate the reserve, the acceptance of
private property rights as seen in San Antonio (Clark 1994) will erode common property
conceptions with time. The fact that, near San Antonio, smallholder indigenous farmers
have had historically the greatest deforestation effects (Nolan 1993) will likely produce an
Indian Reserve o f a fragmented forest at best and a deforested pasture land at worse.
There is little reason to believe that indigenous management of the area would produce
changes from what is seen near San Antonio, as the operating state leasehold system,
already providing inexpensive land security for the farmers, has not produced agricultural
intensification. Nor has it limited peasant household differentiation. It takes a leap of faith
to believe that a community as divided as San Antonio and whose newly adopted
Pentecostal ideas supporting privatization rights would, as Indigenous Reserve managers,
do anything other than continue historical farming practices within the reserve.
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A Masewal Indigenous Reserve would permit land distribution to young families and
to landless village immigrants, resolving a land scarcity need for the immediate future for
those willing to travel the long distance into the reserve to farm. Customary practices
such as land distribution by the village elders, now only permitted in the distribution o f
town lots, could be enhanced. A village settlement within the reserve could be expected
to develop rapidly as villagers move to be closer to water and to their land. The forest
frontier would slowly move deeper into the MPRFR.
Additional village agricultural land may increase the area left idle for long fallow
shifting cultivation.

This would allow current land holders of tired ground near San

Antonio to improve their soil by long fallowing their land through more mature forest
stages, thereby improving soil quality as fallow length increases and improving habitat
components near the village. Whether long fallow and soil fertility would occur without
authoritative conservation mandates is debatable

The history of the tropics is that once

developed, population pressures do not allow for the reforestation of land in most cases.
Forest reclamation would need to be elevated to a community goal among the Masewal
whose experience with reforestation and forestry is noOwhere evident around San
Antonio.
The final possibility is that state and local co-management

of, farm and forest

t

resources might diffuse colonization pressures by combining agroforestry projects with
irrigated agricultural intensification.

Both the national government and the Village

Council o f San Antonio are fragmented by internal factions and unclear political alliances.
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The investment in irrigation and the commitment needed for its maintenance and for
long-term agroforestry projects are demands that require far more security than just land
title security. Political and social stability, cooperation and dedication to debt repayment,
willingness to adjust to new farming techniques and different labor demands, and hard
work are the foundations to successful irrigation and agroforestry projects.

In San

Antonio, farmers have not been exposed to or involved in the practices o f forestry and
only a few have planted fruit trees on agricultural lands.

To find local acceptance,
t
agroforestry programs such as alley cropping, barrier hedges, live tree fences, planting
hardwoods for pasture shade, and small home orchards must be fine tuned to the farmers'
cultural experience (see Palma [1993] and the Diagnostico Paticipativo Communitario
[1993] for an enlightened approach).

Selective management of wamil (forest fallow

portions o f agricultural fields) is a useful tool in establishing an understanding o f forest
practices among farmers and in improving forest utility reasonably rapidly.

Successful

agroforestry improves both soil structure and community welfare. Difficult to achieve due
to site specific requirements, a program of agroforestry in San Antonio would require
improved and closer working relationships between the farmers, the Agriculture
Department and the Forest Department.
Neither the national government nor the local residents have shown the inclination to
put aside past inconsistencies and current differences to work together on a project o f the
size needed for irrigation. Still, should the interested parties find a means to work together
in a formal, organized manner that designates property rights authority and insures
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equitable regulation o f access to water rights, irrigation might provide the means to
maintain a modernized version o f the cultural independence that the Masewal seek. Water
might buy time (and the food security) for this indigenous community to work out the
differences that have come with modernization and to develop economically without
needing to expand to other areas in the near future.

This would allow the Forest

Department, hopefully through co-management with the community, to develop harvest
plans for the hardwood forests that would benefit the community's development in much
the same way an extractive reserve5* might do.

Agroforestry programs could reduce

forest product scarcity near the village and assist in developing a greater conservation
ethic from which new working relations between the village and the government might
grow.

Setting collective sights on a multi-level development project that includes

irrigation, agroforestry, conservation and ecotourism, and indigenous rights preservation is
well within international banking and development standards (Wells 1994),
The commitment to that idea would have to come from the participants themselves.
Without that commitment, the history o f land tenure in Belize indicates that further
deforestation and forest fragmentation is likely in the hardwood forests of the Mountain
Pine Ridge Forest Reserve and that increased household differentiation and cultural
weakening is the future for San Antonio. In such a young country as Belize, political
inexperience with both small farmer and indigenous issues and a negative balance of

58 See Browder, John O. 1992. "The Limits of Extractivism." BioScience. Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 174-182
for a discussion on the pros and eons of extractive reserves in Brazil.
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payments make development projects difficult to undertake even if the political will to do
so exists.
Yet, the prospects for San Antonio remain bright.

The tenacity and strength of

/

indigenous cultures to survive in the wake o f modernization is clearly a positive factor.
San Antonio residents, in spite o f religious and political differences, remain friendly and
open to discussing new ideas and inventions. The Peanut and Grain Cooperative is raising
farmer awareness o f modem technological inputs and gaining valuable experience in large
scale farming and internal cooperative organization. The villagers are law-abiding citizens
with a strong desire to maintain community stability; they^are inventive farmers who are
acknowledged by the Agriculture Department for their productivity and intelligence. Each
year, the village becomes more educated and the willingness to participate in scientific
experiments is evident.
The government's role in agricultural development of San Antonio lags behind the
expectations o f the villagers.

Belize is a youthful government slowly becoming more

confident and capable of dealing with the complex issues o f managing a national economy.
The villagers need to learn not to expect so much from the government, and the
government should leam how to provide key assistance to the village without making the
vacant promises characterizing its past relationship with the village. More than anything
else, the various ministries need to realize that single issue programs sponsored by
independent and non-communicating ministries will not resolve forest conservation or
agricultural development problems in San Antonio.
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A multilevel development program that includes forestry conservation education,
irrigated or dry-land agricultural intensification practices, and needed adjustments in social
institutions to assist the retention o f customary Masewal practices offers a means to
provide for both community and forest needs. Such a program would need to be based on
the direct participation o f local people in the planning and regulation process and the
willingness o f the national Ministries to accept local input and direction. It will require a
serious re-evaluation o f the land tenure institutions so as to develop tenure relationships
that promote both community well-being based on customary practices and forest
conservation.
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Appendix 2 Survey Instrument (Clark 1994)

SURVEY OF SAN ANTONIO (CAYO) - AUGUST, 1994
I. DEMOGRAPHICS
I)Age of head of household
2)Length in village ____
3)# family members in house ______ 4)#men >14 years _____
5)# women >15 years _______
6)# People 15-25 in house 7)# People needing town lots in house in next ten years __
8)/ Buildings expect to build on lot in next 10 years ____
9)Estimated gross income ___________
10)Are there months during the year when the family h a s no
income? ___________
When?_______________________
II)What ari your family's staple foods?
12)How do you get it?

milpa____ buy it
from relatives

hunting___
other__________

II. AGRICULTURE
13) Do you own
or lease______ land for farming?
14) How many acres do you own
, lease from goverment
,
lease from others in the community
, or farm with
the Cooperative in the Mountain Pine Reserve________ ?
15) How much of this do you farm each year?_____ •
16)Do y<3u rotate areas of cultivation?______
Why?_________________________ !
______________________ ■
PLEASE PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ABOUT FARMING
PRACTICES
Crops Mav-Nov. Crops Nov.-March % Sold Where. to Whom

17)Who helps with:

clearing__________________________
planting_____________________ '
____
harvesting________________
threshing_________________________
marketing/transport____________ _

18)Do you raise animals? Domestic__________ Commercial
19)What are your biggest farm problems?

2 0 )A re

you

a

c o o p e r a tiv e

m e m b e r ? ________

Why?.

III. FOREST USE
21)Which forest products do you collect and use?,
22)Where do you get t h e m ? _________________________
23)Are forest products becoming scarce? ____________ ;
24) Do you maintain areas on your farm in high bush?_
25) Do you ever purchase sand or gravel_______ or wood.
from Augustine in the Mountain Pine Ridge?
26)How has the forest changed in your lifetime?_____
IV. OTHER .TYPES OF BUSINESS
27)Please describe non-farm employment/business and problems
you have with it.______________________________________

V.

W OM E N

28)Does San Antonio need more employment for women?
29)What can be done to assist women in the village?

VI. GENERAL QUESTIONS
30)Wha£ are the most important problems facing San Antonio?

31)What can the people of San Antonio do to raise incomes
if they had outside assistance? ___________________________

32)What needs to be done to bring the people of San Antonio
together politically? _______________________________ ;
_______
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Appendix 3 Tabulation of Survey Results (Clark 1994)
Demographics
1) Age o f head o f household - mean 41.2 years (valid N = 188)
2) Length o f residency in village - mean 32.02 years (valid N = 184)
3) # of family members in household - mean 5.63 (valid N = 203)
4) question dropped
5) question dropped
6) # people > 15-25 years old in household - mean 1.19 people (valid N = 175)
7) # household members needing town lots in next ten years - mean 1.26 (valid N = 180)
8) # buildings household expects to build on current lot in next ten years mean .64 buildings (valid N = 176)
9) estimated gross income - range Bz$500/yr to Bz$26000/yr (valid N = 28)
10) Months without income?
11) Family's staple foods - question dropped as beans, rice, flour tortillas, and chicken
universal
12) How do you get it? milpa only - 28.5%; buying only 48%; both 23.4% (valid N = 77)

Agriculture
13) How much land do you own? mean 11.36 acres (valid N = 89)
How much land do you lease? mean 19.38 acres (valid N = 151)
14) question dropped
15) How much o f your land do you cultivate each year? mean 7 acres (valid N = 154)
16) Do you rotate areas o f cultivation? yes - 37; no - 43 (valid N = 80)
17) Do you hire others? yes - 21; no - 34 (valid N = 55)
18) Do you raise commercial animals? yes - 6 (9.2%); no - 59 (90.8%) (valid N = 65)
19) see Appendix 5 Results o f Open-ended Questions
20) Are you a cooperative member? yes - 17 (11.1%); no 136 (88.9%) (valid N = 153)

Household Forest Use
21) Which forest products do you collect and use? (valid N = 123)
firewood -100
posts - 39
palm leaf-19
lumber -1 6
cohune palm - 14
vegetables - 1
charcoal -1
herbs - 4
fruits - 2
palmetto - 4
22) question dropped
23) Are forest products becoming scarce? (valid N = 87)
firewood is scarce - 38 (43.7%)
all forest products are scarce - 21 (24.1%)
bayleaf is scarce - 1 (.5%)
posts are scarce - 1 (.5%)
firewood is not scarce - 26 (12.7%)
24) Do you maintain areas on your farm in high bush? yes - 80; no - 23 (valid N
25) Have you purchased products from Augustine in the Mountain Pine Ridge?
sand or gravel wood
no - 51 (valid N = 152)
26) see Appendix 5 Results o f Open-ended Questions
27-32) open-ended questions
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.............

MEAN

.......

VALID

SAN ANTONIO

# OF

VALID

SURVEY QUESTION

RESPONSES

N

PERCENT

Do You Maintain Areas

Yes

80

103

77.67%

in High Bush?

No

23

' 103

22.33%

Are Forest Products Becoming Scarce?
38

87

43.7%

v 21

87

24.1%

Bayleaf Is Scarce

1

87

.5%

Posts Are Scarce

1

87

.5%

Firewood is Not Scarce

26

87

29.88%

Firewood Is Scarce
All Forest Products Are Scarce

Which Forest Products Do You Collect and Use?

*

Firewood

100

123

81.3%

Posts

39

123

31.7%

Palmleaf

19

123

15.4%

Lumber

16

123

13.0%

Cohune Palm

14

123

11.4%

Vegetables

1

123

.813%

Charcoal

1

123

.813%

Herbs

4

123

3.25%

Fruits

2

123

1.62%

Palmetto

4

123

3.25%
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TABLE 1 Results of Survey (Clark 1994)

SAN ANTONIO

# OF

VALID

MEAN

VALID

SURVEY QUESTION

RESPONSES

N

Av. Age of Household Head

188

188

41.2 years

100

Length of Residency

184

184

32.02

100

# of Household Members

203

203

5.63

100

# Members 15-25 Years

175

175

1.19

100

# Members Needing Lots

180

180

1.26

100

# Expected Buildings/10 Years

176

176

0.64

100

Land Owned

89

89

11.36 acres

100

Land Leased

151

151

19.38 acres

100

Land Cultivated

154

154

7 acres

100

PERCENT

Peanut and Grain

Yes

17

153

11.1%

Cooperative Member?

No

136

153

88.9%

Do You Raise

Yes

6

65

9.2%

Commercial Animals?

No

59

65

90.8%

Do You Rotate Areas

Yes

37

80

46.25%

of Cultivation?

No

43

80

53.75%

Do You Hire Others?

Yes

21

55

38.18%

No

34

55

61.82%
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Appendix 4 Resuits of Open-ended Questions (Clark 1994)
19) What are your biggest farm problems? (# of responses)
- Not enough water (61)
- Inaccessibility due to mud, no road, or neighbors (19)
- Lack o f land or land too small (13)
- Poor soil (9)
- While flies and disease (9)
- Neighbor's cattle (3)
- Oversupply o f food, low prices (3)
-P o o r 1994 crop (3)
- None (2)
- Need more funding (1)
20) Are you a Cooperative member? Why or why not. (# o f responses) (valid N = 150)
- No. Prefer to work alone or independently. (14)
- No. There is no land. (6)
- Yes. Have access to machinery. (5)
- No. I don't know how it works. (4)
- No. they fail to provide loans or help. (3)
- Yes. As a means to get land to work. (3)
- No, but I am thinking o f joining. (3)
- No. I have other work. (2)
- No. There is a lack o f information and I don't feel comfortable at meetings. (2)
- No. If I join it will be for nothing. (2)
- No. It is too expensive. (2)
- Yes. To have a market for my produce. (2)
- 1 am a member but the head o f the cooperative hasn't appeared for five years.
-N o Answer (101)
26) How has the forest changed in your lifetime?
- Everything that belongs to the forest is for them and if we want to gain some
money we cannot too because it belongs to the Reserve.
- If we want posts we have to buy them, because if we go and hunt for them it is
scarce around and we cannot enter the Reserve without permission.
- Now everything is scarce.
- We are charged a fine to get wood from the government-owned Mountain Pine
Reserve.
- The government sold everything and left the people with nothing.
- We cannot get big mature woods for lumber now.
- There are very few huge trees as those before.
- Drastic. The high forest is disappearing very fast.
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29) What can be done to assist women in the village?
- Bring water!
- There used to be 30 women who left each day to work in a Chinese sewing shop
in Santa Elena. A sewing shop would help.
- Women can pick peanuts. Sometimes 75 go to the fields at once.
- A Women's Group needs better leadership and education from outside. Last
time, the leader was greedy and it didn't work.
- There used to be a Women's Cooperative to raise chickens, but villagers
complained about the smell. Now there isn't one.
- 85% o f the girls go to high school now.
- Refugees take all the work the women used to do.
- Educated girls have to go to Belize to find work.
- The women should work on the farm, too.
- Provide training in light arts and crafts, poultry products, sewing, and
confectionery.
- A cooperative needs start up money.
- A garment factory, a peanut brittle factory, jam, or a restaurant.
- Women's work on the farm is overlooked. The level of education of women is
low. There is a need for technical training. Our culture gives trouble in today's
world.
30) What are the most important problems facing San Antonio?
Water
- We need wells in each part of the village because the water trucks only deliver to
the center o f town.
- They should quit test drilling and just bring us water from the Reserve.
- Farmers without water in the dry season cannot produce crops needed for cash.
Land
- There is a general lack o f agricultural land.
- Current land ownership is a form of colonization.
- There are no town lots so people must move away.
- There is a diminishing farm layout due to subdivision.
Roads
- Farmers need road to access their land, especially during the rainy season.
- The streets need improvement.
- The water trucks won't come here because the street is too narrow.
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Finances
- Wages around San Antonio are too low.
- Prices o f farm goods are too low and they fluctuate irregularly. Sometimes we
can't sell our goods in Belize.
- The government should provide employment during the dry season.
- There is too much competition in Belize from products from outside the country.
- We have to go to sell in Belize as Indians, but the police go and chase us from
there. So we have to see how we could live.
Other Ideas
- Ecotourism or a restaurant on the main road would help capture tourist dollars.
- We need jobs for the poor.
- San Antonio needs a high school because not everyone can afford to send their
children to Cayo.
- There is no suitable area for garbage disposal.
- There is disunity in the village due to politics and religion.
- They don't clean the well often enough.
- It costs Bz$30 to get water from the MPR. The water truck won't come up our
road.
- The Catholic School needs a blackboard and water tank. We ask the children to
bring water. The poor can't afford $3.50 for their books and we have to buy
them for them.
- The telephone closes at 5:00 PM and won't deliver important messages.
31) What can the people o f San Antonio do to raise incomes if they had outside
assistance?
- Work in groups to operate a revolving fund for projects.
- Small projects such as craft work, tourism, canning vegetables.
- Raise small animals.
- We should have technical people.
- Plant other crops like bayleaf, fruit palm, cedar, or mahogany.
32) What needs to be done to bring the people of San Antonio together politically?
- They will join together if they put a water system in San Antonio.
- Sincerity of government in finishing its projects begun by the last government.
- Choose a non-partisan, impartial political officer for the Cayo District.
- Political influences o f both parties divide neighbors and friends.
- The government won't work with the Village Council.
- People brag and promise but nothing comes o f it.
- Organize seminars in public relations with government officials to teach the
people.
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- There must be something o f interest to bring the people out. Then use that
meeting to encourage people to come out more.
-Talk with the Pastors directly.
- Non-church people (Catholics) won't unite with religious people.
- They need to be Christian. They need to join our religion.
- People shouldn't enter others' cleared land.
- Property lines need measuring because they cause conflicts.
- They need jobs and then the people will be happy.
-W e need police at meetings to stop drunks from harassing people.
- People make too many excuses why they can't help with fagina.
- We need a person to lead the community. More cooperation.
- No one person can do it. We need cooperation and willingness to come
together.
- Refugees work for too little and prices are too high in Belize to sell much. The
government allows foreigners to have most o f the land. Government thinks the
refugees are better than we.
- People come to ask questions at meetings, but the government helps other
people.
- 1 have applied for land for years but never got it. Local people won't rent small
pieces o f land.
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Appendix 5 Definitions Relevant to Land Tenure Issues, International
Development, Buffer Zone M anagem ent and Agroforestry

actual right - "have a correlated duty on the part of others to recognize those rights" (Bromley 1991:49)
ad valorem royalties - royalties based on the value of extracted logs (Repetto 1990:39)
agrarian reform - the combination of agricultural development, colonization, and land reform
(Barraclough 1973:33)

agrarian reform - "a rapid improvement in one or more of the sectors of the agrarian structure" (Tuma
1965)

agrarian structure - land tenure (secure-insecure; collective - individual; owner-tenant; native-foreign;
public-private) with private (title settled-unsettled; contract-subcontract; fee-simple conditional); pattern or cultivation (extensive-intensive; dry-irrigated;
supervised-unsupervised; mechhanized-unmechanized; cooperative-individualistic;
diversified-staple; market {domestic-export}-subsistence); terms of holding and scale of
operation (holding-operadon; large-small; consolidated-fragmented; rent (fixed-share;
cash-kind [service-product]}-no rent {owner-squatter-national}); credit facilities
(institutions{private banks, cooperatives, state} - moneylender/shopkeeper-landlord) (Tuma
1965)
agricultural development - "is the application of technology and capital to increase farm productivity"
(Barraclough 1973:33)
agricultural systems - composition of landowning population (small owner-operators, large
owner-operators, collective fanners), the non-landowning population (hired laborers on large
plantations, hired laborers on small holdings, tenants), and squatters (Prostermann and
Reideinger 1987:42)
1
agroforestry - "refers to the techniques of either growing trees as a crop or of growing trees and
agricultural crops together" (Hyde 1992:433)
agroforestry - "the planting of useful tree species in conjunction with ground crops or livestock"
(Browder 1993:180)
agroforestry - "a complex system involving numerous interactions among species in relation to
physical resources, pest levels and environmental modifications (Baker 1974)" (Ong 1991:107)
agrosilvicultura- "Sistemas agroforestales que utilizan arboles en asociacion y apoyo de una production
(Van Orsdol 1987:11) (translation - agroforestrv systems that use trees in association with and to
support [agricultural] production)
agrosilvopastoril - "El uso integrado de sistems forestales, agricolas v de pastoreo en technologias
sostenibles" (Van Orsdol 1987:11) (translation - the integrated use of systems of forestry,
agriculture and grazing in sustainable technologies)
assartment - the establishment of land claims through the clearing of land (Bruce & Fortmann
1992:482)
barrier hedges - "is the name given to contour-aligned hedgerows established specifically for
erosion control on slopes. These have also been called biological bounds." (Young 1989:68)
biodiversityattributes(Franklin) - composition, structure, function (Noss 1990)
bioticimpoverishment - "As a landscape is fragmented or otherwise altered by human activity,
some species thrive and other species decline. The cumulative loss of sensitive species from
human-modified landscapes results in biotic impoverishment.” (Noss 1989:12)
bufferzone - "a gradient of 'soft-boundary* zones enveloping core reserves and insulating reserves
from intensive land-use activities on private lands. Inner buffer zones would be areas with
low road density, primarily non-motorized recreational use, and very low-intensity silviculture
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(e.g., selective logging). Outer buffer zones would allow more intensive uses, such as 'New
Forestry' silvicultural practices (Franklin 1989) or some livestock grazing, but still be
managed with biodiversity as the fundamental objective. Restoration activities would be
conducted in all zones, as appropriate." (Noss 1989:26-27)
bufferzone - "Area which is managed in such a way that negative influences to the integrity of the
conservation area from the boundary inward are reduced to zero" (Green 1990:4)
ceremonial fund - "All social relations are surrounded by such ceremonial, and ceremonial must be
paid for in labor, in goods, or in money. If men are to participate in social relations,
therefore, they must also work to establish a fund against which these expenditures may be
charged. We shall call this the ceremonial fund." (Wolf 1966:7)
class(Marx) - "the relationship to the means of production (Humphrey andButtel 1986:16)
class(Weber) - the accumulation of different life chances (which resulted from) differential access to
the machinery of state domination and the ability of social groups to use the legitimate power
of the state to serve their own material ends. (Humphrey and Buttel 1986:16)
classdifferentiation - "unequal economic opportunities and wealth distribution if inequality seems
to be of a permanent nature and tends to perpetuate class differences ... That is, economic
class differentiation implies social and political class differentiation." (Tuma 1965:17)
collectiveconsumption - "One attribute of a public good is that additional consumption of the good
by one individual does not diminish the amount available to others." (Jackson in Russell and
Nicholson 1991)
colonization - "the opening up on non-agricultural lands for agricultural use" (Barraclough 1973:33)
common appendant - "the right of the villagers who owned their own land within the manor to feed
their animals used in agriculture upon the lord's 'waste' (Cox 1986:54)
common property - a particular community owns the resource and this community frequently
agrees to rules of behavior, including rules that regulate the rate at which the resource is
used." (Pearce et al. 1989)
common property - rights conferred by a fairly defined community (rights may cover a specific
resource - a tree, crop residues (Pearce and Warford 1990)
common property - represents private property for the group of co-owners (since all others are
excluded from use and decision making). Second, individuals have rights (and duties) in a
common property regime (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975). In one important sense, then,
common property has something very much in common with private property - exclusion of
non-owners. In that sense we may think of common property as corporate group property."
(Bromley 1991:26)
common property regime (is defined) by group ownership in which the behaviors of all members of
the group are subject to accepted rules and open for all to see...in a social setting in which
individual conformity to group norms is the dominant ethic, common property regimes have a
cultural context compatible with and indeed vital for effective performance." (Bromley 1991:27)
common property resources - such as rangelands, are defined as those to which access is open
and free; individual ownership, by law or custom, is impossible, which accordingly generates
a type of social trap. Resource depletion, economic inefficiency and environmental
degradation... inevitably ensue." (Watts 1987:187)
common-property resources - "a class of resources for which exclusion is difficult and joint use
involves subtractability" (Feeny et al. 1990:4)
communal property - is a property rights regime; "the resource is held by an identifiable community
of independent users." (Feeny etal. 1990:4)
community - "comprises the populations of some or all species coexisting at a site" (Noss 1990:360)
community forestry - "refers to commonly owned or controlled forests" (Hyde 1992:433)
composition (ecological) - "has to do with the identity and variety in a collection, and includes
species lists and measures of species diversity and genetic diversity" (Noss 1990:356-357)
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conditional ownership - "ownership in a variety of forms existing side by side, limited in different
ways, but meeting the general requirements of'public interest'" (from Tannebaum)
(Tuma 1965:125)
constant wealth inheritance - "This suggests that defining sustainable development as constant
wealth inheritance is not sufficient. It requires modification to allow for the feasible
avoidance of irreversible losses of natural assets, or compensation for their loss by other
natural assets." (Pearce et al. 1989:36)
control - "is the right to disregard the interests of others in the exercise of the above dimensions (to
possess, to use, to manage, to benefit, to be secure, to alienate) of ownership" (Bromley
1991:159)
core invasionsand pressures - "extensions into rural areas of the power, ownership and
exploitation of central, urban institutions and individuals which include the richer world of the
North, governments of the South, commercial interests, and professionals who are variously
wealthy, urban and powerful." (Chambers 1988:2)
core poverty - "where poor people are found in accessible areas of intensive agriculture and dense
population" (SL - homestead gardening, rights to trees, access to common private property
resources, labour-demanding farming systems to generate work and wages, irrigation for
year-round work) (Chambers 1988)
core reserves: "roadless areas of various sizes managed primarily for their natural values, with no
logging, mining, grazing, or other commodity production. Formerly degraded areas being
restored to natural condition are included in this category ... with recreational uses also strictly
controlled." (Noss 1989:26)
corridors: "wide strips of land connecting core reserves into an interlinked network. Whenever
possible, corridors would contain an inner, roadless core managed the same as core reserves.
Otherwise, corridors would be managed in much the same way as inner buffer zones and
surrounded by outer buffer zones." (Noss 1989:26-27)
crisis- "implies the development of tension between tenure groups such that the stability or
equilibrium of the social system is disturbed." (Tuma 1965:17)
culture (Weber) - legitimating ideologies and myths
culture (Durkheim) - shared values among members of society, the source of social cohesion
(Humphrey and Buttel 1986:16)
customary common property - characterized by group/corporate ownership and management
vested in the respective group or its leaders (Bromley 1991)
customary - control by community or tribe, individuals have only usufructuary rights (Poostchi 1986)
deforestation - "is not simply tree removal per se; the process of deforestation necessitates a greater
rate of tree removal than that of tree regrowth, or reforestation. The simple felling of forest
cover is not a priori deforestation unless there is a long-term and permanent reduction of the
forest ecozone. The definition of deforestation generally implies, however, only a reduction
in size if the forest and not in quality of trees." (Abrams and Rue 1988:380)
development - "implies change leading to improvement or progress. Consequently, what constitutes
'real' development is a normative or Value-laden' issue." (Pearce et al. 1989:29)
development - "is regarded as an historical process which links the exploitation of resources in the
more industrialized countries with those of the South." (Redclift 1987:3)
development - social change where new ideas are introduced into a social system in order to
produce higher standards of living, through higher per capita incomes and higher levels of
living through the use of more modem production techniques and improved social
organizations (Poostchi 1986:273)
disarticulation- low cost labor combined with modem technological industrial base (wages do not
rise with productivity because consumption is externally oriented) (Moberg 1992)
discount rate= rate of capital appreciation (possibility of collecting capital gains by leaving
resource for later (Pearce and Warford 1990)
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distributiveobjective- 1) Do we care if benefits reach all the poor or only a group of the poor? 2)
Do we care if benefits help the non-so-poor as long as they also help the poor? (Hyde 1993:434)

diversity(ecological) - "takes into consideration the relative frequency or abundance of each species
or other entity, in addition to the number of entities in the collection. Several different
indices, initially derived from information theory, combine richness with a measure of
evenness of relative abundances." (Noss 1990:356)
diversitylevels- ecosystem diversity, species diversity, genetic diversity (Noss 1990)
domain - the ultimate ownership or control of over the use of a given area (Wolf 1966:50)
ecologicalorganization - regional landscape, community-ecosvstem, population-species, and genetic
(Noss 1990:355)
ecologicalsustainability- whether the resource in question has been used without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED 1987) (Feeny et. al. 1990)
economic growth - "an increase over time in the level of real GNP per capita (or sometimes, the real
level of consumption per capita)." (Pearce et al. 1989:30)
economic growth - means real GNP per capita is increasing over time. But observation of such a
trend does not mean that growth is 'sustainable.' (Pearce et al. 1989:33)
economic importance - "if it has a significant impact on human welfare" (Pearce and Warford 1990:12)
enabling incentives - "if in place assist sustainable resource management, i.e. land tenure, if
secure enables the persons owning or using the land to respond to price incentives and even
planning objectives. The absence of secure tenure is, then, an example of a property rights
failures or an institutional failure." (Pearceand Warford 1990:235)
ecosystem - "includes abiotic aspects of the environment with which the biotic community is
interdependent" (Noss 1990:360)
eco-tourism - "low-impact, guided, walking or equestrian tours on pre-determined, maintained
trails" (Harpold et al. 1990:9)
efficiency- "All resources will be used to the point where no person can increase his utility from the
consumption of private goods without diminishing the satisfaction secured by another."
(Bates in Russell and Nicholson 1981)
efficiency-concern with economic growth with social forestry as the means (social marginal benefits
exceed social marginal costs): net benefits from social forestry must exceed net benefits from
investment in agriculture, water or other alternative investments; (Hyde 1992:434)
entitlements- "entail a socially recognized structure of institutional arrangements that both constrain
and liberate individuals in their behaviors with respect to other individuals" (Bromley 1991:142)
environmental property - involves sets of rights that govern the use of resources including waste
assimilation into the environment; rights: to conserve, consume, sell, lease, bequeath, and
exclude others (Pearce and Warford 1990)
environmental sociology - is generally defined as the study of the interrelationships between society
and the environment (Schnaiberg, 1972; Dunlap and Catton, 1979a). The environmental
sociologist is interested in specifying the mechanisms by which society and the environment
interrelate, the cultural values and beliefs that cause people to use the environment in
particular ways, an their eventual implications for social consensus and conflict."
(Humphrey & Buttel 1986:4)
environmentally sustainable agriculturalgeneration - "a process through which income is
generated while preserving the long-term productive capacity of soil and water resources"
(Harpold et al. 1990:9)
environmentally sustainable agriculturalproduction - "the use of agricultural techniques that
minimize soil depletion, chemical inputs and build soil structure. This promotes the
1
intensive, long-term agricultural use of land, discouraging its short-term depletion which
necessitates expansion to new land." (Harpold et al. 1990:9)
equitability (agroecosystem) - how evenly the products of an agroecosystem are distributed among
its human beneficiaries (Conway 1985:35)
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erosion control - the use of trees to reduce soil erosion by supplementary’use - "The trees and
shrubs are not the primary means of checking runoff and erosion, but fulfill the functions of
stabilizing conservation structures and making productive use of the land which these
occupy” and directuse - "the trees, shrubs or hedgerows are in themselves a major method
of reducing erosion" (Young 1989:59)
exposure - "the putting of a party in a new legally binding situation" (Bromley 1991:146)
externality - "is said to exist whenever the costs of change exceed the anticipated gains"
(Bromley 1991:42)
externalityhas two aspects. First, there is the fact that a decision unit's utility of production
function contains real variables whose values are chosen by others. Second, the decision unit
responsible for choosing the value of those real variables does not compensate the recipients
by an amount equal to the marginal cost of its actions." (Bromley 1991:63)
externalities- "increased intersectoral and final demand linkage effects, ecological effects, and
social effects" (de Janvrv et al. 1989:13)
extractivereserves - "natural tropical forest areas reserved for the extraction of potentially
renewable commercial forest products (e.g., latex, fruits, nuts fibers, and timber) by
traditional resident populations" (Hyde 1993:174)
extractivereserves- 'forest areas inhabited by extractive populations granted long-term usufruct
rights to forest resources which they collectively manage' - Brazilian Ministry of
Agrarian Reform and Development (Hyde 1993)
faction- "incorporate groups organized around leaders that promote the interests of their members"
(Moberg 1992:12)
fertilesoil- "is well structured, has good moisture-holding capacity', is resistant to erosion and
possesses a store of fertility in the nutrients bound up in organic molecules." (Young 1989:93)
'first'thinking ... "goes with it has a structure, traits, and values generated by and serving the richer
nations, and in all nations the urban industrial and elite cores." (Chambers 1988)
food securityfor the poor; as well as short-term asset stripping for quick profit by those who make,
or are beyond the control of, the laws." (Baker 1984:55)
foresttimber enrichment - "the planting of commercially valuable tropical hardwoods in secondary1
forests" (Hyde 1993:180)
function (ecological) - "involves ecological and evolutionary' processes, including gene flow,
disturbances, and nutrient cycling" (Noss 1990:357)
functional dualism - between commercial sector and minifundistas - subsistence covered by
minifundio which allows depressed w'ages (de Janvrv et al. 1989)
group - a number of people in a geographical location in interaction or communication together who
share common interests and goals (Poostchi 1986)
hierarchytheory - "higher levels of organization incorporate and constrain the behavior or lower
levels" (Noss 1989:357)
household, peasant - "has the potential to become capitalists, owning sufficient resources to
compete with commercial farmers." (de Janvrv et al. 1989:12)
household, subfamily peasant - "is semiproletarianized and relies heavily on wage labor; they act as
a buffer between the urban and rural labor markets and fluctuate between these markets
according to the prevailing economic conditions." (de Janviy et. al. 1989:12)
implicitrightsoftransfer- "this process of modifying the degree of control to be exercised by
‘owners of record' over land" (Bromley 1991:161)
implicittransfer- one in which the legal entitlements that attach to a parcel of land are modified in
some way (Bromley 1991)
implicittransfer- "refers to some form of collective action that alters existing entitlements, such a
collective action being implemented through the offices of the state" (Bromley 1991:162)
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improved treefallow - "is intended to simulate the effects of shifting cultivation but with the tree
fallow consisting of planted species, selected for their soil-enrichment capacity or useful
products." (Young 1989:60)
infrastructure "is important because it suggests the ordered properties of the environment, no
matter what scale one has in mind" (Humphrey and Buttel 1986)
institution- an abstraction referring to an aspect of a culture that satisfies some fundamental
function of society (Poostchi 1986)
intensification - "the gradual change towards patterns of land use which make it possible to crop a
given area of land more frequently than before" (Boserup 1965.43)
interaction - the process of exchanging messages with other persons through personal contact or
other means of communication (Poostchi 1986)
interdependence is the ability, and the presumed right, of Alpha to impose unwanted costs on Beta.
(Bromley 1991)
intergenerational equity - secures welfare of current generation without decreasing welfare of
future generations (Pearce and Warford 1990)
intergenerational equity in the quality of life:
1) the next generation should inherit a stock of wealth, comprising man-made assets and
environmental assets, no less than the stock inherited by the previous generation
2) that the next generation would inherit a stock of environmental assets no less than the
stock inherited by the previous generation (Pearce et al. 1989)
internationallinkageswhich provide the transformation momentum behind environmental change.
These international linkages involve the transfer of capital, labour, and natural
resources." (Redclift 1987:2)
irreversibilities- once they occur, it is suffered by the next generation and all generations to come
(Pearce et al. 1989)
land and income concentration - "deviation from the line of equality, or inequality according to a
Lorenz curve." (Tuma 1965)
land/labor ratio- "the relationship between the arable land and the rural labor dependent on it for a
•' living. Effective land/labor ratio refers to the currently accessible land area, given the
population, while the potential ratio describes the relationship that may arise from a change in
the magnitude of either or both in the future." (Tuma 1965:18)
large-scaleversus small-scaleoperation - is relative and depends on the availability of land,
economic efficiency, and the techniques in use" (Tuma 1965:17)
land ownership - "the right to dispose of land" (Tuma 1965:17)
land reform - "involves intervention in the prevailing system, levels and patterns of agricultural
land ownership, control and usage, in order to change the structure of land holdings, improve
land productivity and widen the distribution spectrum of benefits coming from such reforms."
(Poostchi 1986:114)
land reform - "the large-scale redistribution of property in land for the benefit of small farmers and
agricultural laborers. .. . If land tenure is basically power with respect to land (and water),
then land tenure reform must be the redistribution of this power." (Barraclough 1973:33)
land reform - "an institutional innovation promoted by the ruling order in an attempt to overcome
economic or political contradictions without changing the dominant social relations." (de
Janviyetal. 1989)
landscape - "refers to ’a mosaic of heterogeneous land forms, vegetation types, and land uses’
(Urban etal. 1987)." (Noss 1990:358)
land settlement - "the planned, organized or spontaneous movement of people to areas of
under-utilized agricultural potential" (Poostchi 1986:125)
land tenure - "the legal and traditional relations between persons, groups, and classes that regulate
the rights to the use of land, transfer thereof, and enjoyment of its products, and the duties
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that go with those rights. In brief, land tenure can be considered as a reflection of the power
relations between persons and groups in the use of land." (Barraclough 1973 :xvii)
land tenure system - "a local social system closely interrelated with a particular pattern of land
tenure relationships. Other indicators of distinctive tenure systems include the legal forms of
tenancy, the type of agriculture, and the degree of security and bargaining power enjoyed by
landless workers and small farmers. The essential nature of all these relationships changes as
methods of production become more advanced technologically, and other job alternatives
become available. The degree of modernity and capitalization must also be considered in
classifying tenure systems. It is necessary to distinguish between the ownership unit and the
managerial unit; one land owner often controls several farms or "operating units" from the
farm management point of view." (Barraclough 1973:15)
land tenure systems - include legal, contracted or customary, rights duties, liberties, and exposures
(Poostchi 1986)
legal system - the ways in which institutions (that create social order that allows it to function and to
survive) are promidgated and enforced (Bromley 1991)
livelihood - "adequate stocks and flows of food and cash to meet basic needs. " (Chambers 1988:4)
localparticipation - "empowering people to mobilize their own capacities, be social actors rather
than passive subjects, manage the resources, make decisions, arid control the activities that
affect their lives" (Cemea 1985:10 in West 1994:11)
localsocialsystem - "predictable patterns of interaction by members of a community"
(Barraclough 1973:40)
marginal production ofresources = rate of growth (Pearce and Warford 1990)
markets - are highly articulated institutional arrangements to channel individual initiative and avarice
into putatively benign - but, if lucky, useftri - directions. (Bromley 1991)
metapopulation - populations of a species connected by dispersal (Noss 1990:360)
normal professionalism - "means the thinking, values, methods, and behavior dominant in a
profession or discipline." (Chambers 1988:4)
norms - are the established repetitive behavioral patterns with certain limits for the members of a
given social system (Poostchi 1986)
open accessregime - no property rights are defined for named individuals or communities, risks
extinction of the resource. (Pearce and Warford 1990)
optimal growth - growth that maximizes the present value of future streams of consumption
(the discounted value of future flows of per capita consumption) - unsustainable if future
generations are undervalued (Pearce and Warford 1990)
ownership - "is the right to possess, to use, to manage, to benefit, to be secure, and to alienate"
(Bromley 1991:159)
paradigm "is a set of definable and logically interrelated concepts fro examining phenomena such as
human society or its institutional parts (Humphrey and Buttel 1986:14)
participation'is of little meaning if the people concerned have no power to participate in their own
national economy or are powerless to seek access to the basic resources for a decent
livelihood." (Baker 1984:60)
peripheral poverty - where poor people are found in areas which are remote and marginal
(marginal farming, crops and livestock, water harvesting, soil retention and fertility
enhancement (Chambers 1988)
periphery - "is that portion of economic space which is characterized by backward technology with
little capacity to absorb the mass of the population into the modern sector. These excess
human masses created by the veiy process of economic growth are the 'marginals.'" (de Janviy et
al. 1989)
personality - the sum total of values, attitudes, thoughts, ideas and habits of a person (Poostchi 1986)
perturbation (agroecosystem) - an irregular, infrequent, relatively large and unpredictable
disturbance (Conway 1985:35)
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policy instruments - "methods to alter property rights among individuals and groups to accomplish
certain ends" (Bromley 1991:35)
political economy is the perspective "in which the outcome of economic forces is clearly related to
the behaviour of social classes and the role of the state accumulation." (Redclift 1987:3)
power (Weber) - "domination of the society by a stratum of elites who are able to control the
machinery of the state (Humphrey and Buttel 1986:16)
power (Durkheim) - leadership and representation of social groups in political sphere
(Humphrey and Buttel 1986:16)
power - "when an individual or a group has the legal ability to alter the status quo structure of legal
entitlements" (Bromley 1991:146)
presumptive right - "support no correlated duty but simply reflect the ability of a party to act as if
there were an actual right present." (Bromley 1991:49)
prisoner's dilemma - is a situation in which it is optimal for any prospective participant in a
collective enterprise to opt out (to 'defect') regardless of the strategy followed by other
would-be participants. If all cooperate, all, in the aggregate, will be better off than if all
defect; but every individual is better off defecting." (Russell and Nicholson 1981:9-10)
production spheres - household sphere of production and exchange (addresses management and
organization of resources), domestic labor, prices of inputs and outputs, extent of commodity
production, intersection of market with use-value production (Watts 1987)
productivity - in terms of numbers/biomass of individual species (Pearce et al. 1989:40)
productivity (agro-ecosystem) - the output of valued product per unit or resource input
(Pearce etal. 1989:41)'
productivity (agroecosystem) - the yield or net income per unit f resource (Conway 1985:35)
property’ - is a benefit (or income) stream, and a property’ right is a claim to a benefit stream that
the state will agree to protect through the assignment of duty to others who may covet, or
somehow interfere with, the benefit stream. Rights have no meaning without correlated
duties and the management problem with open access regimes is that there are no duties on
aspiring users to refrain from use. Property’ is not an object but rather something of value
(the benefit stream) against all others. Property is a triadic social relation involving benefit
streams, rights holders, and duty bearers (Hallowell 1943 quoted in Bromley 1991:2)
property - "is a right to a benefit stream that is only as secure as the duty of all others to respect the
conditions that protect that stream." (Bromley 1991:22)
property regimes - "acquire their special character by virtue of collective perceptions regarding
what is scarce (and hence possibly worth protecting with rights), and what is valuable (and
hence certainly worth protecting with rights)." (Bromley 1991:3)
"property rights indicate which costs must be considered by the various decision-making units in
a society." (Bromley 1991:51)
proprietary interests - "rights to limited use of forests" (Bruce and Fortmann 1992:490)
public choice is "used here to indicate a field of analysis and experiment involving the consequences
of assuming that individuals act in a rational and self-interested (or self-serving) way, not only
when the context is market transactions (deciding what crops to grow or w’hat consumer
goods to buy), but also w’hen it is a collective decision (what person to elect as village head
and, indeed, whether to vote at all). In particular, each individual is assumed to be able to
rank the outcomes he or she foresees resulting from his own actions, and further is assumed
to act to obtain the best possible one of the outcomes." (Russell and Nicholson 1981:3)
public domain - all land not held in private ownership (freehold or fee simple) by someone
(Bromley 1991:108)
public good is a good for which consumption is nonexcludable and nonrivalrous. If the good is
consumed by one person, then it can be consumed by another, and the quantity’ available to
others is not diminished by’ that person's consumption of it." (Bates in Russell and Nicholson
1981:85)
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public orcollectivegood - "is a good, the significant benefit of which cannot be denied to those
who do not help bear the costs." (Freeman et al. in Russell and Nicholson 1981:161)

rationalindividual - in the absence of a disciplining organization, will choose to do nothing either
way - even assuming he has information about potential benefits, the know how and
resources to make improvements." (Freeman et al. in Russell and Nicholson 1981:161)
relativedeprivation - deprivation relative to one's own expectations for oneself; the precondition
for major rebellion is that large numbers of people must see their actual situation as
substantially less desirable than the situation that they perceive ought to be theirs.
(Prostermann and Reideinger 1987:7-8)
renewable - "capable of regeneration" and depends on management regime; sustainable
management allows a resource to renew itself (Pearce and Warford 1990)
replacement fund - "The amount needed to replace his minimum equipment for both production
and consumption" (Wolf 1966:6)
resilience- the ability of the system to maintain its structure and patterns of behaviour in the face of
external disturbance (Pearce et al. 1989:40)
resource management regime - a structure of rights and duties characterizing the relationship of
individuals to one another with respect to that particular environmental resource.
Institutional arrangements are continually established (and refined) in order to determine (and
to modify) the scope and nature of the property regime over natural resources."
(Bromley 1991:22)
right - "denotes a set of actions and behaviors that the possessor may not be prevented from
undertaking."
- "a right - by definition - implies a duty on the part of all others to refrain from preventing
those actions and behaviors" (Bromley 1991:3-4)
"Rights are not relationships between me and other with respect to that object. Rights can only exist
when there is a social mechanism that gives duties and binds individuals to those duties."
"A right is the capacity to call upon the collective to stand behind one's claim to a benefit
stream." (Bromley 1991:15)
risk capital - discretionary land, labor, financial capital (Hyde 1992)
roles - the patterns of behavior associated with a distinctive social position CH10 (Poostchi 1986)
"SD means 'environmentally-sound' development, or integration of conservation and development."
(Thrupp 1988:2)
Security refers to secure ownership of, or access to, resources and income-earning activities,
including reserves and assets to offset risk, ease shocks and meet contingencies.
(Chambers 1988)
sedentation - "intensification of land use through establishment of permanent villages" (Amason et. al.
1982:27)
shock (agro-ecosystem) - an irregular, infrequent, relatively large and unpredictable disturbance to
the agricultural system (Pearce et al. 1989:41)
silvopastoril- "El uso de areas forestales para sostener el patoreo y pastos en production animal"
(Van Orsdol 1987:11) (translation - the use of forested areas to support grazing and pastures in
animal production)
socialapproach - "seeing the environmental stress as symptomatic of a social and political crisis
usually based on: unequal control over access to, and use of, the natural environmental
resource base; the 'developmental' conflict between export-abased cash crops, foreign
exchange and basically socially constructed" - "The environment ...is not merely located in
different places; it means different things to those who use it." (Redclifi 1987)
socialchange - the process by which alterations and change occur in the structure, as well as the
function, of a rural social system (invention, diffusion, and adaptation) CH10 (Poostchi 1986)
socialcosts- "are those falling beyond the boundary of the decision-making unit that is responsible
for the costs" (i.e. externality) (Bromley 1991:59)
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social forestry - "any forestry (except large scale commercial plantation and industrial forestry) so
long as it emphasizes the responses of local consumers to forest-produced goods and
services: usually fuelwood, fodder, forage, sometimes water, soil protection, and other tree
and inter-planted non-wood crops.” (Hyde 1992:432)
social or economic system - a complex structure whose social and economic components are
interdependent; disturbing any of these components would reflect on the other components
and on the system as a whole." (Tuma 1965:18)
social relations of each sphere - different economic status, and interaction in course of social
reproduction, how labor is mobilized, how surpluses are extracted in context of
intra-household and extra-household relations (Watts 1987)
social structure "social practices that are reproduced through time" (Giddens 1981 in Watts 1987:188)
social system - a collection or a group of individuals who are oriented to common goals
(Poostchi 1986:273)
stability - the ability of the system to maintain a relatively constant condition (its 'equilibrium') in
terms of its species composition, biomass and productivity, in response to normal fluctuations
and cycles in the surrounding environment (Pearce et al. 1989:40)
stability (agroecosystem) - the degree to which productivity is constant in the face of small
disturbances caused by the normal fluctuations of climate and other environmental variables
(Conway 1985:35)
stakeholders - "the various parties and groups who have any sort of vested interest in the matters
underlying a conflict" (Hough 1988)
state property - "the evolved administrative structure" to manage the benefit stream from land and
its related natural resources” (Bromley 1991:144)
state property - "rights to the resource are vested exclusively in government which in turn makes
decisions concerning access to the resource and the level and nature of exploitation"
(Feeny et al. 1990:7)
state property regime, ownership and control over use rest in the hands of the state. Individuals
and groups may be able to make use of the natural resource, but only at the forbearance of
the state." (Bromley 1991:23)
stress (agro-ecosystem) - a regular, sometimes continuous, relatively small and predictable
disturbance on agricultural productivity over time (Pearce etal. 1989:41)
stress (agroecosystem) - a regular, sometimes continuous, relatively small and predictable
disturbance (Conway 1985:35)
structure (ecological) - "is the physical organization or pattern of a system, from habitat complexity
as measured within communities to the pattern of patches and other elements at a landscape
scale" (Noss 1989:357)
surplus labor - "in agriculture refers to the amount of labor that may be removed from the land
without reducing total production, given the state of technology." (Tuma 1965:19)
sustainable - refers to the maintenance of enhancement of resource productivity on a long-term
basis. (Chambers 1988)
sustainable development - "development activities that favor a long-term perspective; development
activities that are sensitive to and integrated with the environment and natural processes. It
is, essentially, a sustained-yield management approach to development.... It assumes that
development cannot be sustained unless local people, communities, and organizations are
actively involved and committed to the development activity.... It is our argument that if
conservation is to be sustainable, it will need to be pursued from the bottom up as well."
(Brechin and West 1994:77-78)
"Sustainable development describes a process in which the natural resource base is not allowed to
deteriorate." (Pearce and Warford 1990:8)
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sustainable development - "involves maximizing the net benefits of economic development, subject
to maintaining the services and quality of the stock of natural resources over time"
(Pearce etal. 1989:42)
sustainable development - means that per capita utility or well-being is increasing over time
(Pearce et al. 1989:33)
sustainable development - means that a set of'development indicators' is increasing over time
(Pearce et al. 1989:33)
sustainableeconomic growth - means that the real GNP per capita is increasing over time and the
increase is not threatened by 'feedback' from either biophysical impacts (pollution, resource
problems) or from social impacts (social disruption) (Pearce etal. 1989:33)
sustainability- per capita levels of welfare remain constant or improve over time (Pearce et al. 1989)
sustainability(agro-ecosystem) - the ability of an agro-ecosystem to maintain productivity when
subject to stress or shock (Pearce etal. 1989:41)
sustainability(agroecosystem) - the ability of a system to maintain productivity in spite of a major
disturbance (Conway 1985:35)
sylvopastoralpractices - "include scattered trees on pastures (e.g. systems with Acacia albida or
other Acacia species), combinations of plantation crops with pastures (e.g. cattle under
coconuts, sheep under rubber), live fences, fodder banks, windbreaks and shelteibelts, and
hedgerow intercropping of pastures." (Young 1989:74)
system - "an assemblage of elements contained within a boundary such that the elements within the
boundary have strong functional relationships with each other, but limited, weak or
non-existent relationships with elements in other assemblages; the combined outcome of the
strong functional relationships within the boundary is to produce a distinctive behaviour of
the assemblage such that it tends to respond to stimuli as a while, even if the stimulus is only
applied to one part." (Conway 1985:34)
technocratic approach - physical problem with energy imbalance amenable to technological
solution (Baker 1984:53)

technological paradigm characteristics:
"1 it is a-historical
2 it elevates 'symptoms' to the status of cause
3 it places environment over people in a cynical way
4 it increases the polarization of power relationships
5 it maintains a facade of concern, neutrality, and objectivity
6 it reinforces the status quo and the prevailing model of development
7 it uses the international scientific community and some of the major multi-lateral
organisations to lend legitimacy’ to the existing political order by their
very'non-interference'." (Baker 1984:53)
terms oftrade - "calculated as the prices a country receives for its exports relative to the price
it pays for imports" (Moberg 1992:31)
'Tradition'is being used here as an independent variable indicative of mindless acceptance of old
practices wrapped up in ritual. These 'traditions' were often perfectly rational adjustments
to the natural environment and were followed because they had proved their worth in the
past, i.e. they were a dependent variable." (Baker 1984:55) (on common belief about tradition)
traditionalagriculture- "is a state of economic equilibrium reached by agriculture over a long
period of time and characterized by constant traditional technology and unchanging farmer
preferences and motives" (Schultz 1964 in de Janvry et al. 1989:82)
transactioncosts: 1) information costs; 2) bargaining costs (contracting costs); 3) enforcement
costs (Bromley 1991)
transhumance - rainfed agriculture and animals herds in distance until harvest when returned to
village (Watts 1987:177)
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tree tenure - "consists of a bundle of rights which may beheld by different people at different times.
Four major categories of rights make up the bundle which comprises tree tenure: the right to
own or inherit, the right to plant, the right to use, and the right of disposal."
(Fortmann 1985:231)
underdevelopment - high rate of economic growth coupled to deepening impoverishment of rural
majority (Moberg 1992:5)
underemployment - "in agriculture refers to the situation in which the accessible arable land is
inadequate to keep the rural population dependent on it for a living fully occupied given the
techniques and the institutional arrangements regarding the number of hours and length of the
work season. Underemployment may be disguised or revealed The rural workers are
disguisedly unemployed when the are apparently occupied full time but in fact less intensively
than what is regarded as optimal, such that some of them may be removed from the land
without reducing total production, or they may be able to operate a larger farm with the same
techniques during the same work time. Underemployment would be revealed if the rural
workers are partially unemployed that is, they are working less than the number of hours or
weeks customarily regarded as full employment." (Tuma 1965:18)
usufructuary rights - rights to use but not own land (no need to sell when in great supply)
(Pearce etal. 1989)
utility - "satisfaction or well-being" (Pearce et al. 1989)
well-being - "of a defined population should be at least constant over time and preferably,
increasing for there to be sustainable development." (Pearce et al. 1989:32)
withholding power - the ability not to have to sell produce immediately (Wolf 1966)
References not found under 'Cited References':
Cox, Susan Jane Buck. 1985. "No Tragedy on the Commons." Environmental Ethics. Vol. 7, Spring,
pp. 49-61.
Humphrey, Craig R. and Frederick H. Buttel 1986. 1986. Environment. Energy, and Society. Krieger
Publishing Company, Malabar, Florida.
Hyde, William F. 1992. "Social Forestry: A Working Definition and 21 Testable Hypothesis" in
Emerging Issues in Forest Policy': Nemetz, Peter N. (ed.). UBC Press, Vancouver.
Redclift 1987, Michael. 1987. Sustainable Development: Exploring the Contradictions. Methuen, New
York.

